Thoe are several criticisms levelled at Gartner's theory although it ought to be stated that none of them question the fact that systematic sets of propositions are important to analogical problem solving, rather thty focus on the narrow nature of Centner's theory rather than seek to replace it whole sale.
Holyoak (1985) claims that the systematicity principle would determine that for any given source analogue the same set of predicates would be selected for mqrping what ever the context of the enquiry. This is because the predicates mapped are identified purely on the basis of their inclusion in more gaieral systems, their ccxitoit being irrelevant This ccmsequence is, Holyoak claims, manifestly at odds with exanq)les of analogical reasoning, where the same source domain can provide difiering mappings depending cm the nature of the target domain. This criticism, Gentner (1989) holds, is based on a mis reading of the Structure-Mapping Theory. The predicates treated as candidates for transfer are not idoitified onfy on the basis of a syntactic anafysis of the source analogue alone, but rather on a detailed match between both source and target domain: that is, 'the maximally systematic and consistent match of relational structure.' (Gentner, 1989). Hence differing target domains will result in differing structures being mapped from the same source analogue. Clement and Gentna (1991) conclude 'a preference fw cohooit ^sterns of common information appears to be a psychologically real constraint on analogical mapping.'
One of the central points of the present work is to test the adequacy of the systematicity principle in accounting for people’s actual analogical problem solving performance. That is, the degree to which it actually stands as a bdiavioural constraint This is undertaken in Experiment 9 which effectively pits the systematicity principle against the claim that the amount of elements transferred fi'om the source to the target are constrained by an aim individuals have to expend minimal effort when mapping. This is possible because the predictions derived from each of the two claims are inconsistent. The systonaticity principle predicts an individual, attempting to solve a problem analogically, would map as extensive a set of integrated relations as possible to generate a valid solution plan for the target problon. In the case of the aim to expend minimal effort, howeva, the individual would be expected to map as few relations as are necessary to generate a valid solution plan.
This point relates to Holyoak’s (1985) second criticism. Holyoak claims that the systematicity principle is insufficient to account for the process of selecting appropriate items for analogical mapping, this
point is also echoed by Keane (1988a). Und^ Centner's (1983) analysis the only constraint detennining which relations are mqjped horn the source domain to the target domain is the systematicity principle: only those lower-order relational predicates which are constrained by hi^er-order relations (e.g. 'causes') will tmd to be transferred to the target domain during analogising. Were this the only criterion oa which relations are selected for transfer it would leave the selection of apposite relations seriously under-determined.
In the case of the solar system-atom analogy, for example, it is both appropriate and legitimate for Gentner to claim that predicates such as 'Revolve around (planet, sun)' will be transferred - because they are constrained Ity higher order predicates. However, according to the systematicity principle alone there is no basis on which to claim further predicates such as 'Hotter than (sun, planet)' will not be mapped when these too are constrained by higher-order predicates, even where such predicates are completely irrelevant to the problem at hand. Clearly, such problems of selection would not beset a pragmatically orientated theory, as only those relations vdiich appear relevant to the problem at hand, in this case structural relations, would be identified as candidates for transfer in the first place.
The incorporation of the goal relevance constraint into the Structure-Mapping Theory (Gentner, 1989) would appear to effectively overcome the problem of selection. The initial representation of a target domain would tend to include only relational predicates identified as goal relevant, hence only such predicates would ever be candidates for mapping. Any irrelevant predicates that were transferred would presumably be discarded when the complete analogy was evaluated in terms of its goal relevance.
This though does not deal with the claim that the systematicity principle, and the predictions derived from the Structure Mapping Theory, are inconsistent with those derived for the claim that individuals aim to minimise effort when mapping from the source to the target. The two claims can be tested in instances where it is possible to map either a complex set of relations or a more economic set from the same source analogue. In this instance both sets stand as valid solution plans for the given target problem. This is undertaken in Experiment 9, where predictions about human problem solving performance derived from the Structure Mapping Theoiy are tested against those derived from the hypothesised aim to minimise effort.
analogical problem solving. In Chapter One, Section 1.3.1 Centner's definition of ‘analogy’ was outlined: this definition, I argued, is at variance with common usage of the term 'analogy'.
It is perfectly possible to stipulate a definition of a term in the context of a given theoiy, yet, as was argued in Chapter One, Centner's definition excludes features commonly associated with notions of analogy, specifically object attributes. Further, in Chapter One an analogy was identified - involving Hitler and Margaret Thatcher - which cannot be reasonably accommodated under any of Centner's categories of similarity.
Consequently, there ought to be some compelling reason for accepting Centner's definition, and so discounting instances of object attribute mapping as analogical, yet no such reason is advanced. Centner is alive to this problem but seeks to dismiss it as a question only of terminology (Centner, 1989). Yet in the absence of any reason to reject or replace the common usage of'analogy' there is no justificatif for adhering to Centna^s definition. As Holyoak (1985) states. Centner's definition is quite arbitrary. That is. Centner's (1989) claim that structure-mapping captures what is specific about analogy is only true if'analogy' is defined as being solely constituted by mappings between relations in two domains, and no compelling reason for accepting this definition has been advanced.
The Structure-Mapping Thecxy fails to account few what are commonly regarded as analogies, and there is no good reason for accepting this restrictive state-of-affairs. Holyoak's Pragmatic Theory accommodates both instances of relational mapping and object attribution and therefore conforms to the standard notions of what cfstitutes an 'analogy'. This theory is examined in the following section.
2.4 Pragmatic Theory