Papeles de trabajo

The issue of programme financing follows from the issue of lack of support services that has been pointed out in the preceding section. The assumption under programme financing is that market–based land reform models factor in a cash grant for beneficiaries of the reform that caters for the purchase of land, and post–transfer development projects.100 Further assumptions are that the ‘flexibility’ of the models ensures that there is no hand–out mentality among the beneficiaries; there is no basis for universal subsidies since grants are ‘superior’ to subsidies; grants can be targeted and eliminate ‘distortive effects’ and in the process keep the cost of land low; and, finally, since the State is not involved, the transactions costs are low following the elimination of ‘expensive government bureaucracies’.101

However, implementation of the models has shown that the critique of State– led land reform is misplaced in respect of programme financing of market–based land reform. Implementation of market–based land reform models is extremely expensive. Some scholars have argued that the irony is that for the implementation to attain a likelihood of success, it must rest on sound fiscal resources of the implementing State.102 This is problematic because most countries grappling with unresolved land questions have weak economies and often rely on grants from the Bretton Woods Institutions, particularly the World Bank, for the implementation of their land reform

98 _{See S Borras, Jr., note 12, 54.} 99 _{See R Hall, note 67, 100.} 100

See S Borras, Jr., note 12, 56.

101 _{See S Borras, Jr., note 12, 57.}

projects. Immediately, this raises issues of legitimacy, accountability and independence in tackling the country–specific land question. Even in relatively stronger economies that are engaged with the resolution of the land question such as South Africa, adequacy of funds to support land reform is a serious constraint of the implementation process because, more often than not, the projected required funding is humongous.103 Hence, far from the State taking a passive role, the State is required to provide financial guarantees for the success of the reform.

V FINAL WORD

It has been noted that the impetus for market–based land reform models has been the increased dominance of market as value in mainstream development discourse and the failure of State–led land reform in the 1960s, 1970s and early 1980s. The dominance of market as value also emerges in the context of asymmetrical inter–State relations at the global level. Some States are more powerful than others and the power game is played out in the confines of the Bretton Woods Institutions. Indeed, in the context of resolving a land question, the assumption of support from the Bretton Woods Institutions or the State only serves to entrench skewed land relations that do not favour the land deprived.

However, it has also been noted that market–based land reform models are not without their own problems. Three issues have been highlighted here: the influence of erstwhile land owners does not augur well for a purported level playing field in the implementation of the reform models; lack of post–redistribution support services raises the likelihood of a return to pre–redistribution land relations; and thirdly, the reforms are capital intensive such that in cases of countries with weak economies, the likelihood of the resolution of the land question is seriously undermined. Under the scheme of market–based land reform models, I have concluded that they account for hegemonic responsibilization in so far as the relationship of an erstwhile land owner as a producer and a land deprived as a source of cheap wage labour or as an inchoate producer is entrenched. Further, the assumption of support from the Bretton Woods Institutions or the State only entrenches the status quo of skewed land relations.104 At any rate, the land deprived do not have any meaningful in–put in shaping the land

103 _{See R Hall, note 67, 101–102.}

reform models. In this respect, the negotiability of the interests of the land deprived is ‘ended’ and the scheme tilts in favour of the erstwhile land owners.105

Chapter 3 is a watershed. In general terms, under Chapters 1, 2, and this Chapter, I have been discussing the ‘normative terrain’ that underpins this thesis. In Chapters 4, 5 and 6, I delve into the specific law and policy interventions that have been put in place in the task to resolve the land question in Malawi. Chapter 4 deals with the history the land question in Malawi. Chapter 5 focuses on the policy initiatives that have been put in place in the country to resolve the land question. The main focus here is the National Land Policy. In Chapter 6, I look at the various interests of the key constituencies relating to the land question in Malawi; namely the Bretton Woods Institutions, the postcolonial State, the Achikumbe, and the land deprived. The discussion of this interaction examines the extent to which the interests of these constituencies enhance or undermine the resolution of the land question. In sum, Chapters 4, 5 and 6 contain the more ‘empirical’ trajectory of the thesis.

105 _{See for example E Lahiff ‘“Willing Buyer, Willing Seller”: South Africa’s Failed Experiment in}

Chapter 4

The Land Question: A Historicized and Contextualized Narrative of Land