PARQUE CENTRAL DE MENDOZA, ARGENTINA

[A] p h r a s e is d e n o t i n g s o le ly in v ir tu e o f i t s / o r m . - R u sse ll (1 9 0 5 ) , ‘O n D e n o t i n g ’, p.4 15.

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O phrases contains both singular terms and quantified noun far, we have aecepted the hypothesis that the class o f noun phrases, and w e have seen how to ac com m oda te both semantic kinds within ou r truth theory for a language. N o w , however, w e face a crucial question: w e need to know , for any token noun phrase, which semantic category we should assign it to. That is to say, we need to know the criterion foi’ som e thing’s being either a singular term or a quantified noun phrase. The positive proposal 1 wish to put forw ard (and defend in the rest o f the thesis) is that semantic kinds are reflected in certain kinds o f formal o r syntactic categories for natural language (with a onemiany m apping possible from semantic kind to syntactic class). T he kind o f categories responsible for mirroring semantic kinds will be the com m on-sen se categories, first introduced in C hapter 1, which ordinary speakers leeognise within the syntactic class o f noun phrases; kinds of expression like ‘definite description’ and ‘de m onstra tive ’. I will argue that these syntactic categories can be recognised on the grounds o f surface features of token expressions; and that for each category there are certain central cases w here their semantic allegiance is clear. So, if one m em ber o f a syntactic c ategory belongs to a given semantic kind then all do, and for at least one m em ber o f each syntactic category its semantic status is evident.

This proposal, which I will call the ‘unified’ approach to noun phrases, will be explored and clarified in this chapter and the next, in part by contrasting it with an opposing ‘am biguity’ stance on noun phrase classification. P ropone nts o f an ambiguity theory reject the mirroring o f semantic kinds in syntactic categories, though, as w e will see, they may admit a principled correlation betw een syntactic properties other than syntactie categorisations and semantic kinds. To begin with, then, let us look at the unified stance in a little m ore detail

and see why we might initially find such a position attractive. I will then raise tw o opposing suggestions about how semantic category m ight be assessed, both o f which give rise to an ambiguity theory o f noun phrases; finally, I will provide a very brief initial sketch o f the prinui fa cie problem s for unification which might push us tow ards an alternative approach. Then, in the next chapter, I will say m ore about the unified theory, looking in detail at how it applies in practice to a particular kind o f noun phrase; before returning, in C h a p te r 5, to the possible objections to unification which are to be briefly alluded to at the close of this chapter.

(1) The Unified Theory:

The appealingly simple proposal o f the unified approach is that w e can in practice read off semantic category from surface form. T h a t is to say, the easily accessible, ‘open to v iew ’ features o f natural language expressions provide us with a way into the com plex and difficult realm o f semantic allegiance. The thought is that we can tell, by features o f the orthographic o r phonetic presentation o f an expression, or its sentential position, or other such surface features recognisable to a com petent language usqy p r io r to any kind o f semantic

evaluation o f the term, what kind o f token is being put forw ard. This is because agents appeal to such surface features to determine an expression’s syntactic category and syntactic categories map as a whole to semantic kinds. The thought is that semantic evaluation always p roceeds via recognition o f formal properties; specifically via the recognition o f syntactic kinds, such as definite description, which ordinary language speakers are capable o f discriminating within the class o f ‘noun p h rase ’ on the basis of an expression’s surface presentation. The claim is that given a syntactic category o f this kind, if one m em ber o f that category belongs to a given semantic class, then all do; for this reason the approach is labelled a ‘unified’ one. On such a picture, there is not a further substantial m ove for the agent to m ake from determining that an expression is a definite description or a p ro p er name, etc., to an assessment of

that expression’s semantic allegiance.' T he unified stance is, I believe, the ‘null hypothesis’, from which we may be forced to m ove by c o u nterexam ple or argum ent to the contrary, but which constitutes o u r intuitive view o f our language.

