Let us return to the second issue. The Constitution, in Article 25, clearly gives three rights in relation to the freedom of religion: the right to profess, practice and propagate the religion of one's choice. Words used in the Constitution cannot be regarded as a meaningless surplus. If the right to propagate one's religion is given in addition to the right to profess and practice, it cannot be confined to again professing or practicing the religion. It necessarily includes the right to spread one's religion by inviting others to join it. The makers of the Constitution had no doubt about it, as the proceedings of the Constituent Assembly shows (see pp 257-271 of Vol. 5 of The Framing of India's
Constitution, Second edition, Universal Law Publishing Co.Ltd., 2004). The sub-com-
mittee on fundamental rights of the Constituent Assembly initially included only the right to profess and practice religion in the draft Art 19 (which was to become Art 25). The sub-committee on minorities' rights however insisted that the right to propagate reli- gion should also be added, on the specific ground that Islam and Christianity are prose-
lytising religions and they must be permitted to propagate their faith. This suggestion
made by Mr M.Ruthnaswamy, a member of the sub-committee on minorities rights was accepted by all, and recommended for acceptance by the Constituent Assembly. After considerable discussion, the amendment was accepted and incorporated in Art.25 of the Constitution. Even though it was argued by some in the Constituent Assembly, that if some people want to proselytise they may do so and there is no need to make it a fun- damental right, the Constituent Assembly felt that without the right, the fundamental right of freedom of religion would be incomplete. It was also understood that in actual reality what is involved is the right of the
oppressed communities of Hindu society to choose a religion that will treat them with dignity, as the speech by T.T.Krishna- machari in the Constituent Assembly shows. The liberality of the Constitution in this matter is shown by the fact that the right in Art.25 is assured not merely to citizens but to 'any person'. Even a foreigner can propa- gate religion in India. This is in contrast to other freedoms such as freedom of speech, expression, movement, association etc.,
Words used in the Constitution cannot be regarded as a meaningless surplus. If the right to propagate one's religion is given in addition to the right to profess and practice, it cannot be confined to again professing or practicing the religion. It necessarily includes the right to spread one's religion by inviting others to join it.
which are granted only to citizens by the Constitution.
Considerable damage has been done to the clear intent of the Constitution, and a slo- gan handed over on a platter to the Sangh Parivar by the Supreme Court in a very care- lessly written judgement in Rev. Stainislaus vs State of Madhya Pradesh, reported in AIR 1977 SC 908. H.M.Seervai has described the judgement as ‘clearly wrong’ and ‘produc- tive of great mischief’ (Constitutional Law of India, Vol 2, paragraphs 12.73 to 12.81,
Universal Book Traders, New Delhi, 1999). These words written in 1999 have turned out
to be prophetic. What the Supreme Court said in that judgement is that the right to prop- agate religion does not include the right to convert, because to convert is to impinge on the other person's freedom of conscience. It is not clear how that can be, since freedom of conscience includes the right to be convinced of the truth of another person's ideas and change one's own beliefs accordingly. But the Supreme Court said that while you can spread your religion, you cannot ask another person to accept it. This is plainly absurd. Moreover, as we have said above, it is precisely as the right to proselytize that the right to propagate was included in the Constitution, on the recommendation of the sub-com- mittee on minorities' rights (K.M.Munshi, a member of the sub-group on minority rights explained it thus in his speech in the Constituent Assembly: ‘So long as religion is reli- gion, conversion by the free exercise of the conscience has to be recognized’). Interestingly, the judgement in the Rev. Stainislaus case was written by the then Chief Justice of India, A.N.Ray who was handpicked as a progressive judge by Indira Gandhi for appointment as Chief Justice, overlooking three of his seniors in 1973.
This view that 'the right to propagate does not include the right to convert' has enabled the Sangh Parivar, which has gleefully converted it into a slogan, to paper over a dis- honest use of language. When they have to offer a seemingly reasonable argument, they talk of forcible conversion (which every one would condemn) or conversion by induce- ment (which is more problematic because what constitutes inducement is ambiguous). But in their loud street campaign and in their attacks on preachers and pastors they crim- inalise conversion per se, unqualified by the allegation of use of force or inducement. However, for a wider audience they have emphasised the objectionable language and imagery said to have been used by some Christian preachers in the depiction of Hindu gods and goddesses, as for instance, in the present context, the evangelical group called New Life.
This jugglery is unavoidable because the politics of the Sangh Parivar is essentially undemocratic but living as they do in an open society they are forced into dialogue with others, which obliges them to seek out rational/morally sustainable arguments. And the lie is exposed when the list of establishments they have attacked this time round is seen to include only one New Life church, the rest being Catholic, Pentecostal, Baptist, CSI and other churches, as well as a prayer house of cloistered nuns who do not proselytise at all. And worse still, even the very friendly police of Karnataka admit that they are still investigating who published the offensive literature, and there is not a single complaint about the New Life having used it in its campaign.