países y tres regiones (53 posiciones en total)

3^ USDEK: Undangan-undangan dasar 1945; Sosialisme ä la Indonesia; Demokrasi terpimpin; Economi Terpimpin; Kepribadian Indonesia. The whole was generally referred to as Manipol-USDEK.

state under the constitution. It was required to meet at least once every five years, and was formally responsible for electing the president and setting the 'broad outlines of state policy'. Although it was supposed to be an elected body, Sukarno invoked certain transitional provisions to ensure that a large bloc of its members were appointed from the so-called 'functional groups'. It did not actually meet in session until the end of that year, when, under the chairmanship of Chaerul Saleh, a radical leftist associated with the small national-communist Murba Party, it endorsed both the political program of Manipol-USDEK and the grandiose Eight Year Development Plan that had been drawn up by the National Planning Council.

After July 1959 the political parties remained under something of a cloud. Despite Sukarno's earlier demand for the parties to be 'buried', by 1960 he had come to realise that they were a necessary element on the political landscape. Their survival - or at least the survival of those parties he believed he could control - was essential if the growing power of the army was to be balanced with a countervailing political force. Sukarno continued to promote the role of 'functional groups', establishing a National Front in August 1960 to coordinate the activities of all such groups in line with Manipol-USDEK and his renewed emphasis on the spirit of the revolution. Yet the president was concerned about the possibility that the army would use its organisational and administrative reach throughout the country to build an effective 'functional group' organisation of its own.31 Consequently, political parties remained a necessary evil, although the two parties that Sukarno regarded as implacable enemies, Masyumi and the PSI, were both banned in August.32 A month earlier, in July, Sukarno had issued a

31 The army had established its own functional group umbrella organisation, the Body to Develop the Potential of Functional Groups (Badan Pembina Potensi Karya, BPPK). For a full account of the background and development of the functional group concept and its application under Guided Democracy, see Reeve 1985: especially 108-262.

32 In addition to the participation of some of their principal leaders in the regional rebellions, activists from both parties had further angered the president by their participation in a short-lived oppositional movement known as the Democratic League (Liga Demokrasi). Organised in April 1960 after Sukarno's dismissal of the elected DPR, it had come into existence while Sukarno was away from the country on one of his overseas tours. Though it briefly attracted support from some sections of the military, it was quickly eliminated once Sukarno returned. See Feith 1963a: 343-4.

presidential decree on 'party simplification', aimed at restricting and managing those parties that were to be permitted to remain legal.33 By April of 1961, eight parties were declared to have fulfilled these requirements, including the three largest parties the PNI, PKI and NU.34

The central feature of Guided Democracy politics throughout its early years was the relationship between its two principal architects, the president and the army. Both had wanted a more centralised and authoritarian form of government and both needed the other to make the system work.

Sukarno's power and authority derived from his skills as an orator and a manipulator of ideological symbols. His personality, his words, his actions were central to the way Indonesian politics were conducted during this period. Although he shared power with various other forces, especially the army, when it came to matters of ideology, the direction of domestic politics and the pursuit of foreign policy, Sukarno's views usually held sway. He was the creator of Manipol-USDEK, the central ideological plank of Guided Democracy. But above all there was his deep and abiding conviction about the need to return to the spirit of the 1945 revolution. Sukarno constantly evoked the symbolism of the revolution in his public addresses, as he berated those who had held office throughout the 1950s. Fired by 'the romance of the revolution', he claimed for himself the titles of Great Leader of the Revolution and Mouthpiece of the Indonesian People. He also presented himself as bearer of the Message of the People's Suffering

(.Amanat Penderitaan Rakyat, Ampera). Under his leadership the 'exploitation de l'homme par I'homme' would be eliminated.35 These were bold and dramatic gestures

33 According to presidential decree, political parties were forced to declare their allegiance to Manipol- USDEK, submit their membership lists to the government, and fulfill certain minimum-size requirements.

34 The other five parties were the League of the Upholders of Indonesian Independence (Ikatan Pendukung Kemerdekaan Indonesia, IPKI), Murba, the Catholic Party (Partai Katolik), the small leftist Indonesia Party (Partai Indonesia, Partindo), and the Indonesian Islamic Association Party (Partai Sarikat Islam Indonesia, PSII). Three months later the total number of legal parties was increased to ten when the Indonesian Christian Party (Partai Kristen Indonesia, Parkindo) and the small Islamic Educational Movement (Pergerakan Tarbiyah Islamiyah, Perti) were added to the list.

and Sukarno, a brilliant orator, was able in the early years of Guided Democracy to appeal to and unite many Indonesians, providing them with reassurance following the doubts and uncertainties of the 1950s.

