Pasos necesarios para la extracci´ on de conocimien- conocimien-to

(Common text. Specic text for the baseline and treatment is marked separately).

Welcome and thank for participating in this experiment. Please switch o your mobile phones and remain silent. If you have any questions, please raise your hand and experimenter will answer you privately.

For your participation you will receive 3.00 EUR show-up fee. During the experiment you can earn additional money. Your ad-

ditional earnings depend on your own decisions, decisions of other participants as well as on chance. During the whole experiment your anonymity is guaranteed. Your additional earnings will be expressed in ECU (Experimental Currency Units) that will be con- verted into Euro at the end of the experiment at the following exchange rate: 10,00 ECU = 1,00e.

This experiment consists of three parts. The following instruc- tions describe Part 1 and Part 3 of the experiment. The instructions for Part 2 will be presented to you on the screen once Part 1 is over. At the beginning of the experiment all participants will be di- vided into two groups. You stay within the same group throughout the experiment. 3rd party treatment: One participant in each group will be randomly selected to make a decision at the beginning of Part 2 of the experiment. This decision concerns all participants in his group but has no eect on himself. All the participants will be informed about this decision before Part 2 begins. In contrast to all other participants in his group, this randomly selected participant will not be asked to make any further decisions in the experiment.

Part 1: At the beginning of the experiment participants in both

groups will be confronted with specic examples of everyday be- havior. All participants will then be asked to provide one further example of such behavior, to recall their own recent activity and write down what they recall.

The information participants provide in this part of the experi- ment does not aect their earnings and will be kept strictly anony-

mous.

Part 2: Part 2 will be presented to you on the screen, once Part 1

is over. Part 2 is the only pay-o relevant part of the experiment.

Part 3: In the last part of the experiment you will be asked to

solve certain number of 10 by 10 tables. These tables contain dig- its 0 and 1 in a randomized order. The example of such table is presented below: 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1

Once you see a randomly generated table you have to count how often digit 1 appears in the table and enter this number (with 1 tolerance). If the number your enter is wrong, you will receive a new table until you give the right answer. The table is then counted as solved.

Baseline: The number of tables to solve is xed for each group: one group will be asked to solve 1 table and the other group will be asked to solve 8 tables. You will be informed whether you (and the other participants) of your group will have to solve 1 or 8 tables

after Part 1 of the experiment. Actual solving of tables takes place only in Part 3 of the experiment.

3rd party treatment: After Part 1 of the experiment one par- ticipant in each group will be randomly selected. This participant decides whether other members of his group will have to solve 1 table or 8 tables. This participant himself does not have to solve any tables and makes no decisions in Part 2 of the experiment.

Once you have correctly solved the dened number of tables, you will have the opportunity to surf in the internet until all the other participants are ready with the task.

Before the payment begins, all participants will be asked to an- swer several questions about the experiment.

This will conclude the experiment.

If you have read the instructions carefully and do not have any further questions, click on 'Continue' to start Part 1 of the experi- ment.

Part 2: Instructions (presented on the screen after Part 1)

In this part of the experiment you will be matched with another participant from you group. In each pair there are two roles: Par- ticipant A and Participant B. The roles will be assigned randomly.

Participant A receives an endowment of 100 ECU and decides how much from this amount he would like to give to Participant B. The amount specied by Participant A will be deducted from his account and transferred to Participant B.

Before the participants know if they receive the role of Partic- ipant A or Participant B, both of them will be asked to make a decision as Participant A.

The computer will then assign the role of Participant A to one of the participants and implement his decision. The participants will be informed about their roles, the decision of (selected) Participant A and their earnings.

If you have read the instructions for Part 2 carefully and do not have any further questions, please click on 'Continue'.

Instructions for Judges (presented on the screen after Part 1)

You have an endowment of 100 ECU and can decide, how many tables the participants in your group will have to solve. The default that we set is that the participants in your group at the end of the experiment will have to solve 1 table (8 tables).

You can change the number of tables they have to solve to 8 (1) table(s).

If you change the default number of tables to solve, you loose your endowment of 100 ECU.

If you DO NOT change the default the number of tables to solve, you keep your endowment of 100 ECU.

Chapter 5

Discussion

5.1 Conclusion and methodological remarks

People's preferences for pro-social and ethical behavior are inu- enced by a number of situational factors present in everyday social interactions. The experiments in this thesis identify some of these environmental features aecting the resulting degree of people's eth- icality and pro-sociality.

The ndings of these experiments support the importance of 'the power of the situation' in the domain of pro-social behavior and call for the necessary pre-caution of categorizing people into types (for example, by measuring their social value orientation Murphy et al. (2011)) to understand the outcomes of social interactions. In other words, the interplay between the environment and the person produces no 'sinners' or 'saints' but rather people's 'successes' and 'failures' to sacrice their interest to the benet of others.

Interpretation of the specic ndings of the experiments, how- ever, requires certain precautions.

does participant's willingness to delegate lies in a laboratory in Jena, as shown in one of the projects in this thesis, translate into the behavior of an employee in a particular bank in Hamburg or of an expert in an anti-corruption governmental agency in Ukraine?

Of course, Ukrainian anti-corruption agency is very dierent from the experimental laboratory in Jena in terms of size, actors, or incentives. The question is how systematic are those dierences. If one expects that a certain feature of the anti-corruption institution would make actors behave dierently in comparison to students in Jena, nothing prevents a researcher from isolating this eect in the lab. Any ex-ante claims about low external validity of the lab- oratory experiment remain an unsupported hypothesis. Thus, a director of anti-corruption oce in Kyiv, can treat the willingness to delegate in our three-person game by students in Jena as a rea- sonable working expectation of the behavior of his larger team of deputies, experts, and social activists.

Another important precaution one should take is that the em- pirical analysis in this thesis is based on observation rather than on direct measurement of people's motivation. The work done in this thesis can be viewed as an attempt to link psychological studies that help to identify the environmental factors aecting pro-social and ethical behavior and economic experiments that explore peo- ple's behavior under real monetary incentives. Although we control for a number of factors and impose monetary stimuli, we can only say that certain manipulation produces a particular pattern of be- havior and cannot identify internal processes leading to this behav- ioral change. We observe, for example, a larger incidence of lying when delegation is possible but we are not able to tell much about the changes in decision making processes or internal motivations caused by that delegation possibility. In this respect, a user of this

experimental work would benet from complementing the ndings in this thesis by the evidence from relevant studies in psychology and neuroeconomics.

The last specic methodological issue concerns the qualitative discrepancy in the ndings of the 2nd and the 3rd project of the thesis. In the study on delegation of lies, we have observed com- pensatory behavior: lying was associated with larger donations in the subsequent task. In the study on third-party inuence on one's moral behavior, we have found the evidence for consistent behavior: an unethical act was followed by lower donations. The divergence of these ndings is likely to be driven by two methodological dier- ences between the studies. First, remembering an unethical deed (chapter 4) and actually performing it (chapter 3) are two dierent matters. Although the priming used in chapter 4 is shown to evoke compensatory behavior in other experiments, it might still function as a mere exposition known to enhance consistency (see Mazar & Zhong (2010) for a discussion). Second, one-shot (chapter 4) and repeated (chapter 3) interaction might produce dierent reactions from the participants. Repeated unethical action might accumulate more negative feelings and call for a larger compensation. The fact that in the delegation experiment compensatory tendencies appear only in later rounds supports this intuition.