Michael Fry and Miles Hochstein observed there has been a noticeable ‘failure to integrate intelligence studies, even in a primitive way, into the mainstream of research in international relations’.96
This is largely because intelligence, both as a discipline and as an organised national service, is the product of the 20th
century. Its formation and its definitional focus, especially in the United States of America, were heavily influenced by the prevalent IR theories of the time. Most definitions of intelligence rest inside Realist paradigms of international relations and positivist epistemologies. This is problematic in that it makes prejudicial assumptions about what intelligence is and its
purpose(s). Intelligence is defined as ‘protecting national security’, fuelling the notion that national security is constantly at risk. This in turn influences how any intelligence data is collected and analysed.
A large majority of intelligence scholars never acknowledge their meta- theoretical assumptions. Yet definitions and attempts at theoretical construction rely on these assumptions. As stated by Rathmell, ‘scholars and practitioners of intelligence tend to be wedded to the robust paradigms of realism, with little time for the generalities and perceived vacuities of social theorists’.97
David Kahn, when seeking a theory of intelligence, asserted that all theories must fit inside a positivist epistemology, even when one is dealing with unquantifiable social phenomena. He declared that, ‘no one has proposed concepts that can be tested’.98
He seeks a theory of intelligence that has verifiable or falsifiable propositions. Theorists look for ideas about intelligence in light of what they deem intelligence agencies are for – namely security and survival in an anarchic
95 Patomäki and Wight 2000: 230. 96 Fry and Hochstein 1994: 14. 97 Rathmell 2002: 88.
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world. Wheaton and Beerbower, for instance, define intelligence essentially as a tool. It reduces uncertainty about foreign action in order to ensure advantage in a competitive world.99
Sims is more explicit: ‘intelligence is best understood as the collection, analysis, and dissemination of information by parties in conflict or competition’.100
The distinction between intelligence and information for Sims is that intelligence has the sole purpose of gaining competitive advantage over others.101
Lowenthal states that intelligence refers to issues and activities relating to a state’s national security, for instance, the investigating and observation of the actions, policies, and capabilities of other nations and non-state groups, be they enemies, allies, or neutral parties, in order to secure knowledge of any potential action that may affect said state.102
The idea presented is simple enough. If the world is anarchic and dangerous and states are constantly at risk of war, then intelligence serves to protect states. But to constantly look for threats and insecurities in the world creates threats and insecurity, as Constructivists would argue. Realist theory might inform intelligence definitions, but Realism largely deprives intelligence systems of human agency. Realist theorists pay little attention to intelligence, nor do they particularly appreciate it. It is
understandable, given that IR Realism is the dominant foreign policy paradigm in the states where IR scholars live, that none of them, as far as I know, has successfully integrated IR and intelligence.
To route intelligence into doctrines such as a ‘national security paradigm’ or a ‘rational choice paradigm’ detracts from the reality of the highly subjective nature of analysis. Rational choice theory interprets events as if all action is designed to maximise personal advantage in light of an objective cost-benefit analysis. Ethics, emotions, societal beliefs, and psychological pressures are ignored as the basis of action. Rational choice, as mentioned earlier, is rarely typical of humanity. It is even less typical of intelligence. The mind of an interpreter is never a tabula rasa, despite efforts to reduce cognitive bias. It always contains beliefs, values, attitudes, experiences, emotions, memories, personality traits, and national and self-conceptions. Many of these go
99 Wheaton and Beerbower 2006. 100 Sims 2007: 40.
101 Sims 2007: 40. 102 Lowenthal 2006: 5-6.
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unacknowledged. To resist them is almost impossible. Having accepted the notion of epistemological relativism - that our knowledge and truths are social constructions rather than objective realities - it becomes possible to reinterpret intelligence’s relation to IR in a non-realist manner. Fundamentally, intelligence requires the presentation of an interpretation of events based on, at best,
imperfect but accurate information. It is hardly a stretch to claim that the
resultant interpretations and images are socially constructed. Before constructing a case about intelligence’s relation to IR based on this, it is necessary to assess and redefine intelligence upon neutral rather than Realist determined grounds.
It is an implausible goal to attempt to understand the methods and modes of intelligence utilised by mid-republican Rome through the strict application of modern understandings of intelligence organisations and methods. The large majority of intelligence literature assesses the role of intelligence in the past fifty years in the United States of America: they discuss the development,
organisation, and activities of groups such as the FBI, the CIA, and the NSA, and their relationship with policy makers. Alternatively, they discuss issues such as the oversight and monitoring of intelligence activities to ensure they comply with legal and ethical mores. Most theories that arise are normative and address how reform ought to be possible to avoid repeated intelligence failure, or to improve intelligence systems.103
These definitions are not readily transferable from their historical and socio-political context. They thus have little direct relevance to this study. The mid-republican Roman government lacked bureaucratic intelligence organisations; their government and magisterial roles were not divided into the same rigorously defined and compartmentalised functions found in modern western institutions. Positions, roles, and duties in government were far more ad hoc, overlapping, temporary, and influenced by personal motives than modern bureaucratic organisations. Many aspects of modern definitions need to be abandoned. In spite of this, some aspects of modern practices can be used to help interpret and elucidate the intelligence activity involved in events and actions as they are described in our ancient primary sources.