The armed forces, its power flowing ultimately from its control over the means of coercion, but with a stronger legal basis than previously for its involvement in civil administration and politics, was now more united than at any time in the previous decade. Under martial law it had acquired a zone of authority that it was determined to preserve. During the first two years of Guided Democracy the army became an increasingly powerful element in the regional government structure, while it also cornered a controlling interest in the state enterprise sector of the economy, a direct result of the nationalisation of Dutch assets.

Although both Sukarno and the armed forces began as partners sharing power, there was a high degree of suspicion on both sides. Many senior army officers regarded the president as an unreliable and unpredictable figure, and there was increasing concern in military circles about his apparent attraction towards the PKI, or at least to leftist political symbols and ideas. Sukarno, for his part, was wary of the possibility of the armed forces dominating the political landscape. Without any obvious power base of his own, and requiring an ally to balance this threat, he found the political parties an essential tool for this purpose. The PKI, in particular, provided him with strong support and soon began to play a critical role in Guided Democracy politics.

Although the PKI had been caught off-guard by the collapse of constitutional democracy in 1957-59, under the astute leadership of Aidit and his fellow politburo

members, the party quickly managed to trim its sails to the prevailing political winds of Guided Democracy.36 Of all the parties, the PKI had given the most unqualified support for the proposed changes Sukarno was signalling in early 1959, and it rallied to support

36 The most complete account of the PKI during the Guided Democracy era is Mortimer 1974. See also Hindley 1964.

the president in his establishment of Guided Democracy. For Sukarno there were obvious attractions. With his fascination for the symbolism of the revolution and his fondness for Marxist imagery and rhetoric, the president and the PKI appeared to speak much the same language. But more importantly, the PKI as the largest and best organised of all the political parties was able to provide the mass following throughout the country that Sukarno needed at his public appearances and rallies.37

For these reasons, the president gave the party his support and protection against its natural enemy, the armed forces. As early as September 1959, the army had moved to prevent the holding of the PKI’s sixth national congress. Not only did Sukarno intervene to permit the congress to go ahead, but he addressed its closing ceremony, speaking with great enthusiasm about the party and its leaders. This set the pattern for the following years, as Sukarno not only fought to protect the PKI from army harassment, but moved steadily to bring the party into all the central councils of Guided Democracy government.38 Towards the end of 1960 the president began to canvass the idea of bringing the PKI into the cabinet in accordance with Nasakom, the principle of cooperation between the nationalist, religious and communist streams that he regarded as crucial for the achievement of national unity.39 Although the army was able to oppose this move successfully, when the cabinet was reshuffled in March 1962 Sukarno managed to give the PKI two minor posts.40

Delighted as the PKI was to have the president's protection, this was not achieved without important concessions. In order both to remain legal and retain Sukarno's

•r>7 By 1960, the PKI's membership had grown to over 1.5 million. The party membership continued to grow rapidly over the next five years to the point where it claimed a membership of 3.5 million by August 1965 with another 24 million in affiliated bodies and front organisations. See Mortimer 1974: 366.

38 The communist daily Harian Rakjat was banned on several occasions for short periods during the early 1960s, while regional commanders in several areas used their martial law powers to prohibit all PKI activity in their area of authority.

39 Sukarno's ideas about Nasakom were first enunciated in an essay written in 1926. For an English translation of this work and a perceptive introduction to Sukarno's ideas, see McVey 1970.

40 PKI Chairman Aidit was appointed Third Deputy Chairman of the MPRS, and his deputy Lukman was appointed Third Deputy Chairman of the DPR-GR. These positions were accorded ministerial rank in the new cabinet and membership of the newly created State Leadership body.

parties, but it also had to give its public support to Manipol-USDEK and eschew class struggle in favour of national interests.41

By the end of 1960 the formal structures of Guided Democracy were more or less established and the general character of the regime was becoming increasingly evident to Indonesia's people. In contrast to the sober and pragmatic style of government pursued by most of the cabinets during the period of parliamentary democracy, the Guided Democracy years were characterised by a high degree of political theatre as Sukarno strove to create and then manipulate the symbols of his office.

