In Myanmar‘s nationalistic atmosphere, links to foreign actors are not seen in an
exclusively positive light.117 Thus, while intermediaries draw on their international
capital, they are sometimes reluctant to be associated with foreign interests, and their motivations for working in the field relate more to their attempts to build social capital for their own agenda, rather than for work they perform for foreign development actors.
One local lawyer and intermediary, for example, explained that he had ambivalent feelings towards his work with international organisations because he was worried about his reputation in the larger community. He told me that he had a feeling that he had to ―get out of this business‖ and expressed an urgent need to be ‗‖free-float next [election] year‖ if he was to be able to fulfil his political dreams. The main reason, he suggested, was because ―people‖ lacked trust in international organisations:
You get some criticism here. People think that if your project got 6 million it means that you personally got the money; they will tell me, ―Hey you‘re rich now!‖ They don‘t trust foreign funded organisations and they don‘t like it - I have to get out of this business if I want to be in politics… they don‘t think any foreign organisations do it only because of good will. (Interviewee #14, 13 December 2014)
The local lawyer also explained that, because of such complexities and his political motivations, he was ―not attached to any organisation‖, yet we can assume that many of his foreign colleagues considered him attached to their organisation.
When intermediaries move between several organisations and assignments this often results in criticism from their foreign employers -- that it is hard to get them to carry out the ‗real‘ (i.e., legal technical) work they are hired to do (field notes, December 2015). Instead, intermediaries were perceived as spending too much time ‗attending conferences‘ or meetings (field notes, May 2014). This might be suggestive of de
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Sardan‘s idea that intermediary competences do not receive much recognition from the institutions they belong to (2005, 170). Still, a counter-balance to such views is the significance foreign actors ascribe to intermediaries‘ networks (mentioned above), which we can assume were being fostered through conferences and meetings.
Intermediaries themselves comment that being independent is a Myanmar cultural trait and that they need this degree of freedom in their work life. However, it appears as if intermediaries need to signal that they are unattached to foreign
organizations because they perceive the association with foreign interests as potentially damaging for their political careers. An intermediary expressed frustration over the way his work for foreign organisations was perceived:
Some people really hate me, but for most I am just misunderstood, they look at me and most think ―Who is this guy?‖ I am their junior and I am telling them about human rights and democratic values … but by now they appreciate me, they know my intentions … I do this for the younger generations. (Interviewee #17, 23 September 2014)
Intermediaries‘ motivations are thus influenced by ambivalence: the trajectory of their social promotion can be facilitated through foreign capital, but they need to constantly balance this against societal distrust of foreign interests.
Some foreign practitioners are aware that their local staff or consultants have political motivations. For example, a foreign programme manager explained that one of her local staff ―Has political aspirations and was open about it from the beginning. He wants to start his own political party. If he leaves us it will be for that reason‖
(Interviewee #3, 8 May 2014). Employers in this study had several reflections on intermediaries‘ motivations:
Of course there is vested interest everywhere but this is everywhere, why else would people do it? But there is also a common interest. (Interviewee #24, 14 October 2014) I think they are doing it for the career opportunity and a strong desire to contribute to the transition in their country. It‘s a good opportunity for them. (Interviewee #31, 10 November 2014)
145 We are very lucky that they are just very happy about contributing to their country. Our senior staff might go into politics someday, she has mentioned that. (Interviewee #25, 3
October 2014)
I just take them at their word which is genuinely to support justice, promote legal aid etc. (Interviewee #9, 23 May 2014)
I have seen examples in other countries where organisations have unclear interests but not here. (Interviewee #9, 23 May 2014)
Money. International organisations pay two to four times more than local organisations. (Interviewee #2, 7 May 2014)
An interest in working with internationals and being exposed to international practices. (Interviewee #2, 7 May 2014)
The assumption would be that they want to help build their country but I don‘t know for sure. (Interviewee #2, 7 May 2014)
She is just a very helpful person, happy to help as much as she can, but also extremely interested in legal practice. (Interviewee #8, 22 May 2014)
I don‘t think that they are motivated by career. (Interviewee #8, 22 May 2014)
We see from this overview that some employers remain unaware of the contested spaces intermediaries navigate, and to what extent they perceived their association with foreign organisations as damaging for social promotion. One foreign practitioner was more open about her scepticism about intermediaries‘ motivations:
So many of them [intermediaries] are involved in politics … all are in it for politics … which of course makes you wonder about their own interests … their interests are not in the work they do for foreign donors. The donors turn on a sort of wilful blindness … they don‘t want to see what might be happening as it is not going to advance their development agenda. (Interviewee #40, 9 December 2014)
This foreign practitioner was worried about what would happen with rule of law assistance activities after the 2015 elections: ―What if all will go into politics?‖ (ibid). Foreign practitioners also voiced concern over intermediaries‘ strong connections to the NLD or its splinter or affiliate groups (see e.g., Interviewee #8, 15 May 2014).
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4.4. Conclusion
In this chapter I explored how intermediaries accumulated foreign and social capital during military rule: capital that was central for their ability to operate as intermediaries in the rule of law assistance field in Myanmar after political transition. That overview also revealed commonality in the backgrounds of some of the intermediaries of this study, for example, that they were politically engaged, had studied English during military rule, and had gained access to foreign education and work opportunities for foreign organisations.
After political transition, rule of law intermediaries mobilised the foreign capital they accumulated during military rule within the rule of law assistance space that
emerged. This was evident, for example, in the way intermediaries used their networks to select who got to be included in rule of law activities, in the way they were able to travel more freely across Myanmar and thus became the satellites for new ideas and the rule of law model, and in the way they used their foreign language skills as knowledge brokers who channel information and know the languages of actors on ‗both sides.‘
Access to intermediaries‘ networks is imperative for foreign actors and their rule of law assistance efforts. The networks intermediaries accumulated during military rule stretched beyond the formal and informal channels foreigners were subsequently able to access. Foreign rule of law promoters expressed an urgent need to access intermediary networks; they realise that they are reliant on these in order to achieve the influence necessary for rule of law assistance efforts. At the same time, they have ambivalent feelings towards using informal channels. Some expressed a concern over the fact that too much in the country was done through charismatic personalities and personal networks -- especially when those networks entail political obligations or aspirations.
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I argued that intermediaries‘ ‗international strategies‘ of using foreign capital to build their ‗power at home‘ has been supported by foreign actors in preparation for democratic transition and that rule of law intermediaries‘ access to international capital helps ‗amplify‘ their work on rights-related issues at home. However, I showed how the use of foreign capital was not only to intermediaries‘ benefit, because of existing distrust of foreign interests (a theme I explore in more detail in Chapter 7). This also creates ambivalence for intermediaries, who apply different strategies to hide their connections to foreign actors. However, while intermediaries were reluctant to be associated with foreign capital, they still need to be in a position where they can use their networked resources to channel aid money or development activities to local levels in order to gain political influence.
International and local strategies to build power at home are thus characterised by mixed motivations and aims. I explore that theme in more detail in the next chapter, which analyses the emergence of rule of law assistance in Myanmar after political transition, which in turn resulted in a need for intermediaries.
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