For the unified approach to be successful several factors have to be in play: on the one hand, if syntactic or formal categories sub the class o f noun phrase are to have such a key role to play, it m ust be th at w e have a clear conception o f them and a way to assess m embership o f a class which is independent of semantic questions. 1 will examine the formal structure of expressions m ore closely in the next chapter, when we c om e to look at how the unified account might handle a particular kind o f noun phrase, viz. com plex demonstratives, and in C hapter 6, when we look at the kind o f features speakers actually seem to take as indicative o f syntactic category. Initially, how ever, we might note that there is a strong philosophical tradition o f appealing to ju st the kinds o f category I am interested in and that it has generally been held that speakers and theorists alike have a grasp o f so m e th in g ’s being a dem onstrative or a pronoun, etc., which arises out o f features like the orthographic form o f the expression, and which seems auto n o m o u s from questions o f semantics.^ A second requirem ent o f the unified account is that, given any such syntactic category, the semantic allegiance o f som e o f its m em bers is indisputable. F o r unless we can tie at least one m em ber o f a syntactic class to a semantic kind, the relation between syntax and semantics unification appeals to would be o f little practical value.

This claim, however, I take to be independently plausible, d e m o n stra ted already in the introduction o f o u r tw o kinds o f noun phrase and the intuitive

' T h e c la i m c a n n o t be that th e r e is no f u r th e r m o v e to be m a d e , fo r h o ld i n g th at th e r e is a o n e : m a n y m a p p in g b e tw e e n s e m a n tic and sy n ta c ti c k in ds d o e s not yet tell us w h ich s y n ta c ti c c la s s e s m a p to w hich s e m a n ti c c a te g o rie s . H o w e v e r , as w e will s e e b e lo w , I a s s u m e that th e r e aie c e rta in key c a s e s fo r e a c h s y n tactic c la s s w h e r e s e m a n tic a l l e g ia n c e is clear.

■ W e s h o u ld note that the c la im is that s p e a k e r s can r e c o g n i s e o r d if f e r e n t i a t e k in d s o f

e x p r e s s i o n s su ch as d e fin ite d e s c r ip tio n s an d d e m o n s tr a t i v e s , no t that th e y n e c e s s a r ily k n o w or d e p lo y th es e kinds o f labcds f o r n o u n p h r a s e s .

appeal o f the division betw een quantified noun phrases and referential expressions. It ju st does seem that in certain paradigm cases an e x p re ssio n ’s semantic status is almost beyond doubt (so perceptual dem onstratives seem to I eq LI ire analysis as singular terms, while the noun phrase in ‘all girls are h a p p y ’ seem s a clear quantified noun phrase); thus this second requirem ent will not be exploi ed much further in what follows. Finally, and m ost importantly, the unified theory needs it to be the case that its version o f a ‘mirroring con stra in t’ betw een syntax and semantics is thought plausible. T hat is to say, the idea that semantic allegiance be reflected in syntactic kinds must accord with the dictates of intuition and not conflict with any constraints antecedently accepted from elsewhere. Furtherm ore, it should be seen to be warranted; there should be reason to think that such a mirroring condition could hold. Establishing the plausibility o f the mirroring condition o f the unified stance is one o f the m ajor tasks ahead.

It seems, p rim a fa c ie , that the unified stance has much in its favour: it is, 1 would suggest, the pre-theoretical stance, the position on noun phrase classification with which ordinary speakers begin and from which they will m ove only if this position is shown untenable. It is also the position which has been (perhaps not always overtly) endorsed by a great num ber o f theorists in this area; for instance, though disagreeing on which semantic category to assign the class to, both Frege and Russell seem to agree that definite descriptions as a whole

m ap to the category o f referring expressions or quantified noun phrases. ’ K a p la n ’s theory of direct reference is said to be (primai'ily) a theory of dem onstratives and indexicals, where it seems these are thought to be classes of w ords characterised independently o f their semantic analysis, and Kaplan rarely suggests he has anything other than a unified a c count in n h n d / Finally, in the

■’ F r e g e (1 8 9 2 b ) ; R u sse ll (1905).

