Katsura greeted the Russian pull-back with coolness. Writing to Yamagata on 25 March 1898, he wondered;64
Either they find it difficult to expand in Manchuria with both hands full, or they have no genuine interest in Korea while making their stronghold at Dalny and Port Arthur.
Still there remained the Trans-Siberian line. With its new extension through the Liaodong peninsula, the railway looked like a crossbow drawn on Beijing and Seoul. The British Foreign Office shared Japan’s concern and quietly suggested the Chinese move their capital south, perhaps to Nanjing, but certainly away from Russia’s grasp.65
Despite Russia’s apparent conciliation in Korea and her protestations of good intent in Manchuria, imperialism had its own dynamics. The problem had been described by a Russian Asian specialist in the 1860s;66
Various points in Central Asia have continually been indicated to us as necessary acquisitions to strengthen our position and serve as a base and a bulwark for our possessions.... It has constantly been said that for the glory of Russia, for the raising of her prestige, it is necessary to take some stronghold or other to smash the Asiatic hordes in the field: strongholds have been taken one after another, the hordes have been utterly defeated, good borders have been attained, and then it has invariably turned out that one more stronghold is lacking, that one more final victory is necessary, that the really perfect frontier lies somewhat further off, that our prestige is still insufficiently raised by our former successes.
As Tsuruhara Sadakichi noted after the war with China, Japan’s real victory demanded peace and the expansion of her commerce. In his role of army minister, Katsura stood in the forefront of guaranteeing this peace. His memorandum of 1896 proposed maintaining the balance of power in Korea while expanding through south China. In April 1898, with China’s promise of non-alienation of Fukien province, and the Nishi-Rosen accord stabilising Russo-Japanese rivalries in Korea, this policy appeared to be succeeding. However, even as Nishi and Rosen concluded their negotiations, Minister de Speyer had demanded territorial concessions in Seoul. These included a coaling station on Ch’öllyöng-do, leases at Mokp’o on the northwest coast and Inch’ön near Seoul, as well as coastal whaling bases. Katsura immediately readied funds for Japan to
63Shinobu Seizaburo, ed., Nihon Gaifcö-shi, 2 vols., Tokyo 1974, vol. 1, p. 195-97; Ian Nish, The Origins o f the Russo-Japanese War, London 1985, p. 44-48.
^Tokutomi, vol. 1, p. 870-71.
65F.O. 800/163, Francis Bertie Papers, Bertie memo. 19 May 1899, "The only thing to pray for is that by the time or rather before the railway connection is completed the Empress Dowager will have been removed to other spheres and that those Chinamen who then direct the Chinese government will sufficiently appreciate the danger to their country of the immediate proximity of the Russian power to remove the capital southwest" Bertie made this suggestion to Chinese minister Loh Feng-luh on 21 May
make a counter purchase of land on Chöllyöng-do, but, the Independence Club, with Yi Wan-yong as Kojong’s chief secretary, provided timely intervention to obstruct the Russian demands.67
The Russian navy was still fishing for opportunities. They convinced themselves that the occupation of Koje-do, an island southwest of Pusan, would entail "no dispute on the part of Japan while an occupation of such a point of Korean territory as Port Lazareff (Yönghünghang, near Wönsan on the east coast) would certainly result in protests of Japan."68 Even with the new base at Port Arthur, the 1,100 miles to Vladivostok was beyond the capacity of her smaller vessels, and Russia continued to press for a coaling station off the southern Korean coast. She would soon discover how badly she had misjudged Japan’s reaction.
Japan’s strategic priority in Korea was to control internal communications. The right to build railways from Pusan to Seoul and Seoul to Inch’ön had been granted at the outset of the Sino-Japanese war, but, in the post-war vicissitudes, the latter concession was lost to an American entrepreneur. In 1898, Prime Minister Itö hesitated over the funds for repurchase when the American failed to develop the line, and it needed Vice Foreign Minister Komura Jutarö, citing the example of Disraeli and Suez, and protestations from Katsura to force movement.69 However, it was not until the establishment of the Yamagata cabinet at the year’s end, and with Katsura employing his Kenseitö contacts, that the Diet approved the 1.8 million yen to buy back the concession and further funds were made available for construction of the long-delayed Seoul-Pusan track.70 Internal communications, however, were useless if Russia could prevent Japan from landing troops. After the earlier scare over Ch’öllyöng-do, Katsura suggested to Prime Minister Ökuma in August 1898 that Japan purchase 50,000 tsubo (one tsubo being about thirty- six square feet) of land in the prime anchorage of Masanp’o, the southern port just then being opened. Using a device which he often employed in later years, Katsura proposed that this purchase be made by a Japanese individual or company as a front to avoid
67Moriyama, p. 68; Synn, p. 258-60; C.I. Eugene Kim/Han-kyo Kim, Korea and the Politics of Imperialism, 1876-1910, Berkeley 1967, p. 94-105.
