Público objetivo

Part One of this dissertation analysed the social configuration of Santa Marta and Riohacha provinces in the colonial period. It emphasised the highly complex nature of social and racial identities and it focused on their relation with the spatial order o f the provinces. Although interaction did occur on many levels between groups such as the local nobility, the royal officials, other elites, free commoners, slaves, tributary Indians and unconquered communities, we have seen that in the late colonial period, society was nonetheless hierarchically divided by social, racial and ethnic markers. The next question which this thesis addresses is the ways in which this particular social configuration affected the responses of different social groups and individuals to the political crisis unleashed by Napoleon's invasion of the Iberian peninsula in 1807, and how the subsequent War of Independence and the formation of the republic modified the social make­ up of these societies. This is the topic that is explored in this second part.

The provinces of Santa Marta and Riohacha are of particular interest during the Wars of Independence, because they were important theatres of war from 1811 to 1823. Some o f the major batdes which determined the outcome of the war took place there. Santa Marta and Riohacha gained a reputation as the most ardent defenders of the King against the patriots of the interior and the province of Cartagena. The traditional explanation for samarian royalism and resistance against republicanism has focused on the actions of a few peninsular Spaniards. Following the classic work by José Manuel Restrepo, traditional historiography tended to view the royalist resistance as a trick played by peninsular governors and merchants on a backward and politically ignorant

population.117 This view is misleading for several reasons. It exaggerates the influence and power exercised by a few peninsular royal officials, neglects how entrenched these peninsulars were in the local elite networks, and ignores the political outlook and interest of the larger part of the population who played an important role during the wars of independence in Santa Marta and Riohacha. Perhaps most importantly, it overlooks processes by which republican and royalist factions were created, and the part played by local political issues which did not correspond directly to either peninsular interests and policies or those of the rebel cities of Santa Fe or Cartagena.

In this chapter, we will explore the development of the political crisis and the ensuing war, and how these were experienced by different groups of people in Santa Marta and Riohacha. The picture which starts to emerge is more complex than the traditional view and less adaptable to a simple dichotomy between royalism and republicanism. It stresses the difficult position of nobles and commoners alike in choosing sides in the war, their reluctance in supporting wholeheartedly either peninsular royalists or rebels from Santa Fe and Cartagena, and their search for alternative, intermediary and negotiated positions. It also sees the political crisis as a catalyst for a series of conflicts which were rooted in particular tensions within the local society. This does not mean that the Independence period is treated as if it were a local rebellion. Although strictly local concerns emerged, the different groups of people in Santa Marta and Riohacha were well aware of political developments in other parts of the viceroyalty and the Spanish empire, and responded to them according their 337

337 For a recent critique of this view, see Jorge Conde Calderón, Poder local y sentimiento realista en la independencia de Santa Marta' in Historia Caribe 2:4 (1999), pp. 77 - 86

perceptions of their own position within both the existing system of government and its possible alternatives.

Crisis of the Spanish monarchy

When Napoleon invaded the Iberian peninsula in 1807, and forced in turn both Charles IV and his son Ferdinand VII to leave the throne, it was not immediately apparent that this political crisis would tear the enormous Spanish empire apart. When the news of the invasion reached Spanish America in 1808, most cities and provinces proclaimed their loyalty to the Spanish monarchy, and war on the French usurper. So also in Santa Marta. In a letter addressed to the King dated 25 August 1808, the governor of Santa Marta, Victor de Salcedo, stated that they had received the news of the French invasion from Cartagena.118 Within seven days of receiving the news, the governor explained, Santa Marta had declared war on France, and the peace treaty with Great Britain was made public. 'Santa Marta de Indias and her province has filled the desires of Your Highness giving their most public expressions of their love and loyalty to the Sovereign.. .War has been declared against the perverse emperor of the French, Napoleon I, and against that whole nation, while [we find ourselves] under their tyrannical yoke...With reason one can say that Santa Marta is one of the King's most loving and loyal provinces...'119 The public celebration of the Ferdinand's ascendancy to the throne confirmed the loyalty of the samarios:

