Because a good many philosophers, particularly within the English-speaking analytic tradition, have become dissatisfied with the argument from analogy, a whole host of alternative solutions have arisen in the current debate. We will examine the most significant alternatives.
Behaviorism
If one rejects the argument from analogy, the most obvious recourse is to advance some form of behaviorism.
Exposition. Behaviorism, as applied to the question of other minds, is the view that all mental attitudes or psychological expressions are fully reducible to behavior or physical states. Some philosophers would say that these expressions are completely understood in the light of behavior. If this is so, then the argument from analogy is unnecessary, since the behavior is the meaning of the expression, not merely a ground for inference in an
analogical argument.
One of the advantages claimed for this position is that it is in principle open to public check. For instance, when we say that we are in love, we are asserting something about behavior in specific circumstances. We are talking about showing kindness, getting
married, and having children. Anyone who says he loves a member of the opposite sex, and yet is consistently cruel or indifferent, does not want to marry, and refuses to have children is on shaky ground in claiming to be in love.
Criticisms. An extensive criticism of behaviorism is not our goal here, since it is far more than just a theory about other minds. However, any criticism of behaviorism in general weakens its use as a solution to the problem of other minds (see also the criticism of materialism in chap. 12).
There is, however, an objection to behaviorism that does relate directly to the problem at hand. It has been argued that a behavioristic account of certain first-person
psychological statements is invalid. When we are in intense pain, we do not claim to be in pain on the basis of certain behavior which we observe in ourselves, but because of the circumstances causing that behavior.
This objection has gained considerable importance with a group of philosophers who consider it a decisive reason for rejecting both behaviorism and the argument from
analogy. The reason is that both arguments claim a contingent (non-necessary) relationship between mental states and behavior. This objection shows that this is not so. The
connection between mental attitudes and behavior is logical, or conceptual. There is no need to observe and correlate mental states with behavior because it is not a contingent matter. The relationship is necessary.
Wittgenstein
A number of philosophers have found that the views of Ludwig Wittgenstein, the father of logical behaviorism, support this last objection. The distinguishing feature between behaviorism and logical behaviorism is that behaviorism sees the relationship between mental states and behavior as contingent while logical behaviorism considers it conceptual or logical.
Exposition. Wittgenstein asked, “How do words refer to sensations?” His answer is that there is only one possibility; “Words are connected with the primitive, the natural
expression of sensation and used in their place.” That is, words are conceptually related to and used as symbols for perceptions. Although Wittgenstein does not elaborate, certain followers of Wittgenstein (Norman Malcolm, for instance) claim that this is Wittgenstein’s answer to the question of reference between mental states (sensations) and behavior (expressions).
Further, these philosophers argue that this understanding of sensation expressions has a number of advantages. First, we can explain why our first-person sensation statements have importance for us. Such sensation statements as “ouch” have the significance of natural expressions of sensation and emotion. Second, Wittgenstein’s understanding of expressions of sensation is said to explain the logical features of psychological statements.
This is why it would be absurd to conclude that one is in pain only by observing one’s own behavior. It also explains the impossibility of error about being in pain. If a person burns himself on a hot stove, he does not wonder whether or not he is in pain.
Criticisms. In spite of the advantages of Wittgenstein’s analysis of expressions of pain, there is a problem. Yet a cry of pain seems to contradict the statement, “He is not in pain.”
Since most logicians hold that only statements can be contradictories, there is a problem with the denial that a cry of pain is a statement.
Wittgenstein, however, held that pain statements (“I have a headache,” for example) are never exactly like cries of pain. Sometimes the utterance is more like a natural expression and other times less, dependent on the context. Wittgenstein, then, provided three criteria for present-tense utterances of sensations and emotions: (1) These
expressions cannot be mistakenly spoken; (2) they can be pretended or feigned; and (3) they can be made without self-observation.
These further considerations give rise to a host of problems. First, how can they all be true at once? How can it be possible that they cannot be uttered mistakenly but they can be pretended? The most hopeful approach is to claim that sensation expressions, like natural expressions, can be feigned. One can make an insincere groan. Such a groan is like a lie, and a lie is a statement. The next problem is with the incorrigibility of the expression. At best it appears that some revision is necessary in the incorrigibility claim. One must say that present-tense, first-person pain statements are corrigible (correctable), but not in all the ways other statements are. They are simply corrigible in the sense that they can be pretended or feigned.
In addition to the objections to Wittgenstein’s analysis of psychological statements there is a criticism which Wittgenstein himself foresaw. It was that one might reach the
conclusion that the sensation itself was nothing. But Wittgenstein denied that this was the impression he wished to give. Rather, he argued that he wanted to turn his face from the picture of the inner process. He was anxious to get away from the mysterious and
concentrate on the public. Despite Wittgenstein’s protestations, however, he was not totally successful in dispelling the suspicion that the sensation is nothing. It was difficult to turn his face from the inner process without leaving the distinct impression that the sensation did not exist.
P. F. Strawson
Strawson’s position arose out of the problems with Wittgenstein’s argument for the existence of other minds.
