Washington, D.C., October 10, 2001.
Hon. NORMANY. MINETA,
Secretary of Transportation, Department of Transportation, Washington, DC 20503.
DEARMR. SECRETARY: We are writing to express our concern over the status of the collective bargaining agreement reached between the American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees (AFSCME) and the Federal Aviation Ad- ministration (FAA). It is our understanding that this contract has yet to be imple- mented.
In 1995, Congress mandated in the fiscal year 1996 Department of Transportation Appropriations (Public Law 104–50) that FAA develop a new personnel system in ‘‘consultation’’ with its employees. The FAA wanted an agency and workforce that was better able to meet the demands of the 21st Century. The FAA requested total flexibility in personnel reform so that they could be competitive with private sector organizations and corporations in compensation and hiring.
Subsequently, Congress directed the FAA to ‘‘bargain’’ with the exclusive bar- gaining representative of the employees certified under section 7111 of Title 5, United States Code in the development of the new personnel system.
It is our understanding that AFSCME and the FAA initiated bargaining in June of 2000 over the new personnel system pursuant to the congressional mandates cited above. AFSCME and the FAA came to agreement in January 2001.
After negotiations were successfully completed, the FAA informed AFSCME that the Office of Management and Budget recommended that it not implement the
agreement. To date, the FAA negotiated four contracts as a result of the congres- sionally mandated personnel reform and the FAA has implemented three of these contracts. It appears unreasonable to single-out this one last contract that is neither more nor less generous than the other contracts. The FAA negotiated and agreed to the terms of the contract, and the FAA has the independent legal authority to implement this contract. But, to date, this contract remains unimplemented and dedicated employees affected by this delay are understandably demoralized.
Following the catastrophic events on September 11, the Headquarters employees represented by AFSCME performed with extraordinary professionalism, dedication and competency during the attacks on our Nation. In fact, they still staff the Emer- gency Response Command Centers set up to respond to the emergency and are con- tinuing to work on new safety and security measures as well as developing a ‘‘new’’ air traffic control system.
We are seriously concerned about the morale of the employees caught in this standoff, and we would like to see this matter resolved expeditiously. We ask for your assistance in bringing closure to this matter.
Sincerely yours,
ROBERTC. BYRD,
Chairman, Committee on Appropriations.
TEDSTEVENS,
Ranking Member, Committee on Appropriations. Question. In light of the above information, I would like to have your comments
concerning your agency’s continuing failure to implement this binding labor agree- ment.
Answer. From the opening session through the conclusion of discussions with AFSCME, the FAA made clear that a final agreement would be conditioned on the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) concurrence. OMB declined to concur with the tentative agreement that was reached in early February 2001. Because the con- dition of OMB concurrence was not met, the FAA’s position is that a final agree- ment was not reached and that the parties must return to the bargaining table. The issue of whether a final agreement was reached is the issue now before the Adminis- trative Law Judge.
QUESTIONSSUBMITTED BYSENATORBARBARAA. MIKULSKI AIRPORT APPROACHES OVER MONTGOMERY COUNTY, MD
Question. After September 11, the FAA changed the landing procedures for planes
landing from the north at Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport (DCA). It is my understanding that all aircraft approaching the airport from this route are forced to travel at low altitudes over densely populated areas of Montgomery Coun- ty. Has the FAA examined the safety risks associated with this flight path?
Answer. Revised procedures to address security concerns were implemented in re- sponse to the tragic events of September 11, 2001. In addition, published instrument approach procedures were used on a regular basis to ensure aircraft maintained a straight and steady course to the airport. Between March 23, 2002 and April 27, 2002 the Federal Aviation Administration, working with the Department of Defense, the Office of Homeland Security, and the United States Secret Service, continued its efforts to return operations at DCA to the previously established noise abatement procedures. On April 27, 2002, after an agreement was reached among all parties, aircraft arrivals and departures at DCA began operating again under the long- standing noise abatement procedures that were in effect prior to September 11. These procedures are for visual flight rules and provide for the aircraft to fly over either the Potomac or Anacostia Rivers.
The noise abatement procedures for aircraft flying to DCA from the north are pro- vided when the cloud ceiling is 3,500 feet above ground level or greater, and the visibility is 3 statute miles or greater. Otherwise, the aircrafts fly the instrument approach procedures that were in effect prior to September 11. These procedures provide required minimum altitudes, below which the airplanes are not to fly, in order to safely fly to the airport during inclement weather.
