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1.3. Wifi (802.11n)

1.3.7. Parámetros de ondas Wifi

Origin

From the previous chapters it can be concluded that a clear decision process is needed in order to facilitate that As-a-Service becomes an alternative within the ASM organisation. By providing a clear process, the alternative can be put forth in an early stage. Secondly, from the literature in chapter 5, it is concluded that Result Oriented Product-Service Systems can be a transition tool for Schiphol towards a more CE business model, which is one of the CR goals of Schiphol. Due to the strict regulatory nature of Schiphol’s Aviation Business Area, a clear process is needed in order to show to their internal and external stakeholders the added value of a PSS both in business sense, as well as a sustainability sense. From the Light-as-a-Service pilot case, it can be concluded that in order to guarantee effectiveness and full benefits, the process should be clear so that every stakeholder involved has a clear understanding of the project’s specifics, expectations from other parties and how the long term relationship will be given shape. The set up and expectations need to be clear for PSS to succeed and provide a good tool for Schiphol to become more circular. When all these steps are clear, the decision process fits in neatly with the Asset Wise! program and provide an extra asset solution to make ASM a more effective asset management organisation which can focus more on performance and results. Thus, it is clear that a decision process is needed. The next paragraph will treat the most important points from the previous chapters regarding the content of the decision framework. It will draw upon the necessities from a CE point of view, the properties of Product-Service Systems all aligned with the business environment of Schiphol, in order to smoothen the implementation.

Circular Economy

CE focusses on regenerative by design, aiming at maximising the value throughout the whole value chain, while reducing resource usage. In order to achieve this, it is important that the optimisation as such is not confined to just Schiphol, or just the supplier of Schiphol, but at both parties. In order to achieve this, it is important that both Schiphol and its suppliers work together more closely in order to

achieve a joint goal and not just two individual goals. A joint goal requires clear expectations from both parties and clear expectations require a transparency and corporation from both parties.

Product-Service Systems

Product-Service Systems could be an excellent tool for Schiphol to facilitate the transition towards a more CE as well as an effective Asset Management organisation. In order to guarantee a success, it is important that the PSS is set up as a result oriented PSS, which allows for both Schiphol and the supplier to have the same goal and maximise the effectiveness of the asset both on performance as well as on the environment. 5.3.1 gives 4 criteria which act as a first guideline to see whether a certain asset can be acquired as a (Result Oriented) Product-Service System. The need for result orientation of the PSS can help Schiphol to set the next step towards performance contracts, which is the final contractual goal of the Asset Wise! program given the maintenance of assets. A Result Oriented PSS has maximum effectiveness if the ownership remains at the supplier, but this complicates the ability for Schiphol to determine what a fair price is to pay for the service, because there exists a transfer of responsibilities and associated risks from Schiphol towards the supplier. Risks required return and thus, a supplier will include a risk premium into its price. Thus, using Cost Estimation under Uncertainty, Schiphol is able to estimate a fair price for the service and therefore enable a fair comparison between a traditional asset solution where Schiphol becomes owner and an As-a-Service solution.

Business Environment

Schiphol Aviation Asset Management has a rather unique position due to the deep involvement of the ACM (Dutch Competition Authority) and the Aviation Law which puts a restriction on how ASM is able to put its investment to work. There is a clear distinction between Aviation and Non-Aviation related activities and if necessary an allocation scheme is in place to divide costs between them. Furthermore, all Aviation related OPEX costs are directly incorporated in the Airlines Tariffs. For CAPEX the assets are added to the Regulatory Asset Base (RAB) and a fictional rate of return may be earned on those assets. This rate of return has as a maximum a regulated and by the ACM controlled WACC. The impact of this regulation is that a new difference in earning capacity may come into existence when there is a big difference between a traditional asset owner (and therefore adding to the RAB) solution and a PSS, where the CAPEX is replaced by OPEX and no extra earning capacity is allowed due to the strict regulation, which might endanger the position of Schiphol in the future.

As stated in 6.4.4, the most important impact of the business environment on the framework is that costs and revenue are very hard to directly link to one another. A projects outcome is hard to convert into figures which show a direct increase in revenue. Therefore, projects are, mostly, evaluated on costs and not on whether the NPV is positive. Furthermore, all costs which are incurred by ASM are transferred, via the cost allocation keys, towards the users of their assets. So, in short it can be stated that the NPV of a project is always zero, because all costs incurred are always earned via the allocation. Therefore, decision making is on costs and not on revenue and this is very important for decision making and explains why Schiphol puts so much emphasis on the TCO, risks and functionality triangle in the decision making process.

Light-as-a-Service evaluation

The following points are identified as not sufficient in the evaluation. For each point the solution to cope with the point is given, which is either based on previously mentioned literature, new literature or information from Schiphol.

1. There is no clear indication of what potential risk and impact of purchasing a service compared to a traditional asset

2. There are no criteria used on whether a product/asset is suitable to be purchased as a service 3. There are no conditions provided which ensure success

4. There is a mismatch between stakeholder relationships and their respective contractual agreements

5. No proper KPIs were developed and therefore only one KPI made it into the contract, which is insufficient to effectively steer on performance

6. There is no clear monetary incentive for the supplier to deliver results, because i) the KPIs are missing, ii) no clear norm, bonus and/or malus setting is contractually agreed upon.

7. The structuring of the contract was not well due to the novelty of such a service contract. There was no proper Service Level Agreement.

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