68Krasny Archive, vol. 52, above p. 254, minutes o f meeting, 1 February 1895. 69Honda Kumatarö, Tamashii no Gcükö, Tokyo 1941, p. 11-13.
70Oka, Yamagata, p. 79; Tokutomi Sohö, ed., Köshaku Matsukata Masayoshi-den, 2 vols., Tokyo 1935, rep. 1976, vol. 2, p. 760-63. As prime minister in 1897, Matsukata had agreed on one million yen for a Japanese syndicate to repurchase the Seoul-Inch’ön line, but delays and troubles both with Morse, the American owner, and within the syndicate, had led to a demand for a further 800,000 yen in April 1898. This demand was renewed on 31 October 1898 when Yamagata and Katsura moved into action. The railway concession returned to Japan on 31 January 1899.
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diplomatic repercussions.71 Ökuma approved and, on 1 October 1898, ordered the
Japanese minister to Seoul to prepare for such a purchase. The following week, Navy Minister Saigö asked Katsura to support a purchase of land on Koha island, off Mokp’o on Korea’s south-western tip, and again the cabinet accepted that Japan’s security was endangered. Secret army funds of 90,000 yen were diverted in readiness.72 However, the collapse of the Kenseitö cabinet, and the disruptions in Korean diplomacy, with eleven changes of foreign minister in 1898 alone, prevented any further move at this point.
Russian dignity could not accept a complete renunciation of interest in Korea, and
she felt entitled to pursue legitimate rights. The new Russian minister to Seoul,
Aleksandr Pavlov, considered these included the lease of whaling stations, and it was believed that he sought to ensure satisfaction by supporting large-scale arrest of Independence Club members at the end of 1898. The following spring, he worked for the complete destruction of the Independence Club, and, having engineered a new administration under Cho Pyöng-sik, received the desired leases on 29 March 1899.73
Earlier the same month, Tokyo was shaken by a report that Russian naval opinion was uniting behind the lease of Koje-do, another island on Korea’s southern coast. Although the rumour proved baseless, Japan’s army and naval general staffs needed no further provocation. On 28 March, Katsura and Yamamoto presented a joint army-navy plan to cabinet for 500,000 yen of secret military funds towards a pre-emptive purchase. The cabinet gave immediate approval.74
The newly-opened port of Masanp’o now became the focus of Russo-Japanese competition. On 5 May 1899, en route for home leave, Minister Pavlov entered the harbour and, after marking out a site for the new Russian consulate, erected posts around 10,000 tsubo of land outside the foreign settlement. Observers inferred that this would serve as a coaling station and dock, and perhaps as a replacement site for the existing Russian naval hospital at Nagasaki.75 Irrespective of its purpose, and contrary to earlier Russian opinion, Japanese security precluded Russian domination of such a sensitive area. Foreign Minister Aoki ordered his representative at Pusan to take swift measures;
71Moriyama, p. 68. 72Moriyama, p. 68.
73NGB, vol. 31 part 2, p. 400, Hioki (Seoul) to Ökuma, 5 and 6 November 1898; vol. 32, p. 224-27, Katö Masuo (Seoul) to Aold, 26 March, 18 April 1899.
74Moriyama, p. 69; NGB, vol. 32, p. 231, Aoki to Katö, 7 March 1899.
75NGB, vol. 32, p. 246-47, Nakamura (Ptisan) to Aoki, 10 May 1899. A brief summary of the incident and the value of Masanp’o as a harbour is given by Horace Allen, report to Secretaiy of State John Hay, 19 March 1900, in Scott S. Burnett, ed., Korean-American Relations, vol. 3, Honolulu 1989, p. 86.
the army general staff sent an officer to the spot; and Katsura arranged to make necessary funds available to a Japanese merchant in Pusan, Sakoma Fusatarö.76
The supplementary effect of Russian expansion was to promote Japan’s own interests as first China, and now Korea, turned to her as a counterbalancing force. Agriculture-Commerce Minister Min Yöng-gi and Foreign Minister Pak Che-jun were no longer certain of Russia’s good intentions and were persuaded into co-operating with Japan. Min had a subordinate purchase the land desired by Russia and, late in June, this was sold to Sakoma using Japanese army funds.77 The acting Russian minister was furious, protesting first at the Korean foreign ministry, and then to Japan’s new representative, Hayashi Gonsuke. However, both Pak and Hayashi denied that their governments could intrude on private commerce and the dispute was concentrated in Masanp’o.78 There, Russian officials remained on hand throughout the year as Russian and Japanese proxies vied to buy up available land. In September, Seoul was warned that Pavlov’s return was imminent and either the Japanese landowner must be forced to give up his rights or Russia would reserve to herself freedom of action. Russian vessels frequently entered Masanp’o to reinforce the point and, momentarily, a Russo-Japanese war seemed in the offing. Japan’s naval attache at Pusan asked the cabinet to balance regional forces, but Yamagata refused a trial of strength.79 As he wrote in October
1899;80
Our present situation is that military expansion remains incomplete and financial reform is only just beginning. We must strive to avoid a clash with Russia.
