PASTAS DE CEMENTO

Overview: In 2013, there were no reported terrorist attacks in Kyrgyzstan. However, Kyrgyzstani security forces arrested several individuals suspected of affiliation with terrorist organizations and terrorist activities abroad. Security forces became more aware of increased recruitment of citizens for terrorist acts in Syria. On December 26, the Government of Kyrgyzstan arrested one fighter who reportedly returned from Syria.

The Government of Kyrgyzstan is committed to preventing terrorist attacks and reaches out to

international organizations and foreign governments that can provide training and technical assistance. The country remains vulnerable, however, especially in the south where conflicts on the border with Tajikistan and Uzbekistan and lack of central government control of the mountainous border are an issue. The Government of Kyrgyzstan is also concerned about the potential for an influx of terrorist elements into its territory following the withdrawal of ISAF troops from Afghanistan in 2014.

Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security: In 2013, the State Committee for National Security (GKNB) remained the main government organization tasked with countering terrorism. It arrested several individuals based on their alleged connections to terrorist organizations, including those linked to Hizb-ut-Tahrir, which the Kyrgyzstani government designated as a terrorist

organization in 2003. Embassy officials report positive cooperation with Kyrgyzstan’s main counterterrorism bodies – the GKNB and the MOI.

In November 2013, the Kyrgyzstani Parliament approved a law aimed at improving interagency cooperation and regulations in the field of counterterrorism. The law addressed the integration of international agreements and improvements in streamlining regulations for counterterrorism activities. The new legislation also reduced the number of people required in order for a mass gathering to

receive additional security and protection from terrorist attacks. This will allow more events to qualify for an increased police presence.

Although the GKNB’s antiterrorism unit has demonstrated the capacity to quickly react to bomb scares or other potential terrorist threats, it has limited capacity to act to counter the threat in practice. It lacks both specialized training and equipment.

There remains strong political will and desire for increased capacity building and acquisition of equipment and all law enforcement entities demonstrated a desire for cooperation with international organizations. Kyrgyzstani police officers continued to participate in the Department of State’s Antiterrorism Assistance (ATA) program, and received training focused on enhancing law

enforcement capacity to secure Kyrgyzstan’s airports and conduct terrorism-related investigations. The ATA program continued to focus on strengthening police capacity to secure the country’s borders. The border guards and customs service also cooperated closely with Embassy Bishkek’s Export

Control and Related Border Security Assistance (EXBS) office. EXBS is funding construction of additional border towers and providing renovations and enhancements to existing border towers along the southern borders of Kyrgyzstan with Uzbekistan and Tajikistan. The OSCE, through its

Community Security Initiative (CSI) continued to support an embedded police advisor with law enforcement agencies in each region of Kyrgyzstan, which began following ethnic clashes between

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ethnic Kyrgyz and Uzbeks in 2010 in the southern regions of Osh and Jalalabad. Along with community policing, the advisors train local law enforcement officials on how to identify potential terrorist attacks.

The Government of Kyrgyzstan does not maintain a terrorist screening watch list. It also does not have biographic or biometric screening capabilities at ports of entry. Although internal information sharing within the host government increased in 2013, it still needs improvement. Information sharing with other countries happened rarely and usually only by request in the context of a human trafficking or other organized crime investigation. The Government of Kyrgyzstan does not collect advance passenger name records on commercial flights.

In August, the GKNB arrested two citizens of Kyrgyzstan and a citizen of Kazakhstan who were suspected members of a terrorist cell in southern Kyrgyzstan. According to GKNB, the suspects intended to execute a series of attacks in Kyrgyzstan on behalf of foreign sponsors. The suspects purchased weapons, explosive materials, and communication equipment. In September, GKNB Special Forces facilitated the repatriation of two Kyrgyzstani recruits from Syria, working in

collaboration with relatives of the recruits. It is not clear how many Kyrgyzstani nationals remain in Syria. On December 26, an alleged fighter who returned from Syria was arrested in Batken province under suspicion of attempting to recruit local Kyrgyzstani citizens for membership into an unnamed terrorist group.

Deterrents to more effective host government law enforcement measures against terrorism include interagency rivalries, a lack of coordination between the GKNB and the MOI, and budgetary constraints. Inefficient Soviet-era bureaucratic structures, low salaries, and frequent personnel turnover hampered law enforcement efforts. Kyrgyzstani counterterrorist units remained largely untested in real-life situations.

