2.2.1. Psychological Arguments
Some scholars have investigated the causes of geno/politicide by focusing on leaders’
psychological conditions. They argue that political leaders do not always commit mass murder in a premeditative manner (Fein, 1993). Elites’ mental and emotive states can influence the outbreak of geno/politicide. A few researchers underscore leaders’
mental pathology. They claim that elites usually do not lean toward mass killing because their conscience deters them from infringing severely upon human dignity.
Mental disease or deviation eliminates this qualm, which makes it easier for the elites to perpetrate mass killing (Decalo, 1989). For instance, in the 1970s, then Equatorial Guinean dictator, Francisco Macías Nguema, routinized atrocities and as a result, at least 50,000 citizens were murdered under his rule (White, 2005). Decalo (1989) maintains that Nguema’s mental derangement accounts for his barbarous behavior.
The emphasis on leaders’ mental pathology is subject to certain critiques. First, the fact that mentally ill rulers perpetrated extensive mass killing does not necessarily indicate a causal linkage between mental disorder and mass killing. Second, scholars who support this argument have not proposed clear criteria for ‘mentally ill’ leaders.
Thus, determining which leaders had mental disorder is highly arbitrary. Third, the mental pathology argument disregards that elites who do not suffer from mental disease or deviation might be willing to jettison their moral scruples and undertake savage actions in order to achieve their goals. Finally, any human rights violations can
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be attributed to mental pathology. That is, leaders’ mental disease can account for not just mass killing, but also any actions that do not entail killing but impinge on human dignity.
Other scholars contend that leaders’ feeling of revenge rather than mental pathology triggers mass killing. The desire for revenge, sought for honor and pride against a collective entity, eradicates whatever moral scruples the avenger may have against committing atrocities (Chirot & McCauley, 2006). In other words, political leaders who think that their honor and pride have been gravely besmirched are willing to take aggressive and cruel retributive actions in an attempt to restore their damaged honor and pride. The obliteration of Hereros by German colonialists in German
Southwest Africa (currently Namibia) epitomizes genocide instigated by feeling of
revenge (Chirot & McCauley, 2006). In 1904, Hereros launched rebellion against abusive German colonizers and initially succeeded in beating German troops. The defeat
enraged German ruling elites and made them perceive that Hereros tarnished the honor of the German Empire. In order to retrieve the sullied honor, German leaders sought ruthless reprisal by orchestrating genocide against Hereros (Chirot & McCauley, 2006).
It is estimated that around 65,000 Hereros, at least 75 percent of the total Herero population, were deliberately slain or starved to death in 1904 and 1905 (Pakenham, 1991; Chirot & McCauley, 2006).
Furthermore, Midlarsky (2005) incorporates prospect theory into the study of genocide. Genocide tends to occur within the domain of loss that is created by ‘the experience of either (1) transfer of territory, population, authority, or some combination
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thereof to another political entity, or (2) military defeat or significant casualties in political violence (e.g., war) that either are about to be or have already been incurred’
(Midlarsky, 2005: 83). The domain of loss generates fear, vulnerability, resentment, and a desire for revenge, which increases the probability of leaders’ perpetrating genocide (Midlarsky, 2005; Straus, 2007).
2.2.2. Rational Choice Arguments
Those who view genocide from rational choice angle criticize psychological arguments, claiming that psychological factors, such as mental pathology, revenge, and emotion, do not account well for the outbreak of mass killing. Mass killing occurs when political leaders realize that it is the best option to accomplish certain political and military objectives (Valentino, 2004). In other words, mass killing is a rationally calculated strategy to achieve important goals. Two situations can provide political leaders with the strong incentive to engineer mass killing. The first one is when elites attempt to disfranchise segments of their population and to deprive these citizens of their homes and possessions or their way of life. Mass killing can be the best option for these leaders because this reprehensible strategy helps to annihilate the influence of the
dissent groups and to overcome or prevent resistance by these groups (Valentino, 2004).
Valentino (2004) suggests that radical communist reform (e.g., agricultural
collectivization in the Soviet Union), ethnic cleansing (e.g., partition of Bangladesh in 1971), and territorial expansion (e.g., German colonial expansion in Namibia from 1904
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to 1907) entail the deprivation of some domestic or indigenous populations, thus giving rise to mass killing.
The second situation is when political leaders are embroiled in war. Kalyvas (1999; 2006) contends that indiscriminate violence operates as a deterrent to civilian defection. Indiscriminate violence collectively penalizes suspected enemy collaborators and those related to them, thus deterring civilians from defecting to the rival actor. In other words, indiscriminate violence is a rational strategy to maximize civilian support (Kalyvas 1999; 2006). Sartre (1968) and Valentino, Huth, & Balch-Lindsay (2004) argue that incumbent rulers6 are likely to perpetrate mass killing when they confront guerilla combatants. Guerillas eschew decisive battles and engage in prolonged campaigns through hit-and-run attacks, assassinations, terror bombing, and other tactics. Guerilla forces also rely heavily on the local population for food, shelter, supplies, and
intelligence (Guevara, 1998 [orig. 1961]; Mao, 2000 [orig. 1961]; Valentino, Huth, &
Balch-Lindsay, 2004). Therefore, it is extremely difficult for government forces to defeat guerilla combatants directly. This predicament incentivizes embattled rulers to
slaughter a great number of civilians suspected of supporting insurgents. The
government orchestrates mass killing in a desperate attempt to destroy rebels’ support bases and thus to squelch the insurgency (Sartre, 1968; Valentino, Huth, & Balch-Lindsay, 2004).
6 On Genocide, Sartre underscores (neo) colonialism as the main cause of genocide. Thus, in the context of his argument, incumbent rulers are Western (neo) colonialists who encountered fierce resistance by the colonized.
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2.2.3. Ideological Perspective
Constructivists assert that intangible elements such as identity, idea, and culture shape state preferences and actions (Wendt, 1999; Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998).
Constructivism lays the basis for ideological perspective on geno/politicide. Harff (2003) posits that genocide and politicide are likely to break out when political leaders seek to materialize ideologies that advocate an extreme view of the world and the
establishment of an idealistic society. These ideologies encompass strict variants of communism, rigid anti-communism, religious extremism, and strict secular nationalism or ethnonationalism. To facilitate the materialization of the ideologies, leaders
eradicate certain ethnonational or political groups that they regard as irreconcilable enemies, even if these groups do not pose a real threat to the leaders. After seizing power in 1975, Pol Pot and his Khmer Rouge comrades who idealized a perfect agrarian communist society relentlessly pursued the radical transformation of the Cambodian society. In an effort to stimulate this process, the Khmer Rouge ruthlessly killed up to two million citizens many of whom were city dwellers, business owners, landlords, intellectuals, and students (Chirot, 1994; Kiernan, 2002).
Some scholars refute ideological perspective. Those who criticize constructivism maintain that ideology is not an independent variable, but an intervening one.
Education, socialization, political turmoil, or other factors shape elites’ ideology. Thus, in explaining geno/politicide, these factors are far more important than ideology.
Kalyvas (1999) also debunks the role of ideology, charging that 1) one ideological tenet can beget multiple courses of action, 2) political leaders often take advantage of
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ideology for the ex-post facto justification of their actions, and 3) ideology accounts little for the temporal and spatial variations of massacres. Midlarsky’s criticism is milder than the previous two. Although acknowledging that utopian belief can be an element in sparking genocide, he claims that it alone cannot capture the whole story of genocide (Midlarsky, 2005). Therefore, scholars must delve into variables that link the belief system to genocide in order to comprehend the origins of genocide fully (Midlarsky, 2005).