La parábola del hijo pródigo en sus doce elementos místicos.

Modern cognitive science and philosophy have inherited the conception of the mind as a kind of entity from Descartes. Descartes’ view of the mind replaced a tradition of Aristotelian thought, which provided the first conceptual framework for the investigation of human psychology. Following Kenny (1984, 1989), the following discussion will provide an outline of Aristotelian psychology and ideas about the mind. By comparing the Aristotelian and Cartesian frameworks of thought directly, it will be possible to illustrate the misleading features of the Cartesian framework concisely, which lead to the entity view of mind. Furthermore, it will provide a powerful argument for the (re-) endorsement of the Aristotelian conceptual framework in philosophy and cognitive science, which construes the soul or mind not as an entity but as a characteristic attribute of (all) living beings. As Jonathan Barnes points out, Aristotle’s concept of mind is

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Note: Language is the means by which we represent and understand the world. It originates in the socio-cultural microcosms of human experience, viz. their forms of life. As such language mirrors the intellectual landscape of a culture. It is for this reason that tracing the conceptual connections of the concepts of a language can reveal an entire history of thought.

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‘at least as good a buy as anything else currently on the philosophical market. Philosophy of mind has for centuries been whirled between a Cartesian Charybdis and a scientific Scylla: Aristotle has the look of an Odysseus.’126

3.1 The Aristotelian Conception of the

In his treatise De Anima, Aristotle lays out his psychology at the centre of which lies the idea of the (anima (lat.)). For Aristotle the or soul127 was not a separate entity existing besides the body, but rather, was to be understood as the characteristic powers of a given living being (DA414a20-21). This conception stands in stark contrast to the immaterial substance which Descartes had envisioned, and the glutinous substance contemporary cognitive science envisages. In an Aristotelian context, the soul, is to be understood as a biological concept, and not as a metaphysical one as in the Cartesian tradition. Consequently, the Aristotelian and Cartesian views represent two fundamentally different conceptions of the nature of man. For Aristotle, his conception of the soul is the principal of both animal and vegetable life (DA, 402a7-8).

Aristotle believed in a hierarchy of three different kinds of soul existing in nature:

a. The nutritive soul, which he conceived to be the most fundamental principle of life. It is the power in virtue of which all biological organisms are said to have life, viz. growth, nutrition and reproduction (DA,415a23-26).

b. The sensitive soul, which comprises the powers of perception, desire and locomotion. The sensitive soul is only possessed by higher organisms such as non-human and human animals. Plants, on the other hand, only possess a nutritive soul.

c. The rational soul, which is unique to human beings or creatures similar or even superior to human beings (DA,414b27-28) and comprises the powers of intellect (thought/reasoning) and volition. Characteristically, Aristotle’s conception of the (rationale) soul is also devoid of any ethical or religious connotations.

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Barnes J (2003) ‘Aristotle’s Concept of Mind’, in: Articles on Aristotle – Psychology & Aesthetics, Barnes J, Schofield M, Sorabji R (eds.), London, Duckworth

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Henceforth the term soul, which is the traditional translation of the Aristotelian term , will be used to refer the Aristotelian conception of the mental.

Aristotle’s conception of the soul sprang from his ideas on matter and form. The soul, so Aristotle, is the form of a natural body, which has life (DA, 412a20). Every natural body, which has life is a substance, in the sense of being a composite (DA, 412a15-16). The concept of substance is related to the concept of matter, as substance is an umbrella term denoting,

‘…matter, which in itself is not a this; secondly, shape or form, which is that precisely in virtue of which something is called a this, and thirdly that which is compounded of both.’ (DA 412a6- 9)

All natural bodies including non-living and living bodies possess both form and matter. In order to describe the form of living bodies one has to describe their souls, as they are the forms of those natural bodies, which are (potentially) alive (DA 412a19-21)128. Thus, to specify the form of a body is to say what kind of thing it is and to define the form is to state what it is to be that kind of thing.

The distinction between form and matter provides the basis for Aristotle’s understanding and description of persistence through change. As Bennett and Hacker point out,

‘Aristotle introduced the notion of matter as a technical term to pick out that which has a capacity for substantial change, and form to pick out that which makes a certain matter into the kind of substance it is.’ 129

It is in this way that Aristotle came to conceive of the soul as the form of the living body. At the same time, Aristotle also thought of the soul as the first actuality of the living body, viz. the unexercised dispositional power of an animal (DA412b6-7). In contrast, Aristotle refers to the exercise of a dispositional power as a second actuality. In general, the actualities of a substance are both the things a substance is and the things a substance can be engaged in (e.g. the things the substance is doing) at a certain time. Aristotle counts the powers of a substance, which includes both the active and the passive potentialities the substance possesses, among the

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It has been pointed out that as far as Aristotle was concerned, the Greek language already had a term, , to denote the forms possessed by living bodies (a subclass of natural bodies). (see: Everson S ‘Psychology’, in: The Cambridge Companion to Aristotle, Barnes J ed., Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1995).

