The window of opportunity-theory states that rebel groups should attack other groups of the same identity, during specific periods characterized by especially low or high costs in a civil war. The costs of an attack are decided based upon the strength of the rebel group as well as their recent activities during the war (Pischedda, 2018:139-140).
The question is whether the conflict between Ahrar Al-Sham an IS in 2013 and 2014 can be characterized as a window of opportunity or a window of vulnerability. The window of opportunity is presented when a stronger group sees the chance to attack a weaker rival with low costs. A window of vulnerability is presented when a weaker group fears that it will lose its power within the nearby future and chooses to attack a rival when the costs are high (Pischedda, 2018:140). But in order to assess this, it must first be determined who initiated the
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fighting. This is unclear, as IS did kill the leader of Ahrar Al-Sham in December but Ahrar Al- Sham was the group who initiated the larger fighting in January. As Pischedda writes that the theory is interested in “large-scale combat” (2018:149), this conflict is deemed to be initiated by Ahrar Al-Sham.
Between Ahrar Al-Sham and IS, Ahrar Al-Sham was assessed as the stronger rebel group due to a combination of the estimates of the number of its fighters, its alliances to other rebel groups as well as statements made by other researchers (Lister & Zelin, 2013). During this time IS, was undergoing a split with Al Qaeda, which is assessed as further weakening IS at the time. While Ahrar Al-Sham is suggested to be the stronger group, according to the measures it was not in any means greatly superior to IS. Rather, the estimates of this thesis seem to suggest that Ahrar Al-Sham was stronger but only slightly. The costs of an attack were deemed to be high, both in regard to territorial gains as well as in regard to the conflict with the government. This suggest that it may have been a combined window of opportunity and vulnerability that spur Ahrar Al-Sham to attack IS. This combined window appears when a stronger group fears that it will lose its position and will thus accept higher costs of attack.
With the gift of hindsight, we know that IS grew substantially during the months after the conflict with Ahrar Al-Sham. While Ahrar Al-Sham was the stronger group in January 2014, it is very much possible that they were aware of the growing strength of their rival. As established in the results section, IS grew rapidly from 2013 to 2014. This could suggest that Ahrar Al- Sham knew, or at least suspected, that their position as the stronger group was fading and that they needed to do something about it. All of this supports that the attack by Ahrar Al-Sham on IS in January 2014 can be described as a combined window of opportunity and vulnerability.
A difficulty regarding the assessment of the conflict between Ahrar Al-Sham and Al Nusra in 2017 is that it is not clear who initiated the fighting. The reports refer to clashes in the Idlib province, not to singular attacks. Since this is unclear, a short overview of the possible windows for both groups will be discussed. Ahrar Al-Sham was deemed as the stronger group and would have high costs of attack which would suggest a combined window of opportunity and vulnerability, similar to the case in 2014. Al Nusra was deemed as the weaker group and had high costs, suggesting a window of vulnerability over a fear of losing military power. Both windows make sense, as both groups had at this time suffered splits with sub-factions who joined the other group. Therefore, the fear of losing military power was very much a possibility.
However, the question then arises why Ahrar Al-Sham and Al Nusra did not fight in 2014, during the conflict with IS. According to the theory, a window was presented where Ahrar Al- Sham saw an opportunity to attack IS. Though it is beyond the scope of this thesis to include
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Al Nusra in the 2014 case, it may be reasonable to assume that the group was militarily weaker than Ahrar Al-Sham at the time. Yet, despite this, Ahrar Al-Sham only attacked IS at the time. This could suggest that the parameters set up by Pischedda (2018) are not enough to explain inter-rebel fighting. For example, during that time period, IS was expanding quite aggressively against other rebel groups and they were also responsible for the death of the current leader of Ahrar Al-Sham in December 2013. This would suggest that they were viewed as a threat to Ahrar Al-Sham whereas Al Nusra was not seen as a threat at the time. The cause of the attack does not even have to do with threat or material strength. It could also simply have been viewed as revenge for the killing of their leader.
To conclude, the theory on windows of opportunity and vulnerability can provide answers for why Ahrar Al-Sham and IS fought in 2014 and why Ahrar Al-Sham and the Al Nusra Front fought in 2017. In the first case, it was deemed that Ahrar Al-Sham was the attacker and that they were motivated by a fear of losing their superior position compared to IS. The attacker was not as clear in the second case, but the assessment is that both Ahrar Al-Sham and Al Nusra were also motivated by a potential fear of losing military power.