The first major revision to the relations established by the Police Act 1964 came much later in the Police and Magistrates' Court Act (PCMA) 1994. This introduced a 'managerialist' approach to police governance through the imposition of local and national performance targets. It was also the Conservatives' last police Act before being succeeded by a Labour government. PCMA was introduced at a time when Britain's political parties had converged in pursuing harsh penal policies, an era Reiner (2010) dubs as 'crime control', and traditional concerns for civil liberties were replaced by those seeking greater police efficiencies and reductions in crime. Loveday (1997:76) views the Act with optimism, arguing at the time that it could potentially “alter” police authorities' relationship with their chief constables by enabling them to influence the strategic direction of their forces and matters falling into operational independence. For Jones & Newburn (1997), “potential” was indeed the prime word in an uncertain future where, at time of writing, these relations were untested, particularly the Home Secretary's vast powers to impose any targets unpopular with police authorities and chief constables. Overall, however, as is now discussed, the Act had made the roles of police authorities and their chief constables more interdependent and transferred further powers to the Home Secretary.
Police authorities central duty was redefined to “secure the maintenance of an efficient”, rather than merely adequate, “and effective police force” (PCMA 1994, section 4(1)). They were given the responsibility for issuing a local policing plan setting out the priorities for
14 Although the Home Secretary had part-financed mutual aid, the police authorities whose chief constables were in receipt of aid were still required to reimburse those authorities whose forces were supplying resources.
their force for every financial year but with the proviso that all objectives had to comply with those set nationally by the Home Secretary. Oddly, chief constables were responsible for drafting the plan in the first instance before handing it over to the police authority who could then make amendments before publishing it, providing that they consulted their chiefs on any changes. Police authorities were required to consult the public through the police-liaison groups set up by PACE in developing their objectives. Any views obtained needed to only “be considered” thus showing how peripheral the public really were to this process. Additionally, authorities were required to publish an annual report assessing the extent to which these priorities had been met or not, and to also send a copy to the Home Secretary, perhaps as a way of pressuring chiefs to conform with the plans.
Other changes included reducing police authority's membership to seventeen; introducing independent members with wider skill-sets to fulfil the authority's enhanced functions; and giving them powers to employ civilians. Confusingly, all civilian employees were placed under the direction and control of chief constables, including the powers of “engagement and dismissal” unless otherwise agreed between them, thus showing how further interdependent their functions had become.
Jones & Newburn's (1997) detailed study of the PCMA, its former Bills and the circumstances surrounding the Act's introduction shows that the composition of police authority members was the most controversial proposal. As they argue, the Conservative Home Secretary's far-reaching proposals to directly appoint the chairperson and a higher number of independent members was defeated by successful police lobbying. Instead, the final Act ensured elected councillors constituted the majority of an authority's membership, enabled them to select their own chair and introduced a complicated process of nominating
independent members whereby the Home Secretary could shortlist candidates but not decide the final appointees. What the Home Secretary did gain was greater powers to amalgamate and make alterations to forces without the need for the prior consultation required by the Police Act 1964. He also gained powers to directly intervene into the workings of police authorities by issuing codes of practice regulating their conduct; powers to require reports on any matter be submitted to him and, potentially, to make this public; and also to direct them to undertake any measures he considered necessary if their force received a negative inspection report.
Overall, the PCMA had made the roles of chief constables and police authorities more interdependent but, as others have argued, had also increased the potential for greater local democratic control over policing (Jones & Newburn, 1997; Loveday, 1997). Significantly, this was against the centralising trend of legislation at the time. In particular, police authorities' ability to set performance targets and use this to base their decision concerning whether to renew their chief constable's contract and to decide performance-related pay gave them considerable powers to potentially influence areas that fell into operational independence (Loveday, 1997). However, their powers were subject to important constraints. First, the success of police authorities depended upon them actually exercising their powers with the confidence that they had thus far been 'shirking' (Scarman, 1981; Morgan, 1987; Jones & Newburn, 1997). Second, much depended upon how future Home Secretaries exercised their powers to define local priorities, establish regulations and enforce them upon police authorities and chief constables. Further, chief constables were given a 'get-out clause' allowing them to ignore local and national objectives where justified by operational reasons (Loveday, 1997; Jones & Newburn, 1997), another highly ambiguous and undefined criteria.
Jones & Newburn (1997) conclude that the tripartite structure immediately following PCMA's introduction was one of little practical change aside from an immediate concentration of power into the hands of chief constables. As they stress, this is only because the Home Secretary at the time- who had encountered tremendous difficulties in introducing the Act- had refrained from exercising his vast powers in ways that could trigger further political controversies and issued vague objectives already prioritised locally. Although relations were “untested” for some time, the potential “for some highly significant confrontation”remained (Jones & Newburn, 1997:209). However, the potential for this and more robust local police accountability was short-lived following the election of a Labour government shortly after PCMA.