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There is some ambiguity around the concept of what postmodern risk represents. Some scholars describe late modern risks that are manufactured or external risks (see Giddens 1999b), some scholars consider risks within a risk society (see Beck 1992), whereas other scholars describe a new postmodern penology of risk (see Feeley and Simon 1992, 1994). Therefore, theorists debate the distinctions between traditional, late modern and postmodern risks, asking questions such as, are there new risks or are there simply different ways of looking at risk (Adams 1995, Kemshall 2003). On the surface

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actuarial practices and risk-based technologies and apparatus appear to be capable of producing new ways of understanding that are deemed able to identify otherwise unknown risks and risk levels. However, some scholars have noted that the research, knowledge, and information that have developed around concepts of risk have been utilised to structure assessments and the management of offenders within criminal justice for over forty years (See Bonta’s analysis of offender assessments 1996). Advancements in technology and information sharing practices have aided the growth of electronic-based statistical packages that focus on the technical assessment of risk. Many current technological practices can be seen emerging as far back as 1980’s, such as the Offender Assessment System (OASys) in the UK. Therefore, it is difficult to totally accept the view that contemporary formations of risk are entirely new.

An unquestioning confidence in progress and development, and a belief in scientific thinking (as is characteristic of modernism) saw the abolishment of the death penalty in the UK and a rise in confidence in a managed and strategic approach to criminal justice. An unprecedented investment in reason, scientific knowledge, capitalist development and social order transformed ‘risks’ and the relationship between the citizen and the state (Leonard 1997). In pre-modern times the everyday was abound by superstition, customs and beliefs, the presence of a vengeful God and an evil Satan. Dangers, threats and hazards took the form of witches, demons and devils; natural events or disasters, such as earthquakes and floods, brought fear and insecurities (Lupton 1999). Risk was seen to be outside the remit of human control, rendering the individual blameless or faultless. In contrast, the modern era perceived risks as being purely technical in meaning. Risks became calculable, knowable, predictable and manageable through actuarial-based models and scientific knowledge (Kemshall 2003). Advances in technology saw the rise in social control and social regulation that became achievable (to a degree) through governance and control strategies derived from risk-focused technologies and apparatus (see Rose 1996, 2000). A language of risk and risky became commonplace in expert discourse (Lupton 1999). The individual became the primary focus for the management of risks through regulatory governance that promoted self- discipline, self-control and self-management. The state introduced risk-focused campaigns aimed at increasing awareness and reducing uncertainties. Risk not only became a dominant medium for exercising control within regulatory agencies, but risk

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discourse and the scientific ability to discover risks had also come to be considered as a better form of knowing that fuelled decision-making practices within criminal justice. What is significant in postmodern thought is the way in which some scholars have started to question scientific discourse around risk, and to explore what risk means at a micro level (as opposed to a purely macro level). Kemshall (2003) and Lupton (1999) for example, talk about late modern and postmodern risk as interchangeable terms, although some theorists who analyse contemporary life at both the structural (macro) and individual/action (micro) levels reject the term postmodernity in favour of a late or a new modernity (for example Giddens and Beck). Most theorists agree that the consensus around the late/post modern debate seems to be focused around a growing sense that our relationship to science has changed. Beck (1992) notes that people once invested in a belief system that science could be relied upon and experts (through the application of scientific knowledge) were able to judge ‘true’ risks to guide us towards being responsive risk-avoiding individuals. Insight is offered by Giddens who notes:

‘in western society, for some two centuries, science functioned as a sort of tradition. Scientific knowledge was supposed to overcome tradition, but actually in a way became one in its own right. It was something that most people respected, but was external to their activities. Lay people ‘took’ opinions from experts’ (Giddens 1999b, p6).

Beck agrees that this no longer describes our relationship with science (Beck 1992). People no longer believe in the inevitability of progress and the power of scientific methods as the best way to solve matters around crime and offending. People are much less willing to accept that truth can be found in metanarratives and ideologies which will find the causes of criminality or locate a universal rehabilitative solution. For example, positivist approaches to framing criminality that focus upon the identification of criminogenic behaviours such as drug use and subsequently contribute towards the application of universal rehabilitation measures such as Drug Treatment and Testing Orders (DTTOs) or Drug Rehabilitation Requirements (DRR) have been called into question prompting government ministers to rethink crime and punishment (Rethinking Crime and Punishment (2003).

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This epistemological shift has prompted a questioning of criminal justice practices within western society that are based upon risk discourses and their ability to effectively manage and rehabilitate offenders. Doubts are raised around the effectiveness of technological and informative systems that focus upon the rationalisation and normalisation of offender’s and the predictable nature of criminal activities have come into question (Kemshall 2003). Instead, society and its citizens have experienced a political crisis in rising prison population sizes, low impact upon crime rates, a rise in reconviction rates, and a demise of public confidence in criminal justice agencies (see Kemshall 2003, Worrall and Hoy 2005). As contemporary western societies move away from the ideal of science as a better form of knowing we are experiencing a deconstruction of penal traditions and rehabilitative ideology through policies and debates which ask if Nothing Works/Prison Works/What Works (see Martinson 1974, Raynor and Vanstone 2002, Underdown 1998, Windlesham 1996). There is an increasing focus on the use of diverse rehabilitative interventions in the prison and probation services such as art therapy, counselling and experiential learning. And there is a classification of new offences (such as ASBOs) and a reclassification of existing offences (such as cannabis) in what might appear as a desperate attempt to tighten the reins on individuals who are not easily persuaded to ‘fall in line’.

Current concepts of risk have also come into question by a growing body of literature that focuses upon how risks are understood at a micro level. Scholars such as Lyng (2005), and Cohen and Taylor (1992), encourage thinking about activities (that may be perceived as ‘risky’ from a scientific/expert perspective) from an individual’s perspective of their experiences within everyday life. Here specific activities are experienced as an emotion or desire, a way in which people deliberately engage in the undertaking of pleasurable or thrilling activities in an attempt to escape the humdrum of the everyday or as a form of escapism from the highly controlled body and self. Both Lyng and Cohen and Taylor shy away from the use of the term ‘risk’ and instead draw attention to how individuals construct their understandings of their behaviour – this raises the question, do individual’s view their behaviour as risky? This approach to understanding ‘risky behaviour’ challenges macro perspectives of conceptualising risk by revealing a significant area of knowledge that has been disregarded in favour of what could be considered as a more fruitful construction of risk. It also raises questions

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around how suitable are actuarial-based risk discourses that are utilised within current