^ T h is is a s o m e w h a t d e lic a te poin t, fo r w e s h o u ld no te that K a p la n ( 1 9 7 7 ) , p .4 8 9 , b e g in s with a s t a t e m e n t w h ic h m ig h t s e e m to c o n tr a d ic t his in c lu s io n in th e u n if ie d c a m p : “ T h e g r o u p o f w o r d s fo r w h ic h I p r o p o s e a s e m a n tic a l th e o r y in c lu d e s th e p r o n o u n s ‘F , ‘m y ’, ‘y o u ’, ‘h e ’, ‘h i s ’ , ' s h e ’, ' i t ’, the d e m o n s t r a t i v e p r o n o u n s ‘th a t ’, ‘t h i s ’, th e a d v e r b s ‘h e r e ’, ‘n o w ’,

‘t o m o r r o w ’, ‘y e s t e r d a y ’, the a d je c tiv e s ‘a c t u a l ’, ‘p r e s e n t ’, an d oth ers. T h e s e w o r d s h a v e uses o th e r th a n th o s e in w h ic h I a m in te re ste d (or, p e rh a p s , d e p e n d i n g on h o w y o u i n d i v id u a t e w o r d s , w e s h o u ld say that th e y h a v e h o m o n y m s in w h ic h I a m not i n t e r e s te d ) .’’ In g e n e r a l ,

contem porary arena, recent accounts o f complex demonstratives, such as N e a le ’s, Larson and S e g a l’s, and Lepore and L u d w ig ’s (all o f which w e will look at in the next chapter), seem to presume unification is c orrect for these expressions/

T he appeal o f unification lies in part, I w ould suggest, in the fact that making the key features for deciding semantic allegiance for noun phrases relatively superficial and open to view to com petent language users prior to any kind of semantic evaluation is surely an appealing move. Unification is theoretically clear and simple, providing us with a concrete and uncomplicated way in which to carve up the inputs for our semantic theory. Finally, as w e will com e to see, the unified stanee can a c com m odate all noun phrase occurrences in natural language and is not in tension with any oth er assum ptions w e need to preserve or wish to make. H ow ever, the unified stance is not the only position available here; for it may instead be thought either that syntax is irrelevant to assessing semantic form, or that syntactic properties o ther than those displayed at the level o f syntactic category are im portant in ascertaining semantic kind. Both these options lead to what I call an ‘am biguity’ theory o f noun phrases, so let us turn now to this approach.

An ambiguity approach to noun phrases denies that semantic kinds are reflected in syntactic categories. Given a single syntactic category, it might contain both quantified noun phrases and singular terms; so occurrences o f an expression like ‘the F ’ might, on occasion, be correctly handled by o u r axiom for quantified noun phrases, and, on another occasion, by our axiom for singular terms. Perhaps the m ost fam ous discussion o f an ambiguity theory for definite descriptions can be found in Keith D onnellan’s ‘R eference and D escriptions’ (although there remains an exegetical question o f w h e th e r or not he actually advocated such a position himself), where it seems that the unified approaches

h o w e v e r, w h e r e K a p la n to u c h e s on p r o b l e m a t ic o c c u r r e n c e s o f th e s e w o rd s he talks o f u se s o f e x p r e s s io n s , s e e m in g to e n v is a g e a p r a g m a t i c statu s fo r th e p h e n o m e n a ; see C h a p te r s 5 a nd 6 b elo w fo r f u r th e r d is c u s s i o n o f such case s.

previously advocated by theorists such as Frege and Russell are superseded in favour o f an account which permits members o f a single syntactic category to belong to dual semantic c a te g o rie s/’ Clearly, how ever, if syntactic category is not to be indicative o f semantic kind, then the ambiguity theorist ow es us som e alternative account o f the crucial features here. She m ust still answ er the question o f how we com e to assign each token noun phrase to a semantic class. There are tw o claims the ambiguity theorist could m ake which would support this rejection o f unification: on the one hand, she might dismiss altogether the thought that syntax has a principled relation to semantics, claiming that the features constitutive o f semantic status are ‘beyond the r e a c h ’ o f syntactic properties. Alternatively, she might accept that syntactic properties can be informative about semantic status, but claim that the kinds o f properties which need to be appealed to in determining semantic structure may cross-cut the

In document Parque eco recreativo en el municipio de Libres, Puebla (página 49-56)