Although many Indonesians, especially among the broader reaches of society, were attracted by Sukarno's leadership and rhetoric, there remained a significant minority who were implacably opposed to him. Many people in academic and intellectual circles were quietly cynical of Guided Democracy ideology, suspicious of Nasakom, and resentful of the loss of freedom of speech and the press and the destruction of those democratic values that had largely underpinned the political order throughout most of the previous decade. Fear of reprisals on the part of the government, however, ensured that such people did not express their opinions publicly.42

It would be a gross exaggeration to see Indonesia as a totalitarian state during this period, for power was too diffuse and the implementation of control measures was often lax and inconsistent. Yet under Guided Democracy, the government made some effort to indoctrinate certain sections of society, especially through courses in Manipol-USDEK for students and civil servants. At the same time, various control measures were put in place. The activities of political parties were carefully controlled and in January 1962

41 For an account of the PKI's ideological position towards Guided Democracy during this period, see Mortimer 1974: 77-140.

42 The repressive nature of Guided Democracy politics was quickly evident. The former vice-president, Mohammad Hatta, broke a long public silence with a sober and carefully worded critique of Guided Democracy and President Sukarno's political reforms that appeared in an article entitled 'Demokrasi Kita' (Our Democracy) published in the Jakarta weekly Pandji Masjarakat on 1 May 1960. The issue was immediately banned.

certain leading members of the Masyumi and PSI were arrested and held without trial.43 The Indonesian press, which since the implementation of martial law in 1958 had already been working under strict constraints, was now more closely controlled than ever before. Certain newspapers deemed hostile were closed down permanently, while the editors of those newspapers that were permitted to continue were required to give an undertaking of their loyalty to Manipol-USDEK and were ultimately forced to publish a large amount of government news and propaganda.

Although propaganda and indoctrination appeared to be working in the lower reaches of the education system, the universities and institutes of higher education remained bastions of doubters and cynics. At the onset of his attack on parliamentary democracy, Sukarno had railed against the limitations of 'text-book thinking'. In March 1961 he appointed the radical-nationalist Iwa Kusumasumantri to the post of Minister of Higher Education and Science in an attempt to intensify the Guided Democracy indoctrination campaign in the universities. Although this move was largely unsuccessful - Iwa was replaced a year later with a more moderate minister - university lecturers realised that promotion depended upon a display of active loyalty to the person of the president and to state ideology. Those seen to be out of step with the regime through any expressions of criticism or opposition risked being branded as 'anti-Manipol' or opposed to the revolution (kontra-revolusi). As in other areas of the civil service, such charges could lead to demands for 'retooling'.

The growing authoritarian trend in Indonesian politics was matched by the government's failure to address the serious and rapidly deteriorating conditions of the Indonesian economy. Throughout the 1950s successive governments had struggled to rebuild the economy, at times with moderate success, despite massive problems inherited

43 Included among those detained was the PSI’s leader and former prime minister, Sutan Sjahrir. Other high profile political prisoners during the Guided Democracy years were newspaper editor, Mochtar Lubis, and several senior army officers who had been involved in the PRRI regional rebellion.

from the years of war and revolution. In the late 1950s, however, the national economy was thrown into disarray by a series of sudden and dramatic measures.

The considerable chaos and confusion accompanying the seizures of Dutch enterprises that occurred in December 1957 have already been referred to earlier. Then in May 1959 the Minister for Trade announced a ban on retail trade by 'aliens' in rural areas that was aimed directly at Indonesia's ethnic Chinese community.44 Ultimately, this led to the exodus of about 100,000 Chinese out of the country, raised tensions between the governments of Indonesia and China and seriously disrupted the local economy creating difficulties both for Chinese traders and shopkeepers and Indonesians everywhere who were dependent upon them for the distribution of goods and services.

In August 1959, in a desperate attempt to check spiralling prices and arrest inflation, the government launched a sudden 'monetary purge'.45 These drastic measures caused widespread hardship to many individuals and had a disastrous effect on many private firms and small businesses that were faced with min.

In a sense the economy never recovered from the cumulative effect of these three shocks. The impact of the August 1959 measures on prices and inflation was short-lived and ultimately futile. By late 1961 the economy had again slipped into a period of rapid decline that was marked by sharp price rises, chronic inflation, serious shortages of many essential items and a slump in production of those commodities on which the national economy depended for foreign exchange earnings.

Given the great stress placed on political slogans and national symbols under Guided Democracy, and the stepping up of the campaign to wrest West Irian from the

44 The ban was finally promulgated in November 1959 as a presidential regulation, known as