China, threatened by the US pivot to Asia in 2011, vigorously started to prevent it – this is particularly true in case of the fifth generation of Chinese leaders.719 For Sino-Russian the US pivot meant one important thing: it influenced, inten- sified and warmed political relations between Moscow and Beijing. This was possible thanks to cooling Russia-USA relations, too. For Russia “once the reset began to lose momentum from 2011, old habits of geopolitical balancing
714 Opinion: Russia’s attitude over Syria is significantly affected by West’s deception over
Libya, Left Foot Forward 09.09.2013.
715 M. Kaczmarski, Russia-China Relations…, p. 148.
716 Меморандум между Правительством Российской Федерации и Правительством
Китайской Народной Республики о сотрудничестве в области модернизации эконо- мики [Memorandum between Goverments of RF and PRC on Cooperation in Modernization
of Economy], Pravo.Ru.
717 Russia/China Energy Cooperation Is the Biggest Challenge, OSW, Warsaw, 12.10.2011 718 China lauds Russian Duma elections – diplomats, Ria Novosti, 09.12.2011.
719 Zhao Kejin, China Turns to Southeast Asia, Carnegie-Tsinghua 28.03.2014; M. Majid,
returned; the traditional nexus of difficulties with Washington equating to en- hanced engagement with Beijing reemerged.”720 Thus, “the inconspicuous fad- ing away of the rest coincided with gradual deterioration of China-US relation (…) effectively Russia and China have found themselves on the same side vis- à-vis USA”, thus China and Russia became “’united in assertiveness.’”721
This time it was China which initiated this rapprochement – endangered by Washington from the south and the east, China wanted to secure itself from the north. So, the American factor again influenced Sino-Russian relations. Mos- cow and Beijing united in opposition against Washington’s policy: “they have been able to count on each other’s ‘positive neutrality’; Russia and China have refrained from criticizing each other in international forums and from support- ing Washington’s position.”722 What is important, however, is that political rapprochement did not translate into Chinese economic concessions. Finally, the results of this new rapprochement began to be clearly visible not at once. Before they materialized, two sides had to deal with domestic political prob- lems.
2012 was a difficult year for Russian and Chinese leadership alike. Putin, victorious after the elections of 4 March 2012, had to deal with mass protests (under the leadership of Alexey Navalny who became popular after an anti- corruption campaign against the ESPO maladministration). Chinese leader- ship, on its turn, was shaken by the Bo Xilai case – a political and criminal scandal.
These political storms did not influence the bilateral relations. Year 2012 politically started for Russia and China on 4 February, when Moscow and Bei- jing jointly vetoed the UN Security Council resolution calling for Syrian Pres- ident Bashar al-Assad to step down.723 At the same time, Russia and China sent their special envoys to Syria breaking the diplomatic isolation of Damascus. Russian and Chinese stance on Syria showed how these countries learned the “Arab Spring” lesson: these policies by Moscow and Beijing “were directly shaped by the Libyan experience where Russia and China registered huge losses due to their too conciliatory approach toward the West.”724
During Putin’s reelection in March 2012, Beijing as usually accepted the reality: Hu Jintao congratulated Putin and emphasized that China “firmly sup- ports Russia’s choice of its own development path according to its national
720 B. Lo, Russia and The New World Disorder…, p. 142. 721 Marcin Kaczmarski, Russia-China Relations…, pp. 126-127. 722 Ibid., p. 128.
723 Security Council Fails to Adopt Draft Resolution on Syria as Russian Federation, China
Veto Text Supporting Arab League’s Proposed Peace Plan, UN Security Council
04.02.2012.