Countering the Financing of Terrorism: Kyrgyzstan belongs to the Eurasian Group on Combating Money Laundering and the Finance of Terrorism (EAG), a Financial Action Task Force (FATF)-style regional body. In October 2011, Kyrgyzstan made a high-level political commitment to work with the FATF and EAG to address its strategic anti-money laundering/counterterrorist finance (AML/CFT) deficiencies. Since then, Kyrgyzstan has taken steps towards improving its AML/CFT regime. However, the FATF called for the country to address its remaining deficiencies: the criminalization of money laundering in accordance with international standards; improving the framework for freezing terrorist assets; and improving the AML/CFT supervisory program. In 2012, the Government of Kyrgyzstan established a Commission on Combating the Financing of Terrorism but it was largely inactive in 2013. For further information on money laundering and financial crimes, see the 2014

International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (INCSR), Volume 2, Money Laundering and Financial Crimes: http://www.state.gov/j/inl/rls/nrcrpt/index.htm.

Regional and International Cooperation: In 2013, Kyrgyzstan participated in counterterrorism activities organized by the OSCE, the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) Antiterrorism Center, and the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO). The U.S. military conducted eight counterterrorism training events with the GKNB, the Interior Ministry, the Defense Ministry, and the Border Service. These events were designed to teach units to perform typical military tasks while respecting human rights and the safety of noncombatants.

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Overview: Maldives, an archipelago consisting of nearly 1,200 coral islands grouped into 26 atolls, is strategically located close to international sea lanes bisecting the Indian Ocean. Since 2010, concerns about the activities of a small number of local violent extremists involved with transnational terrorist groups have been mounting. There has been particular concern that young Maldivians, including those within the penal system, may be at risk of becoming radicalized and joining violent Islamist extremist groups. Links have been made between Maldivians and violent extremists throughout the world. Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security: In 2013, the Maldivian government arrested several people possibly associated with violent extremism. However, since existing laws and law enforcement processes severely limit the ability of law enforcement agencies to prosecute such cases, the number of convictions was limited.

Maldives continued to participate in the Department of State’s Antiterrorism Assistance (ATA) program. ATA training focused on building capacity in counterterrorism leadership and management, critical target protection, and crisis management. ATA training included courses in securing maritime and other vital infrastructure from terrorism-related threats. The State Department also provided training to more than 100 Maldivian immigration officers in fraudulent travel document recognition. Maldives has few laws that effectively control the movement of people and money in and out of the country. Due to its sprawling island geography and insufficient technological capabilities, the

Maldivian Coast Guard currently cannot effectively patrol Maldivian waters. In August, the Maldivian government worked with the United States to upgrade its border security with installation of the

PISCES system (Personal Identification Secure Comparison and Evaluation System) at Maldives’ main international airport and at Malé Seaport.

Countering the Financing of Terrorism: Maldives is a member of the Asia/Pacific Group on Money Laundering, a Financial Action Task Force-style regional body. Maldivian authorities believe that funds are currently being raised in Maldives to support terrorism abroad; however, there is no reliable information regarding the amounts involved. While no official studies yet have been conducted, the Maldivian Central Bank believes that criminal proceeds mainly come from domestic sources, as a large percentage of Suspicious Transaction Reports (STRs) are related to Maldivians. The Maldives

Monetary Authority reports that hawala systems (informal money transfer networks) are being used to transfer funds between the islands, although the extent to which these systems are used to launder money is still unclear.

The Maldivian government monitors banks, the insurance sector, money remittance institutions and finance companies, and requires the collection of data for wire transfers. Financial institutions other than banks and intermediaries in the securities sector, however, are not subject to current anti-money laundering/countering the financing of terrorism (AML/CFT) obligations. Insurance companies and intermediaries, finance companies, money remittance service providers, foreign exchange businesses, and credit card companies therefore operate outside the AML/CFT framework. Maldives does not currently require non-profit organizations to file suspicious transaction reports, nor does it regulate or monitor those organizations to prevent misuse and terrorist financing.

The Maldivian government implements UNSCRs 1267 (1999) and follow-on resolutions and 1373 (2001), and monitors and regulates alternative remittance services, despite the fact that they lie outside the AML/CFT framework. The Maldivian government did not report any efforts to seize terrorist assets in 2013.

