Since its launch in 2004 the European Neighborhood Policy has tried to enhance development and prosperity in the southern Mediterranean by encouraging integration and trade between Europe and its neighbors. The idea behind it was to create a prosperous and thus more peaceful and stable Arab world that could guarantee the security of Europe. The events of early 2011 that expressed the deep discontent of the people with the status-quo reminded the EU that these policies had achieved very little and pointed out that a new strategy with a radically different approach was needed. However, the EU does not have a reputation of being an agile and flexible organization. This led some scholars to ask the question: Can the leopard change its spots (Behr 212)?
This question also refers to the traditional supportive stand of the EU towards the former dictatorial regimes of North Africa. Over the years, while initially preaching for political reforms and the development of a civil society, the ENP had increasingly moved towards facilitating the continuation of the status quo. This was mainly the result of Europe’s priority of regional stability over democratization and possible political unrest. In effect, the initial normative agenda lost against the Union’s security and economic interests, a reality that was happily exploited by the Arab autocrats (Bicchi 2011). Consequently, during the years leading up to the eventual revolutions, the EU set up small initiatives of good governance and projects fostering economic reform that were aimed at creating conditions for sustainable
democratization. Yet, these policies were never aimed at destabilizing the regimes and often even cemented the political status quo (Kienle 2005, Behr 2012).
The wave of protests that started in December 2010 surprised the world and caught the EU off-guard. Not only was the EU at the time in the middle of starting up its new foreign policy structure, it had also neglected its connections with the Arab countries since ENP summits with the Mediterranean partners had been repeatedly postponed. In addition, Europe had to consider its position vis-à-vis the demonstrations keeping in mind its relationships with the autocrats. As a result, the EU was slow to respond to the events in Tunisia, the first country to experience massive protests. It was actually only after the ousting of President Ben Ali that HR Catherine Ashton issued a statement expressing EU’s “support and recognition to the Tunisian people and their democratic aspirations.”30
The successful revolution in Tunisia fuelled the spirit of the protestors in neighboring North African countries, primarily in Egypt. This push not only intensified the popular uprising but also altered the European position towards President Mubarak. On January 27, 2011, almost three weeks before the eventual fall of Mubarak, Ashton sided with the protestors and called for an end of the violence against civilians.31 Both these statements indicate that at the time the EEAS and the HR purely reacted to the events in the area. Nevertheless, the EU recognized that a complete revision of its approach to the region was needed.
On February 4, with protests underway in both Libya and Egypt, the Council stated in a declaration addressed to the region that the EU is determined “to lend its full support to the transition processes towards democratic governance, pluralism,
30 Joint statement by EU High Representative Catherine Ashton and European Commissioner Stefan Fule on the event in Tunisia, 14-01-2011. Via http://www.eeas.europa.eu/ visited 01-06-2013. 31 Statement by the EU High Representative Catherine Ashton on events in Egypt, 27-01-2011. Via
improved opportunities for economic prosperity and social inclusion, and strengthened regional stability.”32 In the same document the Council also requested the HR to come up with a series of measures in order to support these processes and asked the EEAS to revise the policies within the ENP. Catherine Ashton acknowledged the urge for change by responding that Europe had to drop its old strategy of stability in order to pursue a policy of democratic progression in the region. These statements from the Council signified the beginning of a more prolific and central role of EU institutions in the interaction between the two regions.
Meanwhile, in these first couple of months of the regional uprisings the EU had already undertaken several measures as an immediate response to the events. The Commission ordered a humanitarian aid package of 30 million Euros to assist in direct needs. Moreover, it bolstered its project along the borders in order to cope with the flow of migrants wanting to cross the Mediterranean. In this aspect extra operations were executed and the European External Border Fund and the Refugee Fund received an extra budget of 25 million Euros. During this period the HR, in cooperation with her EEAS, worked towards a more long-term approach towards the changed Arab neighbors.
4.3 – A Constructive European Response
In effect, the revolutions allowed the EU to return to a bilateral policy focused on democratic values instead of just stability. The first document to emphasize a structural difference in Europe’s approach to the Southern Mediterranean was published on March 8, 2011 in the form of “A Partnership for Democratic and Shared Prosperity”. This supportive program consists of three
32 European Council, Declaration on Egypt and the region. 04-02-2011. Via