103 There are calls to develop an overarching theory of intelligence. For an overview of
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Most scholarly intelligence works include at least one section or chapter devoted to defining ‘intelligence’ and the theoretical approach of the work. These definitions and explanations often pay no regard to those of other authors, something lamented by scholars.104
There is no consensus in intelligence studies as to what ‘intelligence’ means. Traditionally, there is a tripartite
definition: it is a process, a product, and an activity. Intelligence as a process claims that intelligence encompasses all the activities in the ‘intelligence cycle’; that is, everything needed to request, collect, analyse, and disseminate
intelligence. As a product, intelligence is simply that final information presented to decision makers. Intelligence as activity traditionally includes all activities relating to intelligence. This consists of not only the activities required for the ‘process’ but also any action needed to ensure others cannot gain intelligence about you, and any covert or overt action taken to facilitate or implement decisions. This tripartite structure is based on the definition given by Sherman Kent in 1949.105
Neither the process embodied in the intelligence cycle nor the inclusion of counterintelligence and covert action in a definition provide knowledge of what constitutes intelligence. At its most basic level, intelligence is simply a form of information, information about the world, states, and peoples around you. But intelligence has to be more than simply information. As Gill and Phythian assert, intelligence has an ultimate purpose; it is but a means to an end.106
In terms of ancient societies, especially Rome, this end is an open question. In the absence of governmental organisations dedicated solely to monitoring the actions of suspicious domestic and foreign forces, and of a centralised,
bureaucratic government, it is unlikely the end goal of intelligence was ‘national security’ in the manner that many modern definitions assert. National security is a long-term plan. It is developed with foresight and a belief, based on inductive reasoning, about what will happen in the international arena in the future.
Intelligence serves to inform this conception of the future. It allows for the better creation of processes and plans to ensure safety. Roman government lacked this long-term outlook. While security concerns played a part in some decisions and
104 For example Warner 2002: 15; Wheaton and Beerbower 2006: 319-20; Betts 2009: 87. 105 Kent 1949: ix.
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reactions, it was not the immediate sole motivating factor or cause for intelligence gathering and action.
Secrecy is another element often used to reduce the concept of
information to intelligence; it builds on the notion of national security threats.107
Shulsky and Schmitt go so far as to claim that secrecy is the most necessary characteristic in intelligence officers and organisations.108
Secrecy, or at least a covert guise, is essential in certain aspects of intelligence gathering, namely espionage. But it is hardly a necessary component. To define intelligence based upon secrecy implies that it is about gathering information about enemies and threats that they do not wish you to know about. Intelligence is needed about neutral parties, friends, and foes, about culture and economy, as well as military and political affairs. It is not all about discovering threats, but gauging reactions, learning how to better manipulate or respond to others to ensure peace, and to promote trade and friendship. Moreover, in modern intelligence-gathering, a vast majority of intelligence is developed through the analysis of readily available public information such as newspapers and internet sources. Secrecy and plots were common enough in the ancient world. And secrecy was and is required in gathering certain information. But the gathering of data and information about the geo-political circumstances and intentions of neighbours was largely open activity sanctioned by governments and occurred in the realm of public diplomacy.
The most reasonable and accessible definition of an ‘end purpose’ given to intelligence is to facilitate decision-making. In a basic sense, intelligence is sought about both domestic and foreign peoples, in both military and political contexts, in order to make better decisions. For intelligent, coherent, purposeful action in relation to others, leaders must have accurate information as to the strengths, weaknesses, and intentions of others, be they friends, foes, neutral parties, or domestic citizens. Robert Jervis’ interpretation claims that intelligence serves to ‘provide an understanding of the world on which foreign policy can be based and to support instruments to influence and possibly deceive others’.109
107 See for instance Random 1958; Warner 2002; Scott 2004. 108 Shulsky and Schmitt 2002: 1-3.
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This definition is too simplistic for modern intelligence activities; it is, however, suitable for ancient studies. Technically, it confounds all governmental
information with intelligence, including diplomatic information. As it will be discussed here, diplomacy was intimately related to intelligence during the period under study. The problem is that in talking of foreign policy, Jervis refers only to foreign political intelligence. In light of this, this definition needs to be tweaked slightly to apply to this study. I define intelligence as the gathering and analysis of any information, be it military, political, economic, or cultural, that aids one nation or group in understanding another, for the purposes of facilitating decision-making, both politically and in military situations.
Such a definition of intelligence is easily amalgamated into the IR
approach taken in this study. Adopting the approach to IR that human agency, structure, and the international system are linked and influence each other, and that both material and ideational factors are important, intelligence becomes vital to interpreting events in international affairs. Intelligence informs policy
decisions based on information that is collected and analysed. This information is created from the subjective social context in which the individual gatherer exists. Any information collected or analysed is automatically subject to bias. The people who choose which information is relevant, and those who then analyse this information so chosen do so based upon their social context. An awareness of these biases can allow some to be mitigated. There are deeply embedded cultural conceptions of the world, predispositions, which are nearly impossible to remove. As Fry and Hochstein assert, ‘intelligence is not merely the ‘eye’ which perceives the objective international reality of power politics and describes it, but is in fact one of the primary locations of international relations practice’.110
As intelligence presents a subjective reality, distorted by social contexts, it participates in the creation and reproductions of international political reality.
Intelligence presents information. This information is knowledge.
Knowledge is a form of power. By accepting or denying this information - which may or may not be accurate - the state constructs, changes, or reinforces ideas about and an identification of external states or their domestic civilians. As
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Wendt discussed, socially constructed identities are hard to change. Having conceived or inherited the idea that one group or nation is a threat or an ally, there is a natural bias in both intelligence-gatherers and policy-makers to decide that all action confirms that viewpoint. Policy decisions are then made based upon these ideas and identities. In the absence of intelligence, these ideas and identities are still created, changed, and reinforced. Decision-makers lack the same level of power in their constructed relationship. The role of intelligence is to attempt to clarify the reality of societal ideas and identities by elucidating the intentions of others. By doing so, it contributes to the change or maintenance of these identities, and thus facilitates decision-making in potentially turbulent circumstances.