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According to the Maldivian government, capacity building of relevant supervisory and regulatory authorities (such as the Maldives Monetary Authority and the Capital Market Development Authority), as well as law enforcement authorities (the Anti-Corruption Commission, Department of Immigration and Emigration, Maldives Customs Service, and Maldives Police Service), and the judiciary is needed in order to properly counter money laundering and terrorist financing. For further information on money laundering and financial crimes, see the 2014 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report

(INCSR), Volume 2, Money Laundering and Financial Crimes:

http://www.state.gov/j/inl/rls/nrcrpt/index.htm.

Regional and International Cooperation: The Maldivian government cooperated closely with Indian security forces, who offered regular support in the form of assets and training to Maldivian security forces. The Maldivian government also cooperated closely with the Sri Lankan government.

Countering Radicalization to Violence and Violent Extremism: The Maldivian government continued to recognize that counter-radicalization efforts form a critical component to long-term success against violent extremism and pursued initiatives in this area. In 2013, the Ministry of Islamic Affairs conducted more than a dozen seminars and workshops on preventing violent extremism for religious leaders, educators, and local government officials.

NEPAL

Overview: Nepal experienced no significant acts of international terrorism in 2013, although its open border with India and weak controls at Kathmandu’s Tribhuvan International Airport raised concerns that international terrorist groups could use Nepal as a transit point.

2013 Terrorist Incidents: On March 13, a group of attackers ambushed a motorcade including Unified Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) (UCPN(M)) Chairman Pushpa Kamal Dahal (aka “Prachanda”) en route to a campaign event in Kanchanpur. Media reported that a landmine exploded near the lead car, but nobody was injured. In the run-up to the November 19 Constituent Assembly Elections, one individual was killed and several injured in sporadic violence. During this period, police and army bomb squads discovered what appeared to be more than 100 improvised explosive devices (IEDs), of which about one-third were in the Kathmandu Valley. While the vast majority of IED scares were hoaxes, at least five actual IEDs exploded. There were no fatalities from any of these relatively unsophisticated IEDs, although on election day, a young child was seriously injured when he handled an IED that he believed was a toy. Also on election day, an IED injured three individuals when it exploded near a polling station in Kathmandu. In addition, there were at least six petrol-bomb attacks on long-distance buses and vans. A bus driver was killed in one of the attacks, and several individuals were injured.

The police arrested more than 200 individuals for involvement in the attacks, including dozens of members of the Communist Party of Nepal-Maoist (CPN-M) – a splinter party that broke from the UCPN(M) in June 2012 and opposed the elections. CPN-M leaders denied responsibility for the attacks, although CPN-M Chairman Mohan Baidya acknowledged at a December press conference that some party members, frustrated that demands to call off the elections were ignored, may have been involved in the petrol-bomb attacks.

Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security: Nepali law criminalizes activities related to terrorism, including the financing of terrorism. While Nepal has specialized units to respond to terrorist incidents, law enforcement units lack the capacity to effectively detect, deter, and identify

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terrorist suspects. An open border with India and relatively weak airport security hamper efforts to implement effective counterterrorism policing.

Nepali police officers continued to participate in the Department of State’s Antiterrorism Assistance (ATA) program. In 2013, the ATA program funded six training courses to improve counterterrorism capabilities within Nepali law enforcement agencies. ATA training focused on building Nepali law enforcement capacity to secure the country’s borders from terrorist transit and preventing terrorists from establishing safe havens within Nepal. Additionally, the U.S. Department of Justice International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program (ICITAP) began training the Nepal Police in Polygraph Examination to improve criminal investigations, including investigations of potential terrorist activities. The United States also sponsored four joint training exercises with the Nepal Army to develop its counter-terrorism force, the Mahabir Rangers.

Countering the Financing of Terrorism: Nepal belongs to the Asia Pacific Group on Money Laundering, a Financial Action Task Force (FATF)-style regional body. In June, President Yadav signed an additional ordinance to satisfy FATF requirements for criminalizing terrorist finance. The President also approved amendments to the Money-Laundering Prevention Act (MLPA) that give the government broad powers to confiscate assets of terrorist organizations and financiers. In September, Nepal froze the assets of 224 entities and 64 individuals with suspected connections to al-Qa’ida. In October, the FATF noted that Nepal had largely addressed its action plan and is planning on conducting an onsite review to ensure that the process of implementing the required reforms and actions is underway, including addressing deficiencies previously identified by the FATF.

