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In attempting to understand what definiteness is and how it is encoded cross-linguistically, Lyons first distinguishes between two types of noun phrases, simple (in)definites and complex (in)definites. Lyons considers simple (in)definites to be noun phrases which are marked as definite or indefinite by special morphemes, whether bound or free. Complex indefinites, on the other hand, are elements which, when they occur with nouns, encode some other semantic features, in addition to (in)definiteness. In English, the noun phrases introduced by ‘the’ and ‘a’ fall in the first group whereas those introduced by demonstratives, possessives, and quantifiers (among others) fall in the second group. According to Lyons, demonstratives, for example, are complex definites because they encode definiteness and deixis. For the purpose of the present study, demonstratives, possessives, universal quantifier and cardinality terms are discussed in relation to Lyons’ principles of definiteness discussed in the preceding sections.

3.10.3.1 Demonstratives

Lyons (1999) maintains that demonstratives, which are deictic expressions, are definite through identifiability rather than inclusiveness. He rules out inclusiveness as definitizing demonstratives because when a demonstrative is employed, it is possible to have more than one object in a context corresponding to the description containing the demonstrative, in which case inclusiveness becomes irrelevant. Being deictic, demonstratives are (usually) accompanied by a pointing gesture and it is this gesture which makes it easier for the hearer to identify the referent intended by the speaker. For example, if there are several pens in the context where the speaker and hearer find themselves in, the use of the demonstrative ‘this’ in the following example would distinguish the pen the speaker had bought from the Game store and other possible pens in the vicinity.

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In standard accounts of demonstratives (cf. Anderson & Keenan, 1985; Sommerstein, 1972; Diessel, 1999), demonstratives are assumed to denote two semantic features, namely [+Prox] and [+Def], with the former suggesting that they are deictic and the latter suggesting that they are (inherently) definite. Deixis has been voted as the only feature that distinguishes articles from demonstratives i.e. demonstratives are distance-oriented whereas articles are distance-neutral (cf. Diessel, 1999). Thus, the features [+Def] and [+Prox] make demonstratives to be complex definites.

While acknowledging that definiteness is an inherent feature of demonstratives, Lyons casts doubt on whether demonstratives are always deictic. However, this is not a new claim. Himmelmann (1996) also points out German employs one demonstrative (dies) for both proximal and distal entities. Thus, it is distance-neutral in this regard. Thus, Lyons proposes a new abstract semantic feature that would add to the first two well-established features of demonstratives i.e. [+Prox] and [+Def] and that would distinguish demonstratives from definites. The new feature is [+Dem]. According to Lyons, demonstratives are [+Dem] because they are directly referential expressions locating entities in the (non)-linguistic or immediate situations. It is this feature which makes it impossible for demonstratives to occur in contexts where the activation of encyclopaedic knowledge is required such as in associative uses of the definite article (for example, I saw a car. The driver / *this driver was someone I know).

3.10.3.2 Possessives

Possessives in English, for example, include words like his, their, him, them and the ‘s’ genitive Lyons points out that such words show various relations between two entities, namely a possessor and a possessum. The relationship can be one of ownership or belongingness. Some scholars (cf. Alexiadou, 2004a; Asiimwe, 2014) contend that possessives are neutral with respect to (in)definiteness. On this view, a possessive phrase is definite if the noun which contains it is definite (e.g. the car) and indefinite if the noun which contains it is indefinite (e.g. a car). Thus, the possessive phrase ‘the man’s car is definite whereas a man’s car is indefinite. While accepting the view that possessives may impose definite or non-reading on noun phrases, Lyons rejects the view that indefiniteness or definiteness of such noun phrases is induced by, respectively, a definite or an indefinite noun containing the possessive. Rather, he states that such (in)definiteness is rendered by the position a possessive taken relative to a matrix noun phrase (possessum).

(52) a. Lucia’s student has died b. She was Lucia’s student

Lyons argues that noun phrases occurring in subject position as in (52a) favour a definite reading whereas those in predicative position, as in (52b) favour an indefinite reading. This is because the

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subject position seems to be associated with topic entities and predicative one seems to be associated with non-topic entities (cf. Krifka, 2003, Henderson, 2007). Thus, in (52a) but not in (52b) the uniqueness of the referent is evoked.

3.10.3.3 Universal quantifiers

In logical semantics, two terms related to (in)definiteness and quantification are distinguished, namely existential quantification (Ǝ) and universal quantification (Ɐ) (cf. Russell, 1905; Neale 1990). The former is said to be a property of indefinites whereas the latter is assumed to be a property of definites. Lyons points out that universal quantifiers such as all, each, every and both are definite due to inclusiveness, the term which is credited to Hawkins (1978). It was pointed out in section 3.9.1.4. above that with inclusiveness, reference is made to the totality of members or mass satisfying the description in a context. Such proportional determiners are said to be universal quantifiers for this very sense. The inclusive use of ‘the’ with plural and mass nouns corresponds in meaning to the use of the universal quantifier ‘all’. Lyons points out that universal quantifiers can be context-dependent or absolute.

3.10.3.4 Cardinality terms

Lyons defines cardinality terms as those which encode number or amount as opposed to proportion. They include cardinal numerals (one, two, three, etc) and determiners like many, some, several, any, something, anything, and enough, Lyons points out that cardinality terms are neutral with respect to (in)definiteness. However, he points out that some cardinality terms show a stronger preference for indefiniteness than definiteness.