724 Yu Bin, Succession, Syria and the Search for Putin’s Soul, ”Comparative Connections” 2012, vol. 14, no. 1.
conditions”725 which was a clear hint to the Western protests. Even a better proof of Chinese recognition came with deputy prime minister Li Keqiang’s visit to Moscow (26-30 April 2012); Li was the first foreign dignitary to visit Putin after his re-election. This meeting must have been very interesting: “Putin was described as looking into Li’s eyes and taking careful notes while listening to Li’s remarks, something that Putin never did before in his meetings with other dignitaries. The Li-Putin talks were stretched from one hour to al- most two hours; Li reportedly quoted Confucius words, ‘Promises must be kept and actions must be executed.’”726 Li Keqiang’s visit took place during joint maritime exercises on the Yellow Sea (22-27 April 2012) – the largest bilateral exercises and – for China – the largest with any foreign navy.727 The message they conveyed was strictly a political one, let alone that those were only Sino- Russian state exercises; these implications strengthened after Putin’s visit to China in June 2012 (Putin in his third presidential term visited China quite late, as the forth country only) – in the joint declaration both sides emphasized the military cooperation.728
On 16 July 2012, an incident occurred on the Japan Sea – the Russian Bor- der Guard vessel “Dzerzhinsky” has seized the Chinese ship under the accusa- tion of poaching on Russian territorial waters. The Chinese MFA expressed “deep dissatisfaction” due to this fact729, but two sides were able to cover this incident up so that it did not follow the 2009 New Star example and did not deteriorate the mood of Sino-Russian relations.
The summer of 2012 was marked by Sino-Japanese disputes over Senkaku/ Diaoyu Islands that led to an outburst of nationalism and mass protests in China. Similar story, though on lesser scale, happened with Japan-South Ko- rean disputes over Takeshima-Dokdo. The island issue – being number 1 in 2012 in Asia – did not influence Sino-Russian relations yet. However, another event impacted them, a bit overshadowed globally, but noticed in Russia – a Chinese vessel “Xuelong” (Snow Dragon) crossing the Arctic Ocean. “Xue- long” was the first Chinese ship that made it – it symbolized China’s growing
725 Председатель КНР поздравил Владимира Путина с победой на президентских
выборах в России [Chairman of PRC Congratulated Putin on Winning the Presidential
Elections in Russia], Итар-Тасс, 05.03.2012. 726 Yu Bin, Succession, Syria…
727 Совместные военно-морские учения Китая и России 2012 года [China and Russia Joint Military Drills in 2012], Russian.People.Cn.
728 Совместное заявление Российской Федерации и Китайской Народной Республики о
дальнейшем углублении российско-китайских отношений всеобъемлющего равноп- равного доверительного партнерства и стратегического взаимодействия [Joint Dec-
laration of RF and PRC on Further Deepening Sino-Russian Relations to All Encompassing, Equal, Trustful Partnership and Strategic Colaboration], Kremlin.ru, 05.06.2012.
729 Пекин требует от РФ тщательного расследования инцидента с обстрелом
китайского судна [Beijing Demands RF Detailed Investigation of the Incident with Firing
interest in the Arctic (because of the need to exploit the natural resources and use the new transportation route – the Northern Sea Route)730; that is why China called itself a “near-Arctic state.”731 China’s actions were quickly noted in Moscow for which the Arctic, with its resources and sea transport has been becoming one of the most important fields of political activity732. Russia did not like the Chinese attempts to enter the “great game on the Arctic.”733 When Xuelong crossed the Northern Sea Route, Russia started maritime exercises in this region. Quite coincidently, exactly when the Chinese icebreaker crossed the straits near Sakhalin, Russia decided to test whether its anti-ship missiles worked….734
The most publicized event in Sino-Russian relations in the second part of 2012 was the APEC summit in Vladivostok. Putin made Hu Jintao, who was about to leave the post of the PRC Chairman, the first speaker at the APEC summit and the first leader to meet Putin on a separate meeting. Hu in his turn has called Putin his “respected old friend”735 and summarized Sino-Russian relations by outlining such tasks as “deepen strategic mutual trust”, or “coop- erate in investment to elevate both the quantity and quality of bilateral eco- nomic relations” which may be interpreted as a lack of satisfaction from Sino- Russian relations and a call for its improvement.736 Also prime minister Wen Jiabao said goodbye to Russia with his last trip to Moscow (6-7 December 2012). Again, he stressed the need to develop economic relations which meant that the Chinese side was not fully satisfied with them.737