Nepali law allows the government to freeze and confiscate terrorist assets; however, coordination among different institutions remained slow. The Nepali authorities were in the process of installing computer systems to trace suspected terrorist assets and freeze them.

The Nepal Rastra Bank (the Central Bank of Nepal, NRB), licenses and monitors business services that receive remittances. Transactions by unauthorized banks and financial institutions to transfer or

receive money (such as hundi and hawala) are considered criminal money laundering offenses, but it is difficult for the Nepali government to investigate these informal money transfer systems.

Only banks can legally transfer money out of Nepal. Money transfer services in Nepal may receive inbound remittances, but funds must be distributed to recipients through banks, which are required to collect data on the originator.

The NRB’s Financial Information Unit (FIU) directives do not cover non-profit organizations, unless there is specific information that they are involved in money laundering and terrorist financing. For further information on money laundering and financial crimes, see the 2014 International

Narcotics Control Strategy Report (INCSR), Volume 2, Money Laundering and Financial Crimes:

http://www.state.gov/j/inl/rls/nrcrpt/index.htm. PAKISTAN

Overview: In 2013, Pakistan continued to confront terrorist groups, including al-Qa’ida (AQ), Tehrik- e Taliban Pakistan (TTP), the Punjabi Taliban, and Lashkar I Jhangvi (LJ), all of whom mounted attacks against police, military and security forces, or engaged in sectarian violence and criminal

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activities against all sectors of society. Pakistan did not confront Lashkare-Tayyiba, however, who continued to operate, rally, and fundraise in Pakistan with its front organizations. In 2013, terrorists used remote-controlled improvised explosive devices (IEDs) in bicycles, motorcycles, parked cars, rickshaws, donkey carts, and alongside roads, used vehicle-borne IEDs, suicide bombers (including females), targeted assassinations, rocket-propelled grenades, and other armed combat tactics in attacks on mosques, churches, markets, journalists, aid workers, government institutions and officials. AQ and HQN continued to plot against U.S. interests in the region, including U.S. diplomatic facilities. TTP posed a threat to both U.S. and Pakistani interests, and carried out numerous attacks against Pakistani armed forces, Pakistani civilians, and government institutions.

The May 2013 national elections brought in new civilian leadership, which was reviewing a new counterterrorism strategy at year’s end. In the pre-election period, some terrorist groups forged alliances with certain political parties, including religiously-based political parties. Some violent extremists conducted election-related terrorist attacks against political parties, candidates, and

government officials. Pakistan’s government has pursued negotiations with TTP while also targeting the group militarily. Pakistan continued to support the Afghan peace process.

Karachi continued to suffer from political and ethnic violence inflicted by different groups, including militant organizations, fundamentalist religious groups, and the militant wings of political parties. Some militant groups worked to assert control over political parties and criminal gangs operating in the city and surrounding areas of southern Sindh. The security situation in Karachi was a priority concern for Pakistan’s president, prime minister, parliament, Supreme Court, and the military and law

enforcement agencies.

2013 Terrorist Incidents: During 2013, terrorist groups targeted the Pakistani government and military, engaged in sectarian violence, and perpetrated attacks against civilians. Terrorists organized armed assaults on police stations, judicial centers, border check posts, military convoys, and polio vaccination teams. Terrorists plotted against and attacked judges, prosecutors, police officers, defense lawyers, anti-TTP peace committee members, intelligence officers, and elected officials. In the months leading up to the May national elections, terrorists attacked and killed political party workers and candidates, bombed political rallies, and, after the elections, killed newly elected and appointed officials. Terrorists mounted an armed attack on a Pakistan military and Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) office in Sukkur, and days later stormed a major prison, releasing several dozen imprisoned high- profile terrorists.

In separate incidents, terrorists assassinated a high-ranking Army general in the tribal areas, the Karachi Chief of Police, and the president’s chief of security. Terrorists targeted Shia and other religious minorities in all areas of Pakistan, especially in Sindh, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP), and Balochistan. Terrorists killed an international team of mountain climbers, including one U.S. citizen, on Pakistan’s famed Nanga Parbat Mountain.

As of mid-December, over 1,025 civilians and more than 475 security forces personnel had been killed in terrorist-related incidents in Pakistan during the year. The presence of AQ, TTP, and other militant groups continues to pose a threat to U.S. citizens throughout Pakistan. The TTP claimed responsibility