118 AHN, Estado 58-A, nr. 26

119 Ibid, 'Se ha publicado la guerra, contra el pérfido emperador de los Franceses Napoleón lo y contra toda la nación, mientras este baxo de su tirano yugo. Se han hecho saber los Armisticios celebrados con la Inglaterra, y en leal corazón de estos moradores ha llegado a equilibrarse el amor, para con Nro Rey Femando 7o y el encono acia al ambicioso Enemigo, que andava disfrazado con la capa de nra fiel y perpetua alianza. Puede decirse con razón , que Santa Marta, es una de las Provincias mas amantes y leales a su Rey.'

'The procession took place on the evening of the twenty-first of the present month, having been announced previously.. The demonstrations o f jubilee and happiness could be seen in all comers... All the principal men of the city participated in accompanying the Real Pendón with horses magnificently adorned and those who did not have horses went on foot, with the same decorum. Coins were showered in the three major squares of the city...The streets were cleaned with delicacy, the windows and the balconies were adorned magnificendy. The people fla pleve^ did not undermine the feelings of the nobility, and everywhere resonated acclamations for our honourable sovereign and catholic King, the Lord Don Ferdinand VII. There could not have been a day of more complete satisfaction for a provincial government, than that which Santa Marta presented in the

‘ I 340

said evening.

The governor's letter and his description of the celebrations are interesting for various reasons. First o f all, it shows that the people of Santa Marta was well informed about political developments in the Iberian peninsula. The abdication of Ferdinand VII in favour o f José Bonaparte had occurred in late May of 1808 and in less than two months, the city of Santa Marta knew what had happened. Nor

34,1 Ibid. ' ... se hizo el acto procesional de dho Real Pendón en la tarde del 21 del presente, haviendose anunciado antes, por Bando para la reunion de todo el Pueblo. Las demonstraciones de jubilo y alegría se veian nacer de todos los puntos de Vista sin ser posible detener la atención, en ninguno de ellos , por que casi en el momento de fíxarla , la robaron los otros, pareciendo acaso objetos mas interecantes. Todo lo principal de la ciudad concurrió al acompañamiento del Real Pendón, con caballos magníficamente adornados, y los que no lo tenían a pie, con no menos desencia. Se regaron monedas en las tres Plazas prinipales de la ciudad , unas del cuño común, y otras , del que descifrava la lealtad de Santa Marta, como lo manifiestan las que acompaño. Las calles se acearon con delicadeza, las Bentanas y Balcones se adornaron con magnifisencia. La pleve no desgenerava de los sentimientos de la nobleza, y en todas partes resonavan, Víctores y aclamaciones, por Nuestro Augusto soberano y Rey

was the news limited to a literate elite. The letter states that bandos were read publicly to inform the subjects. Secondly, the immediate and general expressions of loyalty towards the imprisoned King are noteworthy. If the governor's description is accurate, nobles and commoners alike united in the outrage against the French invader and in support of Ferdinand VII. This of course occurred not only in Santa Marta, but in most cities and provinces of Spanish America. In Santa Marta the political crisis of the empire had few direct consequences before 1810. Until then the royal officials who had mostly been appointed during the reign of Charles IV were still respected and no groups or individuals made public claims in favour of independence from Spain. The provinces of Santa Marta and Riohacha were not waiting for the first possible excuse to break away from Spain any more than were other regions of Spanish America. It would take several years before the political crisis escalated into a conflict between royalist defenders of the Spanish empire and patriot rebels struggling for independence. During 1808, 1809 and the first half of 1810 the political situation in the provinces of Santa Marta and Riohacha was calm.