NOISE ABATEMENT IN MONTGOMERY COUNTY, MD
Question. What is the FAA doing to address noise abatement issues in Mont-
gomery County?
Answer. In order to address noise abatement issues in Montgomery County, the FAA on April 27, 2002, re-instituted the long-standing noise abatement procedures
that were in effect for arrivals to and departures from Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport (DCA) that were in effect prior to September, 11, 2001.
These noise abatement procedures can only be used during good weather condi- tions because the pilot must be able to see the ground in order to stay over the riv- ers. During inclement weather conditions all aircraft must follow the instrument ap- proach or departure procedures that were in place prior to September 11, 2001. The procedures we are using today are exactly the same as the procedures we followed prior to September 11, 2001.
PRIMARY LONG-RANGE RADARS
Question. I understand that the FAA has a mix of more than 100 aging primary
long-range radars, utilizing technology that dates back to the 1950’s. Given the FAA’s November 2001 decision to retain these primary long-range radars, what ac- tions have you taken to ensure their sustainment?
Answer. The FAA is currently performing upgrades to the infrastructure at long- range radar facilities that will ensure the continued operation of these facilities. The agency has also initiated, jointly with the Department of Defense, studies to exam- ine the operability, reliability, and maintainability of the existing inventory of long- range, primary radars in the en route environment. These studies will reveal the nature and extent of any modifications that may be required.
Question. The FAA maintains more than 125 primary long-range radars for safe
air traffic control and provides the DOD with data from these radars for Homeland Defense purposes. It’s my understanding that while these radars provide excellent coverage around the perimeter of the United States, there may be coverage gaps in the interior of the country.
How does the FAA plan to support the DOD’s Homeland Defense surveillance re- quirements for non-cooperative aircraft?
Answer. The FAA will continue to provide surveillance information to the Depart- ment of Defense and U.S. Customs Service from existing assets, as well as establish additional data connections as requested, in order to support these agencies’ need to identify and track non-cooperative aircraft.
In addition, FAA is participating in the Airspace Management and Protection Work Group established by the Office of Homeland Security. This multi-agency workgroup that is currently developing a national surveillance plan that provides a common airspace picture and enables the exchange of surveillance data among air surveillance stakeholders.
Question. Does the FAA plan include the deployment of additional FAA primary
long-range radars?
Answer. No. However, the agency is working collaboratively with the Department of Defense, U.S. Customs Service, and other users to identify their surveillance needs and assess the viability of fulfilling their needs with existing FAA assets.
STANDARD TERMINAL AUTOMATION REPLACEMENT SYSTEM (STARS)
Question. It has been brought to my attention that the STARS program has suf-
fered serious setbacks resulting in substantial cost overruns and delays. Please de- scribe the oversight you are applying to the current STARS testing.
Answer. The program has met all major milestones since the 1999 restructuring, including the start of operations at our key sites of El Paso, Texas, and Syracuse, New York, with both our Early Display Configuration and the initial version of Full STARS. The program is also on track for the start of operations with the national baseline version of Full STARS in Philadelphia in November 2002.
There is a significant amount of oversight in place today. The STARS team pro- vides senior FAA leadership with biweekly updates on all aspects of the STARS pro- gram, including ongoing testing. Since 1999, the STARS team also briefs the avia- tion authorization subcommittees in the House and Senate on a regular basis. Addi- tionally, the Department of Transportation Inspector General continuously provides oversight and explaining concerns to the FAA, Congress, and the media.
Question. Have you made any changes to the STARS software delivery schedule?
Please describe these schedule changes.
Answer. No significant changes were made to the schedule since the STARS pro- gram was restructured in 1999, and since the addition of a modified software version for Philadelphia in 2000.
All software delivery milestones were met and the system is on track to begin na- tionwide deployment when we commence operations at Philadelphia in November 2002.
Question. Have you encountered any testing problems which may result in future
Answer. No. Testing of the national software baseline is on track and going as planned. We don’t expect any delays.
In the normal testing process, the team identifies ‘‘program trouble reports’’ (PTRs) which they fix. We are now in the second of three phases of operational test- ing of the national software baseline. The number of PTRs will go up as testing pro- gresses, and will then go down between each phase as the critical ones are fixed.
Question. Please quantify the cost-overruns associated with the STARS program
as reported by the DOT–IG.
Answer. STARS has a past history of escalating costs, due largely to human factor changes made in the late 1990s. The original STARS contract was awarded to Raytheon in 1996 with an estimated cost of $940.2 million. In 1999, FAA and Raytheon restructured the contract to deploy STARS in various phases and to ad- dress human factor issues. This increased the cost estimate to $1.4 billion ($273 mil- lion for human factor changes).
