4. ANÁLISIS DE LOS DATOS Y RESULTADOS
4.2 Papel de la mujer rural
European rules to strengthen the regulation of the banking sector (28) were also
proposed (the CRD IV package), but agreement is yet to be found in the Council.
Financial transaction tax
The introduction of an EU-wide financial transaction tax (FTT) was high on the agenda in 2012. An FTT, as proposed (29) by the Commission in 2011, would fa-
cilitate the financial sector in making a fair contribution to public finances and participating in the cost of rebuilding Europe’s economies.
Moreover, an FTT could significantly reduce the contributions of Member States to the EU budget. In May, the Parliament strongly supported the Commission’s proposal. However, on 22 June, it became clear that support in the Council of Ministers for an FTT as proposed by the Commission was not unanimous. In Oc- tober, 11 Member States (30) addressed a letter to the Commission to request the
launch of the enhanced cooperation procedure in the area of FTT, which would allow them to proceed with such a taxation measure. At the 13 November Eco- nomic and Financial Affairs Council, the Netherlands expressed its interest in joining the group under certain conditions. On 12 December, the European Parlia- ment gave its consent to the procedure with an overwhelming majority (81 % of the votes expressed) while discussions to authorise the smaller group of Member States to introduce a harmonised FTT are still ongoing in the Council. Such a deci- sion shall be taken at qualified majority. Once this authorisation is given the Commission will table a proposal on the content, scope and implementing details of the tax.
state aid
The Commission’s role under the state aid rules (31) has ensured a coordinated
approach to bank restructuring while maintaining a level playing field. The crisis state aid rules for banks pursue a triple objective of preserving a level playing field in the internal market, safeguarding financial stability and restructuring aid beneficiaries for long-term viability without state support. Banks were required to move away from unsustainable business models based on excessive leverage and overreliance on short-term wholesale funding and encouraged to focus again on core business. The Commission is the only institution that explicitly imposes burden-sharing conditions on bailouts, helping to curtail moral hazard in the fu- ture, and requires proportionate measures to limit the distortions of competition resulting from the aid.
Throughout 2012, the Commission continued to use state aid control to help re- store a sound financial sector. Even when banks rely heavily on state aid, they can be allowed to stay on the market when parts of their activities continue to have a realistic prospect of returning to viability. This is the case provided that they considerably reduce their size and substantially change their business model to focus only on viable activities. The Commission is thereby making sure that banks use no more than what is necessary of taxpayers’ money to restructure and that they can function without public support in the future. Restoring a healthier finan- cial sector capable of financing the real economy is indispensable for economic recovery in Europe.
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This approach is illustrated, for example, by the approval of the restructuring of Banco Português de Negócios (BPN). The restructuring plan includes the sale of BPN to Banco BIC Portugal.
The Commission also dealt with a series of restructuring aid cases concerning the German landesbanken, which previously relied heavily on aid. The banks have been significantly restructured with a realistic prospect of returning to viability. In July, the Commission finalised the last two cases, being BayernlB and NordlB. They were allowed to stay on the market provided that they change their busi- ness model and focus on viable activities. In particular as regards BayernlB, the Commission imposed a significant downsizing of the bank and an obligation to pay back €5 billion of the rescue aid which exceeded the minimum necessary of state aid required for the restructuring.
The Commission further reacted in May to the partial annulment by the Court of its ING decision of 2009, by issuing a new restructuring decision — with the ad- ditional analysis requested by the Court — confirming that the plan ING pre- sented in 2009 allowed restored viability and mitigated distortions of competi- tion.
In December, the Commission approved the orderly resolution of the Dexia group. Since 2008, Dexia had benefitted from significant public support measures, which were authorised on the basis of a restructuring plan by the Commission in 2010. As Dexia was not able to implement the restructuring plan and faced fur- ther difficulties, Belgium, France and luxembourg acknowledged the necessity of resolving the Dexia group. While the residual group is being run down, the Belgian entity has been bought by the Belgian state and renamed Belfius while the main French activities concerning municipal lending became part of a new develop- ment bank in France.
State aid control was also decisive in the context of the Commission’s assess- ment of banks’ restructuring plans in programme countries. Here the Commis- sion’s role has evolved considerably over the past months, and has in the case of Spain come close to conducting a resolution process (32). The Commission has
always been a central player in the resolution of banks, but its powers have been strengthened recently in the Spanish programme.
S T R E N G T H E N I N G E C O N O M I C G O V E R N A N C E A N D F I N A N C I A l S T A B I l I T Y I N T H E E U R O P E A N U N I O N 45
The memorandum of understanding with Spain made the granting of ESM sup- port for the recapitalisation of Spanish banks conditional upon the Commission’s approval of those banks’ restructuring plans. This meant that no funds could be disbursed before the Commission was satisfied that the criteria of its respective state aid rules — restoration of long-term viability, adequate burden-sharing and appropriate limitations of distortions of competition — were met. This mech- anism ensured greater supervision by the Commission in resolving the Spanish banks, and led to a significant acceleration of the procedure; it took less than 6 months to approve the restructuring plans of eight Spanish banks.
The Commission concluded in November that the restructuring plans of four other Spanish banks — BFA/Bankia, NCG Banco, Catalunya Banc and Banco de Valencia — are in line with EU state aid rules. The in-depth restructuring under- gone by BFA/Bankia, NCG Banco and Catalunya Banc will allow them to become viable in the long term without continued state support. Moreover, the banks and their stakeholders are adequately contributing to the costs of restructuring. Fi- nally, the plans foresee sufficient safeguards to limit the distortions of competi- tion induced by the state support. Because its viability could not be restored on a stand-alone basis, Banco de Valencia will cease to exist as an independent entity and will be sold and integrated into CaixaBank.
In December, the Commission approved the restructuring plans of the four Span- ish banks liberbank, Caja3, Banco Mare Nostrum and Banco CEISS. The plans will ensure that the banks return to long-term viability as sound credit institutions in Spain. Banco CEISS will be sold, and Banco Mare Nostrum and liberbank will need to be listed on the stock exchange before the end of the restructuring period. Caja3 will cease to exist as a stand-alone entity.
In 2012, the Commission proposed a reform of state aid. See Chapter 3 for more details.
The Bankia bank headquarters in Madrid, Spain.
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