I should forget only her song, only these notes of the soul should never return in my unending dreams.
The proudly sailing swan remains unknown, when it sits on the bank slumbering.
Only when she sang could you recognize the loving, silent one, who so reluctantly made herself understood in words.
– H¨olderlin,Hyperion
In the early Idealist accounts of self-consciousness explored in the pre- vious chapter, the subject generally recognizes its existence by defining itself against various kinds of object. However, theoretical explanations of subjectivity do not themselves generate self-conscious entities; the actual, practical experience of the self remains elusive. In Kant’s version of subjec- tivity, self-consciousness emerges from intellectual intuition, a prereflective sense of the self’s existence as the subject of different experiences over time; the construction of the subject is therefore a synthetic act, realized through transcendental deduction. However, this formulation contains a surprisingly unmotivated version of the self, with no clear account of its origin.
In Fichte’s answer to this dilemma, the self posits itself through its oppo- sition to a material object, a nonself he calls theNicht-ich, and becomes
self-conscious by differentiating theIch from the Nicht-ich and declaring “I
am I.” Still, Fichte’s explanation of self-consciousness relies on a potentially solipsistic moment and does not sufficiently address the ultimate cause of the process. In response, theSystemprogramm fragment provides the moti-
vation for this critical moment by describing the process as a free, aesthetic choice to become self-conscious, the result of a desire for beauty – a long- ing for order in the material that also seems to lack sufficient grounds for its existence. Similarly, Schelling describes the act of self-positing through an aesthetic encounter with the self, the unification of subject and object
34 H¨olderlin’s Deutscher Gesang
through a continuous process of the self becoming its own object, combin- ing the self-positing aspects of Fichte’s version with the desire for order in theSystemprogramm fragment, yet not entirely resolving the difficulties of
either.
In different ways and to varying degrees, these accounts rely on the category of the aesthetic to mediate the encounter between subject and object, either as the experience of precognitive sensation in general or as an encounter with beauty in particular. However, the relationship between these two versions of the aesthetic remains unclear, as does the overall relationship between theoretical descriptions of self-consciousness and the actual experience of the thinking self. Theoretical descriptions of the self that rely on a purely abstract idea of the aesthetic leave the practical experi- ence of selfhood relatively unexamined. Likewise, purely Kantian, formalist views of art do not provide a sufficient, or useful, account of the relation- ship between the self and the creative process. In other words, at this point in intellectual history, the aesthetic has become the focal point for both philosophical and artistic development. The next chapter in the history of Idealist philosophy is therefore also the next chapter in the history of Romantic art and would be written by a figure long underestimated in both philosophy and poetry: Friedrich H¨olderlin.
H¨olderlin published few of his literary works and none of his philo- sophical texts during his lifetime; he nevertheless provided one of the most interesting and influential accounts of the connection between aesthetics and metaphysics. A fragmentary essay known as “Urtheil und Seyn,” set the stage for a complex set of transitions – first from metaphysics to aesthetics, then from poetics to poetry – in which musical form plays a critical role in reconciling philosophy with poetry, and the theoretical with the practical. The essay was probably written as an immediate response to Fichte’s Jena lectures in 1794 or 1795 and represents the beginning of H¨olderlin’s turn toward poetry.
In making the difficult transformation from philosopher to poet, H¨olderlin establishes the vital connection between self-consciousness and the material world of art and life; he constitutes himself as a poet through the act of creation, and constitutes a musical-poetic voice, orGesang, within
the text of the poem. Close readings of the essays “Urtheil und Seyn,” (“Judgment and Being”) and “Wechsel der T¨one,” (“Change of Tone”) and several of H¨olderlin’s later poems reveals that H¨olderlin’s ideal of a unified poetry and music reflects a synthesis of subject and object in poetry that resolves the questions brought up in what we may call his
“Urtheil und Seyn”: Existence in Poetry 35 “poetological” writings, following the practice of the Schlegel brothers, although H¨olderlin probably did not use this term himself.1 In a series
of metaphors positing and resolving the dialectical oppositions between musical sound and poetic text, human existence and divine transcendence, and ancient Greece and modern Hesperia (H¨olderlin’s term for the Euro- pean West), H¨olderlin addresses the central problem of Idealist philosophy: the fission between the abstractions of philosophy and the materiality of existence. H¨olderlin’s resolution of this division consists in the concrete realization of the self in the music of poetry, seen as a material manifesta- tion of the existence of the divine in the human, and of being in aesthetic judgment.
