PANORAMA GENERAL DE RIESGOS

recommendations and deliberations comprising part of a process by which governmental decisions and policies are formulated.

- Congress undoubtedly has a right to information from the executive branch whenever it is sought in aid of legislation. If the executive branch withholds such information on the

ground that it is executive privileged, it must so assert it and state the reason therefore and why it must be respected.

- When Congress exercises its power of inquiry, the only way for department heads to exempt themselves therefrom is by a valid claim of privilege. They are not exempt by the mere fact that they are department heads. Only one executive

official may be exempted from this power — the President on whom executive power is vested, hence, beyond the reach of Congress except through the power of impeachment. It is based on her being the highest official of the executive branch, and the due respect accorded to a co-equal branch of government which is sanctioned by a long-standing custom.

- The absence of any reference to inquiries in aid of legislation, must be construed as limited in its appearance of department heads in the question hour contemplated in Section 22 of

Article VI, the objective of which is to obtain information in pursuit of Congress’ oversight function.

- The power of oversight embraces all activities undertaken by

Congress to enhance its understanding of and influence over the implementation of legislation it has enacted. Clearly, oversight concerns post-enactment measures undertaken by Congress (a) to monitor bureaucratic compliance with program objectives; (b) to determine whether agencies are properly administered; (c) to eliminate executive waste and dishonesty; (d) to prevent executive usurpation of legislative authority; and (e) to assess executive conformity with the congressional perception of public interest.

- The acts done by Congress purportedly in the exercise of its

oversight powers may be divided into three categories, namely:

scrutiny; investigation and supervision.

- ENROLLED BILL DOCTRINE – Abakada Guro Party List,

et al. vs. Ermita, ed al., October 18, 2005 – the signing of a bill

by the Speaker of the Housa and the Senate Presi`ent and the certification od the Secretaraes of both houses of Congress that it was passed are conclusive of its due enactment.

- A bill originating in the House may undergo such extensive changes in the Senate that the result may be a rewriting of the whole, a distinct bill may be produced. The power of the

even with respect to bills which are required by the Constitution to originate in the House.

- BICAMERAL CONFERENCE COMMITTEE- The Supreme

Court recognizes the long standing legislative practice of giving said conference ample latitude for compromising differences between the Senate and the House. It can propose amendment

in the nature of a substitute, so long as the amendment is germane to the subject of the bills before the committee.

After all, its report was not final but needed the approval of both houses of Congress to become valid as an act of the legislative department.

- Lung Center vs. Quezon City, G.R. No. 144104, June 29, 2004 – Under the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions and RA 7160 in

order to be entitled to the exemption, the petitioner is burdened to prove, by clear and unequivocal proof, that (a) it is a charitable institution; and (b) its real properties are actually, directly, and exclusively used for charitable purposes. “Exclusive” is defined as possessed and enjoyed to the exclusion of others; debarred from participation or enjoyment, and exclusively is defined, in a manner to exclude; as enjoying a privilege exclusively. The words “dominant use” or “principal use” cannot be substituted for the words “used exclusively” without doing violence to the Constitution and the law. Solely is synonymous with exclusively.

- Suplico, et al. vs. Romulo Neri, et al, GR No. 178830, July 14, 2008- Any government expenditure without the corresponding appropriation from Congress is unconstitutional. There can be no dispute that the proceeds of foreign loans, whether concluded or not, cannot be obligated in a procurement contract without a prior appropriation from Congress. When the executive branch secures a loan to fund a procurement of goods or services, the loan proceeds enter the National Treasury as part of the general funds of the government. Congress must appropriate by law the loan proceeds to fund the procurement of goods or services, otherwise the loan proceeds cannot be spent by the executive branch. When the loan falls due, Congress must make another appropriation law authorizing the repayment of the loan out of the general funds in the National Treasury. This appropriation for the repayment of the loan is what is covered by the automatic appropriation

ARTICLE VII

(PRESIDENT)

- PRESIDENTIAL IMMUNITY- The immunity enjoyed by a

sitting president evolved through case law.

Soliven vs. Makasiar- The privilege pertains to the President by

virtue of the office. There is nothing in our laws that would prevent the President from waiving the privilege. The choice of whether to exercise the privilege or to waive it is solely the President’s prerogative.

Estrada vs. Desierto- There is no basis in the contention that

the immunity of the President extends to the end of the term to which he was elected notwithstanding his resignation. It is clear that the immunity of the President from suit is concurrent

only with his tenure (representing the period during which the

incumbent actually holds office) and not his term (the time during which the officer may claim to hold office as a matter of right).

Romualdez vs. Sandiganbayan, 435 SCRA 371- Executive

immunity applied only during the incumbency of a President.

David, et al. vs. Ermita, et al., April 20, 2006 – It is not proper

to implead President Arroyo as respondent. Settled is the doctrine that the President, during his tenure of office or actual incumbency, may not be sued in any civil or criminal case, and there is no need to provide for it in the Constitution or law.

- SUPREME COURT AS PRESIDENTIAL ELECTORAL

TRIBUNAL- Lopez vs. Roxas, 17 SCRA 755- When the law

grants the Supreme Court the power to resolve an election contest between or among presidential candidates, no new or separate court is created. The law merely conferred upon the Supreme Court the functions of a Presidential Electoral Tribunal. - The power of Congress to declare who, among the candidates for

President and/or Vice-President has obtained the largest number of votes, is entirely different in nature from and not inconsistent with the jurisdiction vested in the Presidential Electoral Tribunal by RA 1793. Congress merely acts as national board of

canvassers, charged with the ministerial and executive duty to make said declaration, on the basis of the election returns duly certified by provincial and city boards of canvassers. Upon the other hand, the Presidential Electoral tribunal has the judicial power to determine whether or not said duly

certified election returns have been irregularly made or tampered with or reflect the true results of the elections in the areas covered by each and, if not, to recount the ballots cast, and incidentally thereto, pass upon the validity of each ballot or determine whether the same shall be counted, and, in the affirmative, in whose favor, which Congress has no power to do.

- In assuming the Office of Senator protestant Santiago has effectively abandoned or withdrawn her protest to the election protestee Ramos as President. (Santiago v. Ramos, 253 SCRA

559).

- Citing Defensor Santiago v. Ramos, the PET stressed that Legarda effectively abandoned or withdrawn her protest when she ran in the Senate, which term coincides with the term of the Vice-Presidency 2004-2010. (Min. Res., PET Case No. 003,