74 provision for inspection after three months to check the survival of the planted saplings.
While these inferior quality saplings have very little chance of survival for three months, even if they survive, they are often destroyed due to open grazing by cattle. Moreover, there is no provision in the scheme for tree guards or protection. Ironically, the workers are paid for their labor only after the inspection is over. As a result, the workers take whatever money is given to them. This suggests that there are loopholes in the delivery of schemes which are exploited by the corrupt officials and other influential actors. In such situations, even stringent laws or effective mobilization of the poor may not be sufficient in tackling corruption. Below we discuss some of the challenges involved in mobilization of the poorest against rent seeking in rural Bihar on the basis of our study of the SSEVK.
2.5 The Challenges Ahead
As noted earlier on, with the change of regime in Bihar in 2005, several administrative reforms have taken place for effective delivery of public services. With regards to the delivery of welfare schemes in rural areas, the office of the BDO is very important. Owing to their crucial role the present regime has restructured the offices of BDO by creation of a new cadre of service named ‘Bihar Rural Developmental Services’ (BRDS). Until the time the first batch of the new BRDS are recruited, the state government has posted the officials from other departments for a limited tenure to perform the duties of the BDOs. Although these changes seem very promising, their effect is yet to be seen. Moreover, many of the BDOs in the wake of likelihood of returning back to their parent departments are trying to siphon off funds as quickly as possible. A volunteer of the SSEVK informed us:
75 Some BDOs are trying to make as much money as possible before they
return to their parent departments where the chances of rent seeking are very limited.34
Another change that has taken place recently is the re-strengthening of local bureaucracy vis-a-vis democratically elected rural local bodies (Panchayats). As mentioned earlier in the paper, under the previous regime, deliberate efforts were made by the ruling party to weaken the power of local bureaucracy and to strengthen the powers of the Panchayat representatives.
During that time the villagers always approached the Panchayats for availing the benefits of welfare schemes. However, with the new regime’s efforts towards good governance, transparency and accountability, some of the additional powers that Panchayats gained earlier on (for example, in influencing the processes identification of beneficiaries or disbursement of developmental funds) have been streamlined. Now the local officials deal with the beneficiaries through Vikas Mitras and not Panchayats. In our interviews with local officials, they suggested that the Panchayat representatives are unhappy with these changes as they are devoid of their influence. As a consequence, the Panchayat representatives have started to blame the present regime of spreading afsarshai (literally, officialdom). The growing tension between officials and Panchayats is certainly problematic for the efficient delivery of services to the village poor.
Apart from the problems identified above, there are also certain challenges on the part of the SSEVK and MVM in terms of their functioning. Some of these challenges were identified in a feedback session with the Actionaid in 2013 that the first author also attended. The Actionaid workers indicated that the SSEVK is fully identified with its leader Amar Singh and there is
34 Interview, 2 August 2013 at Chakiya block. This viewpoint is also corroborated by newspaper reports which suggest that out of 534 BDOs posted across Bihar, 181 are currently under probe, mostly for alleged misappropriation of funds for the IAY (India Express, 10 December 2012)
76 no second rung of leadership. Another problem is that the MVM volunteers, especially at the district level, are exhibiting authoritarian behaviour, and there is lack of participatory decision making, both within the MVM and the SSEVK. The ActionAid team found in the feedback session that, with the growing membership of the MVM, leaders have started feeling more indolent and are not that serious about the village meetings when compared to earlier times.
The procedures of the meetings are also not recorded so the volunteers do not have a clear perspective on the decided course of action and consequently, in the next meeting, the members do not have any basis to compare their progress with regard to their work.
Furthermore there is also a need to focus more on the skills development of the members as solely relying on the entitlement and the welfare measures of the government is insufficient for their empowerment. In addition, the unduly aggressive behaviour of the members of the MVM might turn out to be detrimental in the long run especially if the new regime is not as sympathetic to their cause as the present one. An official at a BDO office warned us about the fate of Musahars in the following words:
The present government is very sympathetic towards the Mahadalits.
When this government gets out of power, the Musahars might have to pay heavy price for their assertiveness […]35
We also noticed an over dependence of the MVM on the SSEVK for all their work, which in turn is dependent on the funding from the Actionaid. It is a concern especially after the funding from the donors dries-up. So, if the MVM does not become self-sufficient in decision making and paying honorarium to volunteers, it will face considerable problems after the support from the SSEVK comes to an end. Further, there is a need for the MVM to connect to
35 Interview, 18 July 2013 at Chakiya block
77 other institutions like the Bihar State Mahadalits Commission and National Commission for the Scheduled Caste for highlighting the cause of the Musahars.