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Bennett & Hacker (2002) ‚The Motor System in Neuroscience: A History and Analysis of Conceptual Developments’, Progress In Neurobiology 67:1-52

substances´ actualities130. It is important to note that Aristotle does not want the soul to be understood as being a part of the body or one thing with the body. This, he remarked, would be like thinking that the wax is identical to the imprint on it (DA412b8-9). Rather, soul is in general

‘substance in accordance with the account of the thing. And this is the `being what it was´ for a body of this kind. In the same way, if some tool, say an axe, were a natural body, its substance would be being an axe, and this then would be its soul. And if this were separated from it, it would not continue to be an axe, except homonymously, whereas as it is, it is an axe.’ (DA412b13-17)

That is, the axe derives its power to chop from its being constituted by the matter of iron and wood formed into matter and handle. The form of the axe is its power to chop. The power to chop wood is the first actuality of the axe.

This short exegesis illustrates how Aristotle came to conceive of the soul as an attribute of a living thing, viz. its characteristic powers, rather than an immaterial substance as envisioned by Descartes.

‘…substance is, as we said, spoken of in three ways, as form, as matter, and as the composite, and of these matter is potentiality, form actuality, and since the composite is in this case the ensouled thing, it is not that the body is the actuality of the soul but that the soul is the actuality of some body. And for this reasons they have supposed well who believed that the soul is neither without body nor a kind of body.’

In conceiving of the soul as the powers of a living being, rather than as an entity existing independent of the body, Aristotle’s ideas stand not only in opposition to the conception of mind which was offered (much later) by Descartes but also to the teachings of his contemporary Plato. Both Plato and Descartes thought of the soul as an entity enjoying an existence separate from the body. Consequently, in contrast to the dualist Platonic and Cartesian psychological frameworks, Aristotle never runs into the difficulty of having to answer questions with regard to the relationship between mind and body. Within the Aristotelian conceptual framework, there is no room for a mind-body problem. Moreover, as Aristotle does not conceive of the soul as and entity, his framework of thought does not invite violations of the logic of

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whole/parthood relationships. Conceiving of the soul as the powers of a living being does not allow for attributing to the soul the distinctive powers of the living being whose soul it is. Aristotle’s urges us

‘not to say that the soul pities or learns or thinks but that the man does in virtue of his soul ’ (DA 408b13-15)

This aspect highlights one of the distinguishing features between classic Cartesian and contemporary ideas about mind encountered in cognitive science. Within these traditions of thought, psychological attributes are ascribed either to the mind (classic Cartesianism) or the brain (modern cognitive science) (see chapter III). The Aristotelian conception of the mind on the other hand, is immune to these kind of mereological errors, and can be a powerful antidote to transgressions of the bounds of sense.

3.2 Aristotle – From a Contemporary Point of View

Anthony Kenny has adapted and developed the Aristotelian conception of the soul in a modern context. In accord with the Aristotelian conception of the soul as the characteristic powers of a living being Kenny suggests that if one is to give a definition of mind at all, it is best to think of the mind as a second order ability, viz the

capacity to acquire intellectual skills131. Understood in this way, the mind is the capacity132 that enables human beings to acquire those skills and abilities, which form

‘the basis to engage in behaviour of the complicated and symbolic kinds which constitute the linguistic, social, moral, economic scientific, cultural, and other characteristic activities of human beings in society.’133

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See: Kenny (1989), p.3ff

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Note: Although, the following will emphasize the conception of mind as a cognitive capacity, following Aristotle’s conception of the rational soul, the mind is not only a cognitive capacity (i.e. comprised of intellect), but also a volitional „capacity“ (i.e. comprised of will). In this context, the human will is to be understood as the ability to act for reasons. Its freedom derives from the special characteristics of practical reasoning.

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The most important skill, which human beings possess, is the knowledge and command of language, as it is through our language ability that we acquire knowledge of other abilities and learn to master and exercise those abilities. To have knowledge of something, simply is to be able to do something. An important distinction that is to be made in this context is that between ability, the possessor of the ability, and the vehicle or mediator of an ability. I am the possessor of my ability to dance, my ability to play guitar, and my abilities to think, imagine, memorize and remember. I am the one who has the ability to do all these things and more. Of course, it is not only human beings who possess abilities of a certain kind. My laptop has the ability to perform calculations with hyper-complex numbers twice as fast as my old machine. Similarly, Neuhauser Zoigl134 can intoxicate you about twice as fast as normal beers can, because of its extraordinary potency. The vehicle of my laptops ability to perform very complex calculations very quickly is the processor inside the machine. The vehicle of the Neuhauser Zoigl`s ability to induce intoxication is the amount of alcohol contained in the beer. Finally, the vehicle of my ability, to dance, to play guitar135, to think, to imagine, to memorize and to remember is the brain. As these examples illustrate, an ability is essentially something intangible. It is, as it were, an abstraction from behaviour136. In contrast, the vehicle of these abilities depicted above is always something solid and concrete. The vehicle of my new laptops’ ability to perform calculations with hyper complex numbers twice as fast as my old machine is the processor inside my new laptop. Similarly, in the case of human beings, the vehicle of their intellectual capacity is the brain. One advantage of this conception of mind is that it provides an unambiguous guideline for empirical investigations:

