A major impetus to the creation of terrorist groups by political parties is the denial of access to other political parties in a polity, in particular, parties operating from left of the political spectrum. As was shown with several rightwing governments in the previous chapters, because of the ideological position of most solidly rightwing governments, they often seek by various means to ban or curtail the political access of political parties on the left and in some cases, the center and those at the religious spectrum. In contrast to these approaches, and as was shown in the quantitative section, ruling regimes of the center and left leaning such as Costa Rica generally maintain a policy of openness towards a range of political parties.
In general, while there are several prevailing theories, which attempt to explain Costa Rica’s relative peace, no study thus far, provides an ample explanation for why that state has not experienced terrorism from political parties. Among the theories used to explain Costa Rica relative absence of civil strive vis-à-vis its neighbors, is the more frequently presented “rural
democracy” thesis. The rural democracy thesis contends that the peaceful nature of Costa Rica’s contemporary democracy is a direct result of the colonial experience, which forms the social and political foundations that aided the stability of later democracy (Wilson 1998, 11). According Wilson (1998, 11), a major assertion of the rural democracy thesis is that due to the failure to find significant precious metals and an absence of a significant indigenous population, Spanish conquistador elites in Costa Rica were prevented from replicating the social and economic cleavages prevalent elsewhere in Latin America. While the above argument seems plausible, as number of scholars correctly and convincingly found in their various works, the thesis has many incongruent arguments (Fonseca 1984; Gudmundson 1986; Wilson 1998; Seligson 1980). In particular, even though the country was colonized relatively late, it was also relatively isolated, and had low numbers of native Indians. Thus, the social and political structure of Costa Rica was never “egalitarian but complex and highly structured” (Wilson 1998, 12).
Although the rural democracy theory may offer some keys towards a better understanding of some types of civil strife, it does not explain the absence of terrorism by political parties. As this dissertation has shown in the previous country cases and quantitative section, the political ideology of the ruling regime does provide answers to why some polities seem to witness higher incidences of political parties using terrorism.
Table 8.1 Election Results, 1948-1998 Costa Rica
Fernado Castro C. Liberacion Nacional
Democratico 123
Daniel Oduber Q. Unificacion Nacional
Liberacion Nacional 223
SOURCE: Booth (1999) “Representative Constitutional Democracy.”
As shown in Figure 8.1 the ruling regimes in Costa Rica since 1948 have been predominately centrist or left leaning therefore this case does not provide any instance of terror groups being formed by political parties. In many ways, the post-1948 decisions by elites in Costa Rica staved off what might have ultimately been a critical juncture marked by terrorism by political parties. Instead, as this section shows, because of the left of center and more importantly centrist ideology promoted by ruling elites, political parties across the political spectrum found few reasons post-1948 to create terrorist organizations.
Simply stated, left leaning and centrist governments in Costa Rica have promoted conciliation and cooperation (Wilson 1998; Bell 1991; Diamond et.al 1999). As was detailed in the previous sections, the pre-1948 period in Costa Rica while relatively stable when compared to other regional states’ domestic political climate, was still not a shining example of liberal democracy. In at least two junctures since the pivotal 1889 elections (1917 and 1948), democracy and peace was interrupted with support from the wealthy coffee aristocrats, the traditional enemy of redistributive reforms (Booth 1999). Hence, in an effort to forestall future breakdowns of the political order following the 1948 civil war, policymakers and politicians took two important steps that were critical to understanding the peaceful nature of Costa Rican politics. First, the decision was made to amend the constitution and second, political parties moved closer to the center.78
The 1948 civil war led to a range of changes to the Costa Rican constitution that ensured it was the most liberal democracy in Latin America (Booth 1999). Despite efforts by coffee aristocracy and other conservative elements to block changes by the social democrats and thus preserve the 1871 constitution, the pro-liberal legislators through the 1949 constitution
implemented several important changes. Among these were to strengthen “the independent judiciary, fortify the electoral branch of government (the National Electoral Tribunal became the Supreme Electoral Tribunnal), weaken the executive, provide for proportional representation, and limited the terms of both presidents and legislators” (Stanifer 1998, 127). Other changes included the decentralization of political power and increasing participation of regional administrators. Such steps were a major accomplishment in a region where centralization has such deep roots. By granting greater power to municipal government and by encouraging the establishment of autonomous agencies, regional parties believed that they could actively participate in the political process (Stanifer 1998, 127).
The Costa Rican 1949 constitution differed in many respects to those enacted by rightwing governments in the other cases. For example, the Conservative and Liberal party in the Colombian case cooperated in creating legislation aimed at increasing their control of the political system. In contrast to Costa Rica, the ruling parties in Colombia had enacted laws aimed at complete centralization of the state and reduction of political participation by other political parties. Such measures ensured that Colombia had a monopoly on access to higher office. In general such features were absent from the Costa Rican political system post-1948.
The second important change that occurred in Costa Rica and one that is cogent to the central argument of this dissertation was the conscious effort made by various political parties to move towards the center. As Stanifer (1998, 127) points out, “shocked by the temporary breakdown of order Costa Rican leaders gravitated to the political center and worked together to produce a document that they hoped would prevent future breakdown.” Thus, consecutive Costa Rican governments made efforts to distance themselves from conventional right leaning programs and policies. In practice, as seen in Table 8.1, the electorate most often elected centrist
and liberal minded governments. Unlike many of its neighbors, conservative institutions such as Catholic Church in Costa Rica were forced to reform and accept the supremacy of the state. Even before the 1949 constitution, liberal governments pressured the church to reform many of its more conservative policies, such as historical demands by the church to have a powerful influential role in the state. As Williams (1989, 3) points out “the move towards a reformist model occurred much earlier and paralleled the Church’s collaboration with the Calderon Guardia government in the implementation of a series of reform.” In general, there was relatively minimal friction between the Church and the state owing to the politically moderate governments generally allowed the Church some level of passive “collaboration vis-à-vis the regime” (Williams 1989, 4).
