PÉRDIDA DE CIRCULACIÓN

As noted above, one of Wittgenstein’s aims in this section of the Tractatus is to establish ‘how much truth there is in solipsism’ (TIP 5.62), in other words which aspects of this doctrine are correct, and which are incorrect.

Solipsism is correct in that yields two key insights: the first is that everything possible can possibly be experienced by me; the second is an insight into the first-personal, metaphysical, or philosophical notion of the subject. According to Wittgenstein, solipsism is right in positing such a subject because, without it, genuine self-ascriptions of experience would be impossible. The world can be said to be ‘my world’ (i.e. the world as it is given to me in experience) and language to be ‘the language that T alone understand’ only if such a subject is posited. Solipsism goes part of the way to capturing this first-personal, metaphysical notion of the subject, since it draws our attention to the fact (in a non-Tractarian sense) that it is impossible to experience other people’s selves understood in the first-personal sense as subjects (premise [D]). However, solipsism stops short of yielding a wholly accurate insight into the subject because it loses its way when it claims that the only subject that I do experience is my own (premise [E]). Wittgenstein shows us that, in fact, it is just as impossible to experience myself as a subject as it is to experience other selves as subjects. (As we will see below, this doesn’t mean, however, that I can have no awareness whatsoever of myself as a subject, according to Wittgenstein.)

Relying on premise (E) is indeed one of the three crucial mistakes of the solipsist. In addition, the solipsist makes the mistakes of trying to infer from a tautological, senseless statement (i.e. ‘it is impossible to experience that which cannot be experienced’) a view as to what can and cannot be included in the world as the totality of facts (i.e. in reality) and a view as to what can and cannot be included in the world understood as the totality of possibilities. Wittgenstein therefore uses his discussion of solipsism, in part, in order to show us the limits of how sense-less statements should be used in philosohical works.

By ‘following out strictly’ the implications of solipsism {TLP 5.64) Wittgenstein has succeeded, amongst other things, in mapping the contours of the self. He does this by exploring the peripheries of language. He begins with senseful propositions, such as ‘[The composite, empirical mind] A

believes p ' {TIP 5-54 - 5.5422). He then shows us how not to use senseless statements (in this case, the tautology ‘it is impossible to experience that which cannot be experienced’) in philosophical works {TIP 5.61 and TLP 5.634). He examines statements which are nonsensical in sense 1, such as ‘the world is my world’ (TIP 5.62). Finally, he exposes statements which can be shown to be nonsensical in the second sense, such as I can experience myself as a subject of experience’ (cf. TLP 5.633 - 5 634) and ‘The empirical self is simple’ {TIP 5.54 - 5.5422). This is one of the ways in which the limits of language and thought can be mapped out, according to Wittgenstein. As Williams puts it:

The limits o f language and thought reveal themselves in the f a c t / t o certain things are nonsensical.' [My italics.]

It is by using this method and by focusing on a statement which is nonsensical in sense 1 (i.e. ‘the world is my world’) that Wittgenstein succeeds in clarifying or providing an elucidation of the first-personal notion of the subject. Providing such elucidations is indeed, according to the

Tractatus, the legitimate task of philosophy:

Philosophy aims at the logical clarification o f thoughts. Philosophy is not a body of doctrine but an activity. A philosophical work consists essentially o f elucidations.

Philosophy d oes not result in ‘philosophical propositions’ [i.e. in senseful propositions about philosophical subjects], but rather in the clarification o f propositions.

Without philosophy thoughts are, as it were, cloudy and indistinct; its task is to make them clear and to give them sharp boundaries. (TIP 4.112)

It [philosophy] must set limits to what can be thought; and, in doing so, to what cannot be thought.

It must set limits to what cannot be thought by working outwards through what

can be thought. {TLP 4.114)

It [philosophy] will signify what cannot be said, by presenting clearly what can be said. (7ÏP 4.115)

And, as noted above, Wittgenstein regards the whole of the Tractatus as consisting of philosophical elucidations which are, in this way, nonsensical in sense 1 (TLP 6.54).

It isn’t therefore surprising that Wittgenstein concludes his discussion of solipsism by saying that:

Thus there really is a sense in which philosophy can talk about the self in a non- psychological way.

What brings the self into philosophy is the fact that ‘the world is my world’. The philosophical self is not the human being, not the human body,

or the human soul, with which psychology deals, but rather the metaphysical subject, the limit o f the world - not part o f it. (TLP 5.641)

The philosophical I is not the human being, not the human body, or the human soul with the psychological properties, but the metaphysical subject, the boundary (not a part) o f the world. The human body, however, my body in particular, is a part o f the world among others, among beasts, plants, stones, etc., etc.

Whoever realises this will not want to procure a pre-eminent place for his own body or for the human body.

He will regard the world quite naïvely as objects which are similar and which belong together. (NB 2.9.16)

For the metaphysical self, the first personal subject, is of great interest to philosophy. And although it cannot be spoken about by means of senseful propositions, it can be spoken about by means o f ‘elucidations’ which are nonsensical in sense 1.

The metaphysical subject isn’t introduced, as Hacker argues, because, without it, thought and language would be impossible. The metaphysical subject is not the precondition of experience or language, but the precondition of experience and language being m ine. Without it, no genuine self-ascription of experience would be possible. Hence, although, without the subject, we would be able to represent the world and to individuate particular persons, I wouldn’t be able to individuate myself as a person in the world, or to genuinely ascribe experiences to myself. I would have no sense of the fact that this is the world 1 experience, or that this is my report of the world.

What brings the self into philosophy is the fact that ‘the world is my world’. (TIP

5.641)

The I makes its appearance in philosophy through the world being my world (NB

12.8.16)

/ have to judge the world, to measure things. (NB 2.9.16) [Note Wittgenstein’s italics.]

It isn’t therefore surprising that Wittgenstein refers to the philosophical, first personal self as being a metaphysical subject. For none of the things we say about objects, facts, and possible states of the world apply to it. Hence, this self is not a person (‘the human being’), or a body, or a composite mind (‘the human soul with which psychology deals’).