‘If one is to say what each of these is, for instance what the capacity for thought is, or for perception or nutrition, one should first say what is thinking and perceiving.’ (DA 415a16-17)

That is, in order to understand what the ability to is one needs to understand what it is to . In other words, in order to gain an understanding of the ability to one has to

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Zoigl is an unfiltered, bottom fermented type of beer, and has the status of a Bavarian Delicacy. Its production is restricted to certain areas of the upper palatinate (Oberpfalz), where it is brewed by private individuals in possession of special legal permission to brew.

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Note: It is assumed that both learning how to dance and learning how to play guitar involves a variety of intellectual skills proper such as , thinking, memorizing etc.

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study the exercise of that ability. And in order to study the exercise of the ability to , one needs to have an understanding of the symptoms and criteria adjudicating the use of the concept of ing, i.e one needs to know what counts as ing .

The conception of the mind as a second order ability (i.e. capacity), and of the brain as the vehicle of this second order ability, has important implications for cognitive science. First, it should put a stop to cognitive scientists and philosophers to adopt the entity view of the mind, which in the past has lead to the concoction of imaginative but logically-flawed (i.e. nonsensical) theories of mind-body interaction (e.g. dualism, behaviourism, mind-brain identity theory, functionalism etc.). In the wake of the entity view of the mind a host of questions arose, which have plagued philosophers and cognitive scientists for years. The infamous mind-body problem or the problem of the explanatory gap137 are but two prominent examples. However, the preceding discussion of the concept of mind gives rise to some considerable doubt about their status as (philosophical) problems. It has shown that talk about the human mind does not refer to a kind of thing, but rather to constitutes an idiomatic way of talking about the characteristic powers of human beings, and their exercise. The question ‘what is the mind?’, mistakenly led philosophers and cognitive scientists to view questions about the relationship between mind and body as problem in its own right; a problem, to which there is a solution if one only probes hard enough. With the benefit of an overview of the concept of mind at hand, however, we can see how false grammatical analogies and simplistic questions have led to the illusion of a problem. Consequently, there can be no solution to the mind-body problem. Rather, our informed perspective regarding the concept of mind, should prevent us from granting this age old philosophical problem e very status of a problem. The mind body-problem, simply disappears. Second, it prevents cognitive scientists and philosophers from falling victim to the “substance hunger” of questions like “What is the mind?”, which in turn leads to misconceived definitions and explanations of the workings of the mind as constituted by the cognitive view. Wittgenstein points out, for example, that questions like,

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It is commonly believed that human experience cannot be fully explained by the mechanical processes implied by reductionist conceptions of the mind such as the cognitive view, i.e. there seems to be a gap between mechanics of the brain and the experiential quality of our emotions, sensations etc. Consequently, it is thought that something extra, maybe a substance/entity of different metaphysical kind, must be added to “fill the gap”, as it were.

‘”Die Fragen, Was ist Länge?”, „Was ist Bedeutung?“, „Was ist die Zahl Eins?“ etc., verursachen in uns einen geistigen Krampf. Wir spüren, daß wir auf nichts zeigen können, um sie zu beantworten, und daß wir gleihwohl auf etwas zeigen sollten. (Wir haben es hier mit einer der großen Quellen philosophischer Verwirrung zu tun: ein Substantiv läßt uns nach einem Ding suchen, das ihm entspricht.) (BBD, p.1)

‘"Questions like What is length?", "What is meaning?", "What is the number one?" etc., produce in us a mental cramp. We feel that we can't point to anything in reply to them and yet ought to point to something. (We are up against one of the great sources of philosophical bewilderment: a substantive makes us look for a thing that corresponds to it.’ (BBE,p.1)

On the other hand, adopting an Aristotelian position by viewing the mind as the ability to acquire intellectual abilities illustrates, what kind of insight empirical investigations into the human mind can yield: Thus, neural events and processes can be correlated with the exercise of a human beings ability to think, perceive, imagine etc. Moreover, cognitive scientists can try and discover what neural states, events and processes are empirical necessary conditions for human beings to be able to exercise their intellectual abilities. Third, if minds are capacities, they not only are not entities, but most importantly, they can’t be physical entities. If it is wrong to think of the mind as a physical entity, it is wrong to conceive of the mind as biological information processing unit. By now, it should be abundantly clear that this view does not constitute so much a particularly insightful conception of the mind, but rather a piece of sophisticated scientistic metaphysics; the result of a gross lack of conceptual clarity. While one would hardly think of a car’s ability to accelerate from 0-100km/h in 4,1 seconds as a material entity, mind-brain dualists do so consistently in their investigations. Finally, in the Aristotelian tradition, there is no room for talk about an inner and an outer. After all, it would make little sense to conceive of my ability to