The Costa Rican government granted significant liberty to the Costa Rican Communist Party (Bell 1971, 9-11). This is further evidence of the difference in left and centrist political policies from those of the right in creating harmonious political dialogue. Despite significant pressure from the United States government for limits to be placed on the Costa Rican Communist Party, the Costa Rican government granted unprecedented access to the communists to participate in politics (Palmer and Molina 2004). In the mid to late 1940s, the communist movement, as it was in many areas of the international system, began to be presented to many poor and lower economic classes as an alternative to western style capitalism. In Costa Rica, especially in the rural districts where foreign American companies such as the United Fruit Company operated large banana farms, there was massive exploitation of the poor and uneducated class (Bell 1971, 24-27). Communist movements, similar to those in nearby Nicaragua, encouraged the lower and even some lower middle class citizens to challenge the government to create social programs (National Democratic Institute For International Affairs
1990, 27). As illustrative of the attitude of accommodation by regimes in Costa Rica towards communist movements, a frustrated and angry representative of the United Fruit Company approached agents from the United States Secretary of State about the issue of communist inspired strikes. As the memo to the Secretary of State showed, the United Fruit Company tried to get the United States intervene in Costa Rica by raising claims of communist diffusion:
Don’t you think that if a Communist Government would be established in Costa Rica that it would be very dangerous for President Ubico in Guatemala, who has succeeded heretofore in stamping out Communism in that country before it could get a start; for President Martinez in El Salvador who stopped Communism at a loss of three thousand lives; for President Carias in Honduras and for old man Sacasa in Nicaragua? Do you think it is possible to get word to them through your American Ministers in those countries and from you to their representatives (of other Central American countries) in San Jose to point out to them the grave danger which exists here and which would affect them if carried to its present conclusion in order that they might bring pressure upon President Jimenez to let him know that the Governments in these countries are watching the situation in Costa Rica with much concern (U.S. Department of State, 1944).
Unlike in Colombia, the Calderon Guardia government, as did many of its successors, responded to demands by the Communist Party and its supporters not by banning the Communist Party but instead sponsoring:
Comprehensive programs that included, among others, the Law for New Industries to encourage diversification of the economy; the creation of the Social Security System and the enactment of the Labor Code; the pragmatic Land Law, the so called Law of
Parasites, which allowed the landless to acquire title to land on the promise of cultivating it; and the simple but effective program of distributing free shoes to needy children in the first grade to protect their feet against parasites and to help abate the feelings of
inferiority produced by the lack of such a basic item (National Democratic Institute For International Affairs. 1990, 29).
Under the leadership of Manuel Mora, the Communist Party candidates were frequently elected to the country’s parliament. For many communists, despite preferring a different economic model there was no need to challenge violently the state through arm conflict.79
As Figure 8.1 shows, the access granted to opposing political organization in Costa Rica enabled almost all political organizations in the state to believe that they had a legitimate opportunity to vie for higher office. Hence, the chances of political parties turning to terror was significantly reduced in that polity.
Mora’s position was simple “violent revolution was not necessary or called for in Costa Rica, because the Communists participated in the democratic institutions of the nation and thus impel a peaceful transformation of systems and institutions” (Bell 1971, 24-27). For the ruling regimes, especially post-1949, liberal policies of dialogue over authoritarian policies helped ensure that the political atmosphere in Costa Rica did not become closed so as to precipitate violence as it had occurred in many of Costa Rica’s neighbors. Palmer and Molina (2004, 5) point out that one of the important liberal traits of consecutive Costa Rican governments has been to “resolve conflict by channeling it in a legal and institutionalized fashion.”
79 The only exception here was the 1949 civil war when leaders of the coup who had taken control of government
Figure 8.1 Tracing the Causal Path–Costa Rica
Table 8.2 Structured Focused Comparison of Cases Between 1960-2006
Variable Colombia Turkey Japan Costa Rica
Majdemoc No No Yes No
Proportional rep Yes Yes No Yes
Left wing gov’t No Yes No Yes
Centrist gov’t Yes No No Yes
Right wing gov’t Yes Yes Yes No
Religious gov’t No No No No
External conflict Yes Yes No No
Political repression Yes Yes No No
Political party/terror groups Yes Yes Yes No
Three party coalition gov’t No Yes Yes Yes
Thus, the absence of terrorism in the state along the lines of political party provides a clear indication of the role centrist and left of center ideology play in reducing terrorism by political organizations. It seem, Costa Rica represents one of many cases where countries that have adopted leftist or more often centrist ideology as a medium of rule.
As the structured focused comparison presented in Table 8.2 shows a centrist ideology more often than rightist ideology create harmonious environment where opposition political parties on the far left, religious and even right, are less motivated to use violence as a means to achieve their political aims. In fact, as shown in Table 8.2, the only consistent variable which explains political parties turn to terror is the existence of rightwing governments. While as a point of criticism, it can be argued that Costa Rica possesses various other factors that allow for peaceful cohabitation of political interest such as a proportional electoral system, a relative peaceful past
various occasion also possessed one or all of the mediating factors previously mentioned.
Importantly, what this negative case shows is that an equitable centrist ruling ideology appears to be a key factor in polities that do not possesses incidents of political parties creating terrorist organizations.