The social and political unrest and the beginnings of violent conflict which began in Santa Marta in mid-1810 were largely the result of developments outside the province, in the Peninsula and in the two most important cities of New Granada, Santa Fe and Cartagena. During the two first years after Napoleon's invasion of the Iberian peninsula, the Junta Central based in Seville had by and large maintained itself as the head of the Spanish empire which resisted the French invaders. But in 1810, the Junta Central disintegrated and a Regency Council based in Cádiz now ruled in the name of the captive Ferdinand VII. The

Católico cl Señor D Fernando 7o. No puede haber un día de mas caval satisfacción, para el 191

position o f the Regency had been weakened by Napoleon's bold offer of independence to Spain's American dominions in December 1809. The Regency was thus from the outset forced to grant political concessions to the Americans, to ensure their continued loyalty. In February 1810 the Regency proclaimed that American Spaniards were free men, who had the right to elect their own representatives for the National Congress, and whose '...destinies no longer depend on Ministers, Viceroys or Governors; they are in your hands.. .”41 This did not always have the desired effect, however. For when the Iberian provinces and Kingdoms established Juntas to rule the parts of the peninsula which were not occupied by the French, and when no swift resolution of the war seemed likely, the Spanish American provinces and kingdoms followed suit. Although the political crisis, the uprisings, and the wars which swept across Spanish America between 1810 and 1824 affected nearly all towns and cities there and changed the lives of millions of people, it must be remembered that the crisis was not primarily a revolution from below. On the contrary, it was the apex of the political hierarchy which had temporarily disappeared, or - to use one of the common metaphors o f the time - the Spanish nation had been left without a legitimate father. After a few years, officials in the American provinces found this situation increasingly difficult to handle. Although many of the provinces had enjoyed a certain de facto autonomy of the day-to-day government and administration of the regions, important issues such as the appointment of royal officials, the legislation o f political, commercial and ecclesiastical matters, and the administration of justice in important cases had always been the responsibility of the King and his ministers. Contemporaries thus perceived a real threat to the social and political order if some superior authority was not established. In other

govierno de una Provincia, que el quc presento Santa Marta, en la tarde ya referida.'

words, the French occupation o f the Iberian peninsula caused a fundamental debate on the constitution and nature of the monarchy, a debate which was not only of utmost importance but also complicated and complex. The most renowned experts, lawyers and royal officials of high rank did not necessarily agree on the correct path for subjects to follow.

One of the most important issues debated on the American side between 1810 and 1815 was whether the Regency Council should be recognised. During this first phase of the crisis, the overwhelming majority of the American Juntas claimed to be loyal to Ferdinand VII. In other words, at first there was no ideological struggle between republicanism and royalism, but rather a more limited discussion about the position o f the American provinces within the Spanish empire. In May 1810 the representative of the Regency to New Granada, Antonio Villavicencio, arrived in Cartagena. His task was to convince the people and authorities of New Granada to support and respect the Regency as the legitimate head of the Spanish dominions during the absence of Ferdinand VII. In Cartagena, Villavicencio found willing followers. A native of Quito and a descendant of Cartagena residents, Villavicencio had studied law at the Colegio del Rosario in Santa Fe, and was probably already acquainted with many of the leading creoles of the city of Cartagena who had also studied there.142 The cabildo of Cartagena was also composed o f a group of peninsular merchants, members of the Consulado de Cartagena (established in 1794) whose economic interests made the Cadiz-based Regency a preferable alternative. The governor of Cartagena quickly found himself in a very difficult position. Francisco Montes had been

341 C ited in M c F a rlan e, Colombia before Independence, p. 33 8

appointed governor of Cartagena in 1809, and arrived in the city in the middle of conflict between the cabildo of Cartagena and the viceroy over the right of the Cartagena merchants to trade with neutral British and North American merchants. Although the interim governor of Cartagena, Blas de Soria, had allowed this trade, this conflicted with a law issued in March 1809 by the Junta Central which had forbidden all commerce with neutrals.342 343 The interim governor informed the viceroy of the decision he had made to permit North American ships to enter Cartagena in order to sell flour, and explained the necessity of this. However, by a decree issued on 4 July 1809, the viceroy made it clear that such trade could not be permitted, and he threatened severe punishments against both the interim governor and the customs director if another neutral vessel was allowed to trade in Cartagena.344 This prohibition was openly rejected by the cabildo of Cartagena in a session held 12 August 1809. Soria asked two of the most prominent members of the Cartagena elite to write reports on the issue. Antonio de Narváez y la Torre, the former governor of Santa Marta and now

comandante general del ejército, and José Ignacio de Pombo, prior of the Cartagena