The present cost baseline for STARS is $1.33 billion. This takes the program com- pletely through the development phase and through replacement of the most ‘‘crit- ical risk-to-service’’ facilities. Although a cost estimate of $1.69 billion exists for the full production phase (verses the $1.4 billion baseline of 1999), the agency has not sought approval of that estimate, as it is exploring various means to reduce out-year costs.
The cost estimate ($1.69 billion) that the DOT–IG used for the STARS program projects an increase of roughly $285 million. Most of that amount, $220 million, would be due to increased production and deployment costs.
The other $65 million is due to increased development costs. The increase in de- velopment costs was primarily due to the creation of an additional software baseline for national deployment. That baseline required us to procure additional hardware, contract for additional work from our prime contractor, and conduct additional de- velopment and testing, while maintaining the approved schedule.
The estimate for the increase in production costs is primarily due to increased ad- aptation activities, establishment of deployment teams, an increase in spares re- quirements, product warranties, unbudgeted prime contractor support after initial operations, unbudgeted Early Display Capability (EDC) to Full Service (FS), and unbudgeted replacement for Sony display tubes.
QUESTIONSSUBMITTED BYSENATORHARRYREID
STANDARD TERMINAL AUTOMATION REPLACEMENT SYSTEM (STARS) DEPLOYMENT SCHEDULE
Question. Please provide a detailed deployment schedule and cost estimate for the
installation of the entire system, not just through 2004.
Answer. The present cost baseline for STARS is $1.33 billion. This takes the pro- gram completely through the development phase and through replacement of the most ‘‘critical risk-to-service’’ facilities. Although a cost estimate of $1.69 billion ex- ists for the full production phase, the agency has not sought approval of that esti- mate, as it is exploring various means to reduce out-year costs.
STARS will go operational in the following cities in:
Fiscal year 2003.—Philadelphia, PA; Portland, OR; Miami, FL; Milwaukee, WI;
San Antonio, TX; Raleigh, NC.
Fiscal year 2004.—Tucson, AZ; Kansas City, MO; Nashville, TN; Roswell, NM;
Port Columbus, OH; Moses Lake, WA; Boston, MA; Charlotte, NC; Rochester, NY; Oklahoma City, OK; Tulsa, OK; Seattle/Tacoma, WA; Santa Barbara, CA; Dayton, OH; Salt Lake City, UT; Cincinnati, OH; Buffalo, NY; Indianapolis, IN; Daytona Beach, FL.
Fiscal year 2005.—Little Rock, AK; Norfolk, VA; Pittsburgh, PA; New Orleans,
LA; Orlando, FL; Shreveport, LA; Cedar Rapids, IA; Pensacola, FL; Houston, TX; Atlantic City, NJ; Grand Rapids, MI; Portland, ME; Toledo, OH; Pasco, WA; Madi- son, WI; Jacksonville, FL; Akron, OH; Wichita, KS; Phoenix, AZ.
Fiscal year 2006.—Lubbock, TX; Harrisburg, PA; Bangor, ME; Austin, TX; Fort
Wayne, IN; Eugene, OR; Lansing, MI; Tampa, FL; Lafayette, LA; Boise, ID; Savan- nah, GA; Erie, PA; Lincoln, NE; Burlington, VT; West Palm Beach, FL; Rome, GA; Flint, MI; Greensboro, NC; Springfield, MO; Palm Springs, CA; Waco, TX; Roch- ester, MN; Charleston, SC; Roanoke, VA; Aspen, CO; Reno, NV; Huntsville, AL; Rockford, IL; Montgomery, AL; Muskegon, MI; Knoxville, TN; Peoria, IL.
Fiscal year 2007.—Springfield, IL; Baton Rouge, LA; Fayetteville, NC; Fort Smith,
AR; Fort Myers, FL; Colorado Springs, CO; Gulfport, MS; Billings, MT; Green Bay, WI; Kingsport, TN; Fresno, CA; Columbia, SC; Greer, SC; Fargo, ND; Abilene, TX;
Lexington, KY; Allentown Bethlehem/Easton, PA; Sioux City, IA; Youngstown, OH; Cape Cod, MA; Charleston, WV; Augusta, GA; Corpus Christi, TX; Kalamazoo, MI; Elmira, NY; Saginaw, MI; Great Falls, MT; Mobile, AL; Champaign, IL; Wilkes- Barre, PA; Spokane, WA; Midland, TX; Wilmington, NC; Hilo, HI; Duluth, MN.