“urtheil und seyn”: existence in poetry
Between 1794 and 1800, H¨olderlin wrote a series of short, unpublished essays on philosophy and poetry – many of which exist only as fragments – as well as many letters addressing those topics. Several excellent studies (in particular those by Kurz,2Henrich,3 and Frank4) examine the concept of self-consciousness in H¨olderlin’s early philosophical writings, establishing his importance as a contributor to the circle of philosophers gathered in Jena during the late 1790s, which included his comrades at the T¨ubinger Stift, Hegel and Schelling. During this time, H¨olderlin wrote his most famous, and probably earliest, attempt to confront the problem of subjectivity: the fragmentary essay known as “Urtheil und Seyn.” This fragment, written on the flyleaf of a book between May 1794 and April 1795, represents a remarkably early critique of Fichte, and, as Dieter Henrich has observed, a new direction in the history of Idealist thought.5
In particular, the essay confronts two major issues: the subject-object division of being and the difference between the theoretical, philosophical “I” and the practical, individual “I.” To address the first issue, H¨olderlin creates a spurious etymology of the word “Urtheil,” “judgment”:
Judgment. in the highest and strictest sense is the original separation of object and subject which are most deeply united in intellectual intuition, that separation through which alone object and subject become possible, the arche-separation. In the concept of separation, there lies already the concept of the oppositional relationship of object and subject to each other, and the necessary presupposition of a whole, of which object and subject form the parts. “I am I” is the most suitable example for this concept of judgment as theoretical separation, for in practical judgment it opposes thenot-I, not itself.6
36 H¨olderlin’s Deutscher Gesang
The etymology of “Urtheil” (“Urteil” in modern spelling) H¨olderlin creates
for this occasion immediately sets two major, recognizable concepts in Idealist thought in conflict with each other. The first, Kant’s concept of judgment as the pre-cognitive moment of sensory awareness, presupposes the presence of a subject, yet the second, Fichte’s self-positing and self- conscious subject, presupposes an act of judgment that separates the “I” from the “not-I,” thereby bringing the subject into existence. Fichte’s “I am I” can therefore only posit itself theoretically, because the faculty of judgment required for its existence requires a pre-existing practical self. H¨olderlin’s division of “Urtheil” into “Ur-theil,” that is, his analysis of
judgment as the original or archeseparation of subject and object, therefore makes Fichte’s version of self-consciousness paradoxical. The declaration of “I am I” requires judgment to give it an “I” and a “not-I,” yet the faculty of judgment requires an “I” to possess it. The theoretical subject cannot posit both the existence of the practical subject and the subject-object relation, because the ability to posit anything requires a practical subject with the faculty of judgment to do any positing at all. Neither judgment nor self- consciousness can take place without an existing framework consisting of a practical subject, a material object, and a process of self-reflection, all of which presuppose being, which H¨olderlin discusses on the other side of the flyleaf.
