La PEC en las SNIUAA

Domestic political pressures for change have long driven decentralisation reforms in Tanzania. The pragmatic approach to decentralisation adopted from the 1970s onwards was driven by the political calculations of the ruling party, TANU and CCM, although donors did wield significant influence through their aid conditionalities. With regards to the 1998 local government reform and the decentralisation policy under way, CCM in its election manifesto of 1995 promised to strengthen the local government system with the overall objective of improving the quality of, and access to, public services provided by LGAs (URT, 1998; Tidemand, 2015). Their domestic appeal aside, the declarations of the manifesto also broadly conformed to the objectives of key donor organisations on whose financial support the reform programme heavily rested (URT, 2005; Mgonja & Tundui, 2012). Ministry officials interviewed confirmed that ‘decentralisation came up from the CCM party manifesto of 1995 and the government managed to convince donors for funding’ (Ministry official01 11.06.2014). It was in this context, following its victory in

the polls 1995, that the CCM government invited both bilateral and multilateral donor agencies to take part in design of a local government reform programme and it was through this process that the Local Government Reform Agenda 1996–2000 was developed (URT, 1996, 1998, 2005a, 2009). As might have been expected under the circumstances, the local government reform agenda was fully endorsed by key donor agencies and following their pledges of support, a special programme management team was immediately established to develop the LGRP in 1997 (URT, 2005a) and this was followed by the publication of a government policy paper on local government reform in 1998. In that regard, the government of Tanzania has itself acknowledged that the LGRP ‘has been a vehicle through which the government and donors initiated and promoted the decentralisation process’ (Mmari, 2005, p.10; see also URT, 1998; 2005a).

Domestic political considerations unquestionably influenced the pace at which local government reform objectives were implemented, and the hybrid nature of decentralisation which emerged. TASAF officials affirmed that the Fund was conceived by top leaders in the party and government. Having been piloted in a few local councils, political office bearers, and especially the Members of Parliament, pressured the government to extend TASAF operations across the country based on the promising outcomes of its first phase (TASAF, 2005). Given the nature of TASAF operations, this

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suggests a shift in political commitment to devolution towards a deconcentrated form of administration.

An analysis of the policy orientation of Tanzanian governments under different presidential leadership is of interest in that it reflects a progressive shift towards, and a compliance with, the neoliberal agenda advanced by Western donors. Thus, for example, the first president, Julius Nyerere, was highly sceptical of the structural reforms proposed by donors and is quoted as saying: ‘When did the IMF become an international ministry of finance? When did nations agree to surrender to it their power of decision-making?’ (Nugent, 2004, p. 326; Loxley, 1986). In the late 1970s Nyerere’s disagreement with the structural adjustments proposed led to a suspension of the IMF support and a severe reduction of foreign aid to Tanzania (Muganda, 2004; JMT, 2011). His stepping down from the presidency in 1985 sent a message to the donor community that the country was ready for neo-liberal reforms. The second president, President Mwinyi (1986–1995), set the stage for structural and institutional reforms and played a vital role in opening up the country to market forces. Mwinyi spearheaded the liberalization efforts immediately after assuming office in 1986 (Kjaer, 2004; Shivji, 2006). The reforms during his presidency emphasized getting the prices right, particularly the dismantling of the set of policies resulting from the 1967 Arusha Declaration which had been designed to support a centrally-planned economy that (Muganda 2004), And by the end of 1991 the government ‘had implemented a substantial element of the liberalization process’ (Muganda 2004, p.3; Kjaer, 2004).

The third president, President Mkapa (1996–2005), took to heart the implementation of the IMF/World Bank’s Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility (ESAF) programme and its successor, the Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (PRGF). Mkapa fully embraced the World Bank-supported programmes and those supported by other multilateral and bilateral donors (Havnevik & Isinika, 2010; Kjaer, 2004). His commitment to reforming the public sector included the privatisation of two-thirds of public enterprises, introduction of the local government reform programme, and initiation of the National Strategy for Growth and Reduction of Poverty along with the establishment of TASAF (Muganda, 2004; Havnevik & Isinika, 2010). Confirming this commitment, a World Bank’s report states that:

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When the President of Tanzania visited Malawi in 1998, the Malawian President took him to see communities supported by the Malawi Social Action Fund (MASAF). This resulted in the Government of Tanzania (GOT) requesting the World Bank to send the same team to help it create a similar social fund to help communities contribute to their own development (Lenneiye, 2006, p. 1).

A TASAF official interviewed asserts that, following the President’s visit to Malawi, ‘TASAF benchmarked from the Malawi Social Action Fund (MASAF) which had a similar objective of fighting poverty’ (TMU official01 14.05.2014). The fourth president, President Kikwete (2006–2015) continued with the implementation of the reforms initiated by previous governments although the reforms seem to lose momentum in his second term in office (2011–2015).