Fiscal year 2008.—Asheville, NC; Casper, WY; Myrtle Beach, SC; Evansville, IN;
Monroe, LA; Florence, SC; Amarillo, TX; Bakersfield, CA; South Bend, IN; Waterloo, IA; Reading, PA; Jackson, MS; Sioux Falls, SD; Lake Charles, LA; Huntington, WV; Terre Haute, IN; Tallahassee, FL; Chattanooga, TN; Louisville, KY; Mansfield, OH; Binghampton, NY; Moline, IL; Longview, TX; Bismark, ND; Clarksburg, WV; Merid- ian, MO.
Fiscal year 2009.—Pueblo Memorial, CO.
Question. Please describe your contingency plan if STARS cannot be deployed ac-
cording to the current schedule. What are the costs involved and what would it take to trigger the plan?
Answer. If STARS were not deployed according to schedule, the contingency would be to continue operations with the existing automation system until STARS is de- ployed to that site. The added cost to the agency would be an increase in the main- tenance costs of the existing system. Not all of the sites have the same existing sys- tem, however. Some sites have an ‘‘ARTS IIIA’’ system, some have an ‘‘ARTS IIE’’ system and some have an ‘‘ARTS IIIE’’ system.
The ARTS IIIA sites are the first to be replaced. The last IIIA site is Tampa, which is scheduled to be replaced in the middle of 2005. Should the STARS deploy- ment schedule slip prior to Tampa, ARTS IIIA maintenance would be required for a longer duration than was otherwise planned. The cost would be directly related to the number of sites slipped as well as the length of time slipped. Maintaining all of the ARTS IIIA sites currently costs approximately $5 million a year. This cost begins to go down in fiscal year 2004, and eventually phases out as STARS replaces the ARTS IIIA’s.
After the ARTS IIIA’s are replaced by STARS, the ARTS IIE and ARTS IIIE sites will be replaced thru 2008 (although a few IIE and IIIE sites are planned for re- placement prior to 2005). If there was a delay in STARS deployment at this point, additional ARTS IIE and ARTS IIIE maintenance dollars would be needed. The ARTS IIIE’s cost approximately $5 million a year to maintain. The ARTS IIE’s cost approximately $2 million a year to maintain. Again, the total amount needed would be directly related to the number of sites delayed as well as the length of time.
In addition to maintenance costs, there would also be the cost to refurbish old equipment to meet operational needs if STARS is delayed. The average cost to refur- bish old equipment per year is $972,840 for ARTS IIIA’s, $585,420 for ARTS IIE’s, and $392,150 for ARTS IIIE’s.
Question. According to the IG’s office, the FAA never justified its rejection of Com-
mon ARTS as a substitute for STARS, particularly since it is operational at 140 FAA sites, including six of the busiest terminal facilities. The IG points out that Common ARTS already provides the functionality that STARS proposes to provide when it is deployed. Would you support an independent evaluation of Common ARTS’ and STARS’ functionality, cost, and schedule risk?
Answer. The FAA has done several analyses of alternatives to meet automation requirements, starting with the competition in 1996 when Raytheon was awarded the STARS contract over the other bidders, including Lockheed Martin.
Starting in October of 1999, and more recently in March of 2002, the team con- ducted economic analyses of the STARS program before senior FAA management and received approval to continue moving forward with the program.
Results consistently indicate the economic feasibility of continuing the STARS program versus pursuing an alternative. There are also intangible benefits to STARS that are not readily quantifiable, including higher levels of information secu- rity and more data for controllers (such as latitude and longitude readouts, min- imum separation indicators and additional data block fields).
Common ARTS and STARS are very comparable in terms of what they provide in the near-term. STARS has features that ARTS does not have, and vice-versa. However, many of the computer-human interfaces that were added to STARS in 1999 are not available in Common ARTS, particularly in their color displays. Addi- tionally, STARS has the capability to support a more complex national airspace sys- tem and to expand with future growth in traffic.
Despite all of the steps that have been taken, the FAA would support any addi- tional independent evaluation of this matter.
QUESTIONSUBMITTED BYSENATORHERBKOHL
STANDARD TERMINAL AUTOMATION REPLACEMENT SYSTEM (STARS) AT PHILADELPHIA AIRPORT
Question. I am pleased to learn that Philadelphia Airport will begin operation of
the STARS radar system in November 2002. I also appreciate your efforts to address