Consulado, both confirmed that Cartagena had a right to trade with foreign neutrals, and that Santa Fe was not in a position to forbid such a trade, just as Madrid could not prohibit Valencia, Barcelona or Murcia to trade with neutrals in the Mediterranean.345 Considering these reports, Soria decreed on 28 September 1809 that the trade with North American merchants would continue despite the

342 Adelaida Sourdis, 'Ruptura del estado colonial y tránsito hacia la república 1800 - 1850' in Adolfo Meisel Roca (ed.), Historia económica y social del Caribe colombiano (Santafé de Bogotá, Ediciones Uninorte/ ECOE, 1994), pp. 160 -163

343 Alfonso Muñera, El fracaso de la nación: Región, clase y raza en el Caribe colombiano (1717 -1810) (Bogotá, Banco de la República/ El Áncora editores, 1998), pp. 140 - 144

44 Múnera, El fracaso, p. 142

345 Múnera, El fracaso, pp. 146 - 148. Pombo's report is published as 'Informe del Real Consulado de Cartagena de Indias a la Suprema Junta Provincial de la misma' in Sergio Elias Ortiz (ed.), Escritos de dos economistas coloniales (Bogotá, Banco de la República, 1965), pp. 135 - 271

prohibitions issued by the Junta Central and the viceroy. The new governor could not stop the trade. Francisco Montes wrote an extensive report to the viceroy in February 1810, where he explained that it was impossible to put an end to this trade as long as all the most prominent members of Cartagena society supported it.

Although Montes chose to comply with the wishes of the Cartagena elite against the orders of the viceroy, the governor's position in Cartagena was precarious. He had been appointed after the French invasion of the Iberian peninsula and his loyalties could easily be questioned.1“ The Junta Central disintegrated immediately after he arrived in Cartagena, and to the dismay of the peninsular merchants he was reluctant to acknowledge the Regency. When Villavicencio, the Regency's representative arrived in May 1810, Montes' position was already considerably weakened. On 22 May 1810, rumours spread that Montes was indeed an afrancesado, and the cabildo (which may have planted the rumours to start with) named two co-governors who would rule together with Montes. These two were Antonio de Narvaez and Tomás de la Torre, the peninsular ex-prior of the Cartagena Consulado. On 14 June, Montes was deposed by the same cabildo allegedly because he did not comply with the conditions agreed on 22 May.147 Formally, the lieutenant governor, Bias de Soria, who had acted as governor before Montes was appointed, was named the new governor by the cabildo. This coup was far from a radical patriot attack on royal government. It was executed by the patriciate of Cartagena to 'defend King, Religion and the Fatherland', and the cabildo pledged loyalty to the Regency in Cádiz.

144 M c F a rla n e , Colombia before Independence, p. 3 4 0

In Santa Fe, the conflict between the American-born and the peninsulars was just as tense. One of the main issues was the composition of the cabildo, which had sparked conflict at least since the 1790s. When the viceroy managed to put six new regidores into the cabildo o f 1810, who were all peninsulars, the conflict escalated to the point where leading santafereños attacked both the viceroy and his regidores.’48 In January 1810, Ignacio de Herrera, a creole lawyer, accused the viceroy and the oidores of the Audiencia of being corrupt creatures of Godoy, and possibly pro-French traitors. The political polarisation widened the gap between peninsulars and creoles, and the viceroy and oidores started to arrest men suspected of disloyalty. While the viceroy was waiting for the Regency's