The side entitled “Seyn,” “Being,” which Beißner assumes to be its sec- ond part (a highly contested issue7), attempts to explain the relationship
between Fichte’s absolute “I” and the practical “I” through the concept of intellectual intuition, the concept Kant used as the basis for his version of self-consciousness. In H¨olderlin’s view, being in itself, a unified being, exists only prior to the subject-object division, as in the case of Kant’s intellectual intuition but not in Fichte’s absolute “I.” Because the absolute, self-positing “I” must reflect both on the “not-I” and the “I,” it ismerely an “I,” able to
posit itself as a subject but unable to posit the totality of existence preceding the separation of subject and object. The theoretical “I” that posits its own existence by saying “I am I” cannot therefore posit the already presupposed practical self as a means of achieving self-consciousness. Consequently, H¨olderlin asks how self-consciousness is possible at all:
How can I say: I! without self-consciousness? But how is self-consciousness possible? By this means, in opposing myself with myself, I separate myself from myself, but regardless of this separation of myself in opposition, I recognize myself as the same. But to what extent the same? I can, I must ask this way; for in another respect it opposes itself. Therefore, identity is not a unity of object and subject that would merely take place, therefore identity is not equivalent to absolute being.8
“Urtheil und Seyn”: Existence in Poetry 37 “Opposing myself with myself” in this context means creating not only the fact of self-reflection through opposition but also positing the elements of the opposition itself. In H¨olderlin’s view, the self posits an objectified ver- sion of itself in opposition to the subjective self, creating self-consciousness through the difference between the subjective self and the self-as-object, that is, between the practical “I” that performs the actions of the subject and the theoretical “I” that is the object of this philosophical inquiry. Fichtean self-consciousness would therefore require the “I” to posit both the subject and the unity of subject and object simultaneously, unifying subject and object through the act of self-positing, yet separating them through judg- ment, the Urteil of the other side of the flyleaf. As Dieter Henrich observes, H¨olderlin has concluded that neither the practical nor the theoretical “I” can simply create being:
For H¨olderlin, whose theme, along with Plato and Schiller, was the possibility of unification, the reason he gives in “Judgment and Being” could easily become compelling: one must conceive, prior to the distinction between subject and object that constitutes all consciousness, a whole that always remains unknowable.9
Despite its remarkable insights, “Urtheil und Seyn” remains a fragmentary, unfinished project, and H¨olderlin’s subsequent career in philosophy does not reveal anything that supersedes it, even if he is the actual author of the
Systemprogramm fragment written two years later.
Although H¨olderlin enjoyed moderate success in both publication and social life, he left Jena shortly after composing this fragment, in May or June of 1795, for reasons that remain unclear. He moved to Frankfurt, a city he hated, and expressed considerable regret for having left Jena.10While visiting his mother in N¨urtingen in September of 1795, he wrote to Schiller about working on the problem further:
I intend to develop the idea of an unending progress of philosophy, I intend to show that the undiminished demand that must be made on every system, the unification of subject and object in an absolute – I or whatever one wants to call it – is indeed aesthetically, in intellectual intuition, or at least theoretically possible, but only through an infinite approximation, like the approximation of a square in a circle, and that in order to realize such a system of thought, immortality is just as necessary as it is for a system of behavior. I believe I am able to prove by this means the extent to which the skeptics are correct, and the extent to which they are incorrect.11
Although H¨olderlin had mentioned a philosophical project in several other letters, including one to his friend Niethammer where he mentions an idea for “Neue Briefe ¨uber ¨asthetische Erziehung,”12no trace of a formal
38 H¨olderlin’s Deutscher Gesang
version of this system remains, unless, of course, he is referring to “Urtheil und Seyn” itself or theSystemprogramm fragment; no definitive evidence
for either conclusion has emerged. The description of this project in this letter nevertheless makes an interesting comparison between any possi- ble account of subjectivity and the well-known mathematical problem of squaring the circle, that is, finding a method for precisely replicating the area of a given circle in the form of square, using only a straightedge and compass. Although conclusive proof that this task is impossible would not arrive until 1882,13Leibniz’s and Newton’s calculus had already established that only an increasingly accurate approximation could be achieved by the methods available to mathematicians in 1795; the problem is therefore emblematic of both an infinitely receding goal (using current methods) and a problem that might be solved through an innovative approach. In addi- tion, H¨olderlin states somewhat cryptically that “immortality” would be as necessary for solving the problem as it would for a “system of behavior.” Does H¨olderlin mean that thetask would require immortality to complete,
or does he mean that aconcept of immortality would be necessary for such
a system? The letter supports either reading, but I find it more likely that H¨olderlin has returned to Descartes’ proof of the immortality of the soul by dividing consciousness or the mind from the body in theMeditations on First Philosophy.14In that case, H¨olderlin’s solution to the unification of subject and object, as he admits in the letter, is onlytheoretically possible
unless it occurs “aesthetically, in intellectual intuition,” as he had described it in “Urtheil und Seyn.”