Exposition. On many points Strawson is in agreement with Wittgenstein. He agrees that skepticism about the existence of other minds is senseless and pointless. He also accepts the view that the relationship between mental states and behavior is not contingent but logical or conceptual.
At the same time, Strawson rejects some of Wittgenstein’s central contentions.
Strawson holds that the association of first-person, present-tense statements with natural expressions is both confusing and unnecessary. Moreover, he differs with Wittgenstein on the possibility of a private language, for he sees no problems with the invention of a private language. We might invent a personal language in which we have names for sensations, even if those sensations do not have external or public expression.
From what has been said so far it might be concluded that Strawson holds that the relationship between sensations and behavior is contingent, but he does not. How does Strawson avoid this conclusion? He argues that general agreement is necessary before there can be a common language. The fact that we agree about the appearance of blue,
green, red, and so on makes it possible for us to have a common impersonal color language.
This is not true for language about pain, however, since we cannot talk about the
appearance or shape of pain. This precludes the possibility of a common impersonal pain language. There is, however, something that we are in agreement on—pain behavior—and on this basis we may have a common personal or private language. Strawson’s idea is that there is a logical adequacy for ascribing psychological statements to other persons.
Nevertheless, it is important to emphasize that before one can have a concept of pain, he must be willing to ascribe it to others, for by definition pain is something that belongs to someone. It is for this reason, it should be remembered, that Strawson considers the argument from analogy inadequate. We need other minds before we can have a concept of pain.
Criticisms. At some points Strawson’s views are identical with the defenders of the
argument from analogy, and at other points he agrees with Wittgenstein. Where this is so, his views are open to the same kinds of criticisms.
A. J. Ayer, however, has brought some criticisms which apply particularly to
Strawson’s views. Ayer’s first objection is that Strawson ’s notion of logical adequacy for ascribing psychological predicates to persons is obscure and unjustifiable. Ayer is surely right that we could wish for more clarity in Strawson’s notion of logical adequacy, but he does not make it clear why he thinks that it cannot be salvaged.
Ayer’s second major criticism is Strawson’s reason for holding that the argument from analogy and the resultant philosophical skepticism about other minds cannot be stated coherently. Ayer thinks that Strawson’s objection to the argument from analogy is that it is circular. It attempts to justify belief that there are other persons by relying on the premise that one knows oneself to be a person. Such an argument assumes exactly what is to be proved.
Most philosophers have concluded that Ayer has simply misunderstood Strawson.
Strawson in fact argues that the trouble with the argument from analogy is that it uses the concept of a person and at the same time rejects the rule that a necessary part of the
concept of a person is the idea of mental attitudes based on behavior.
John Wisdom
Although John Wisdom’s views on the problem of other minds in no way constitute a theory about other minds, his ideas have been exceedingly important. He was greatly influenced by the thought of Wittgenstein, and like Wittgenstein believed that a philosophical problem bore resemblances to an illness. According to Wisdom, a philosophical problem is an indication of a deep-seated intellectual disorder related to our insistence on thinking in terms of language of misleading models. The philosophical difficulty is “cured” when we no longer think in terms of such inappropriate models. In this sense, philosophical problems are not solved, but rather are dissolved.
The cure for philosophical illness is insight. Unfortunately, inappropriate models are followed in large part unconsciously. By bringing the offending model to consciousness and showing the way our thought has incorrectly depended upon it, insight and freedom to think correctly are gained.
Wisdom also applies this method to demonstrate the nature of our knowledge about other minds. The first step is to induce philosophical perplexity by focusing on the
problems raised by the most attractive answer to us. The task of the philosopher, then, is not to present us with an alternative model that is correct or true, but to point out the multitudes of statements that express our knowledge about other minds. In doing this the philosopher shows each such statement has its own logic, and that logic is similar to the logic of any other statement. Wisdom claims that by comparing these similarities and differences as well as the variety of ways in which we might or do know about other minds, we come to have a true grasp of the nature of our knowledge about other minds.
The problem with Wisdom’s views is that they point up helpful ways in which to clarify the problem, but few solutions are offered. Unless one subscribes entirely to the thesis that the problem is dissolved when properly understood, then Wisdom is of limited help.
Conclusion
In this chapter we have examined the most common argument for the existence of other minds, the argument from analogy. While the argument from analogy has been widely criticized in contemporary thought, it seems to be as defensible as any of the alternatives. Clearly, it is not without its detractors, but none of the objections offered against it seem to be decisive.
Suggested Readings
Husseri, Edmund. Cartesian Meditations, meditation 5 Plantinga, Alvin. God and Other Minds
Strawson, P. F. The Concept of Persons
Wittgenstein, Ludwig. Philosophical Investigations
16
What Is Truth?
As we come to the close of this section on reality or metaphysics, we want to examine the question of truth. What is truth? If philosophy is ultimately tied up with truth, it is important that we try to define truth, and explain how it can be determined.
In this chapter we shall discuss the four major theories of truth: the coherence theory, the pragmatic theory, the performative theory, and the correspondence theory. Though the coherence and correspondence theories appear first in the history of thought, we will discuss the correspondence theory last and defend it as the correct account of truth.