If compromise or the existing Russo-Japanese agreements failed, then;
We will have to decide whether or not to abandon our long-standing historical and geographical relationship with Korea, and with it our line of advantage.
This would have meant a complete revision of Japanese strategic policy and the adoption of that defensive posture advocated by the Getsuyökai in the 1880s. However, Yamagata had earlier concluded that such a passive approach would only result in ultimate collapse. Consequently, the cabinet attempted to ease tensions, and Navy Minister Yamamoto ordered his ships to avoid Masanp’o and Koje-do for the present, and report on Russian
76NGB, vol. 32, p. 248, Aoki to Nakamura, 13 May 1899; Yamabe Kentarö, Nikkan Gappö Shöshi, Tokyo 1966, p. 141.
^N G B, vol. 32, p. 248-52, Hioki to Aoki, 20 May 1899; Hayashi Gonsuke (Seoul) to Aoki, 12 July 1899; Moriyama, p. 72-73, notes that the army sent 50,000 yen on 17 June and 95,000 on 14 July for these land purchases.
78NGB, vol. 32, p. 252-56, Hayashi to Aoki, 18 and 27 July 1899. 79NGB, vol. 32, p. 266 Hayashi to Aoki, 16 and 26 September 1899. 800yama, p. 254-55, memo, of 11 October 1899.
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activities indirectly.81 On the ground, Sakoma appeared to be winning the race to buy up Masanp’o and, despite Russia’s free use of money and warships as enticement and intimidation, had acquired the most advantageous locations.82 Finally, in the spring of 1900, both sides recognised the futility of competition. Russia accepted land at Masanp’o within the foreign settlement, the Japanese government took over the land purchased privately within the same area for a Japanese settlement, and both renounced claims on Koje-do.82
Whatever satisfaction Russia had given to Seoul and Tokyo with her apparent withdrawal in the spring of 1898 was undone by the pursuit of naval facilities adjacent to Japan. Objectively viewed, Russian demands were comprehensible given the distance between her two Far Eastern ports. However, the Japanese army and navy could not allow such objectivity. There were those who believed a conflict could still be averted and some arrangement come to over Manchuria and Korea. In St. Petersburg, Baron Hayashi Tadasu privately informed the British ambassador that Japan had little or no commercial interest in Manchuria, which, given China’s weakness, was "destined eventually, whether Russia wished it or not, to become practically a Russian province."84 Hayashi Gonsuke in Seoul believed the troubles of 1899 had been essentially minor and could be overcome with mutual willingness. He ordered the Japanese press in Korea to restrict criticism of Russia and asked Foreign Minister Aoki for a real effort to restore
good relations.85 However, the majority view, echoed by The Times in London, was that
the dogs of war were on the loose. As Katsura later recalled;86
Russia sought to use the triple intervention to m onopolise the Japan Straits and link V ladivostok, M asanp’o and Port Arthur. To cem ent this connection, they planned initially to dominate Korea, seize our island o f Tsushima, and then threaten us with war. This w as evident from the land purchase at M asanp’o.
The validity of this view, and the limits of Russo-Japanese understanding, were now to be tested by events in China.
81NGB, vol. 32, p. 238, Vice Navy Minister Saitö to Vice Foreign Minister Takahira, 11 October 1899. Hayashi Gonsuke criticised this order as overly timid and was himself censured by Aoki for speaking out of place, p. 241, Hayashi to Aoki, 16 October 1899.
82NGB, vol. 32, p. 266-68, Kawakami (Masanp’o) to Aoki, 29 September, 10 October 1899. In March 1900, three of Russia’s largest warships arrived at Inch’ön to intimidate the Korean government, Horace Allen to Secretary Hay, 19 March 1900, Burnett, p. 86.
83Morivama, p. 77-78; Andrew Malozemoff, Russian Far Eastern Policy, 1881-1904, Berkeley 1958, p. 120-23; Horace Allen to Secretary Hay, 21 April 1900, and 28 May 1901 (1900?), Burnett, p. 87-88. Allen reported that Pavlov had gone to Japan to be treated for the bite of a rabid dog. There is no record that the dog was in Japanese pay.
84F .0 .46, Charles Scott to Foreign Secretary Salisbury, 9 August 1899. 85NGB, vol. 32, p. 273-74, Hayashi to Aoki, 6 December 1899.