Moreover, the possibility that his friends would help him realize – and publish – this system diminished rapidly. Other letters from the period indicate that H¨olderlin had broken with the entire Jena group for either personal or philosophical reasons; he would not attempt to renew his friend- ship with Schelling until years later.15Schelling’s solution to the problem of
self-consciousness, as I indicated in the first chapter, was indeed an approx- imation based on an infinite regression; if H¨olderlin was aware of this solution, the letter seems to indicate that he found it inadequate. Whether H¨olderlin abandoned his philosophical project due to his own circum- stances, the general dissolution of the Jena circle, or a discouragement with the possibilities of philosophy, he did not continue working directly on philosophical prose. Continuing this approach would correspond roughly to an attempt to square the circle using calculus – an infinite task, already tried many times. Another discourse entirely would be the only hope of solving the problem; for this reason, he began his famous turn toward poetry.
“Urtheil und Seyn”: Existence in Poetry 39 Turning to poetry, therefore, did not mean abandoning the problem of being; on the contrary, poetry, particularly for H¨olderlin, provides an entirely different and more congruous approach to the problem. The dif- ference between philosophy and poetry is their mode of being in itself, and the history of modern H¨olderlin criticism provides ample demonstra- tions of this fact. In “H¨olderlin und das Wesen der Dichtung” (“H¨olderlin and the Essence of Poetry”), Martin Heidegger declares H¨olderlin to be the “Dichter des Dichters,” the “poet of the poet” who defines and cre- ates poetic existence.16Although Heidegger uses his readings of H¨olderlin’s poetry to support his own philosophical system (Adorno17and de Man,18
among others, have made this abundantly clear), he nevertheless provides valuable insight into the status of the poet in H¨olderlin’s poetry:
The poet himself stands between the former – the Gods, and the latter – the people. But alone and first in this Between it is decided, who the human being should be, and where he should settle his being. “Humanity lives poetically on this earth.” Without interruption and with increasing certainty, from the fullness of the surging images and more and more simply, H¨olderlin has consecrated this in-between realm with his poetic word.19
Despite the dubious textual evidence Heidegger himself cites in his essays on H¨olderlin,20H¨olderlin’s more certain texts support Heidegger’s overall
claims. Here, Heidegger poses the question of the ontology of the poet in terms of the poet’s metaphysical location, “where he settles his being,” a place between a series of related oppositional terms and outside of human society. H¨olderlin’s poetry abounds with references to figures who are also outsiders and mediators, including Christ, Bacchus, and Rousseau. Hei- degger correctly describes them as “Hinausgeworfener,” “thrown-out ones,” exiles who create their own context and identity in a Zwischenbereich, an
area of between-ness.
As a poet, H¨olderlin stands between many worlds, but his poetry creates a particular ontological space. The poem itself is theZwischenbereich, as Paul
de Man’s commentary on Heidegger’s interpretation of H¨olderlin makes clear:
Each poem, or every work seen as a whole, is a particular version of the under- standing that a poetic consciousness possesses of its own specific and autonomous intent – or, to put it differently, each work asks the question of its own mode of being, and it is the task of the interpreter not to answer this question but to make explicit in what manner and with what degree of awareness the question is asked. The intent of poetic language is certainly not directed toward empirical insight, nor is it transcendental in the sense that it leads to a closer contact with being in
40 H¨olderlin’s Deutscher Gesang
general; its intent is ontological, that is, directed toward an awareness of its own particular being.21
The vital distinction between poetry and other modes of discourse – espe- cially philosophy – is in the self-awareness of poetic language as poetic
language, “its awareness of its own particular being.” This statement does not reflect a mythologized valorization of poetry in general, nor does it intend to indicate that H¨olderlin’s poetry contains some mystical quality; rather, it simply means that in H¨olderlin’s poetry, the poem’s formal ele- ments – rhythm, meter, trope, modality, diction and so forth – and the indications of its status as poetry in the poem’s content create a form of poetic self-consciousness by reflecting on the conditions of the poem’s exis- tence. In other words, the philosophical act of saying “I am I” becomes both a theoretical and a practical statement when performed in poetic discourse because thematerial of poetry is, in fact, language, and a declaration of