Percepciones y valoraciones de los sujetos en torno al accionar del Estado

Overview: Although unsuccessful in conducting a terrorist attack in Saudi Arabia in 2013, al-Qa’ida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), working primarily from Yemen, continued its efforts to inspire sympathizers to support, finance, or engage in conflicts outside of Saudi Arabia and encouraged individual acts of terrorism within the Kingdom. AQAP’s lack of success in Saudi Arabia can be attributed to the Saudi government’s continued domestic and bilateral efforts to build, augment, and refine its capacity to counter terrorism and violent extremist ideologies in the Kingdom, while increasing participation in international counterterrorism efforts. Saudi authorities continued public trials of individuals suspected of engaging in or supporting terrorism. The government pursued convictions of terrorism supporters, including prosecuting a religious cleric who issued fatwas (religious edicts) allowing suicide operations outside the Kingdom. Saudi Arabia continued to

maintain a strong counterterrorism relationship with the United States and supported enhanced bilateral cooperation to ensure the safety of both U.S. and Saudi citizens within Saudi territories and abroad. Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security: In an effort to more clearly define terrorism, the Council of Ministers approved an updated draft of the Terrorism and Terrorist Financing Law in mid-December. Throughout 2013, Saudi Arabia continued its efforts to disrupt terrorist activities in the Kingdom by tracking, arresting, and prosecuting terrorist suspects. The Saudi General

Investigations Directorate, also known as the Mabahith, is responsible for conducting counterterrorism investigations in the Kingdom and, upon its discretion, will cooperate with other elements of the Saudi government to further investigations into specific cases. Once the investigation is complete, the case is transferred to the Special Investigations and Public Prosecutions Office in the Saudi Ministry of Justice for the duration of the trial. In addition to continuing programs to improve physical border security through the employment of biometric systems, aerial reconnaissance, thermal imaging, and remote unattended sensors along the border region (primarily the border with Yemen), Saudi Arabia moved forward with its efforts to work with neighboring countries to build and maintain joint security programs and explore areas of mutual border security interest.

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Neighborhood police units engaged and worked directly with community members in Saudi Arabia, encouraging citizens to provide tips and information about suspected terrorist activity. The

government offered rewards for information on terrorists and Saudi security services made several announcements throughout the year pertaining to the arrest of AQAP militants and supporters. The Saudi government continued its efforts to bring to trial groups and individuals suspected of terrorism. On September 25, Saudi courts convicted three Saudi nationals on charges related to coordinating the sending of youths to participate in violent extremism in conflict areas. Saudi

prosecutors also convicted one of the three defendants of preparing to conduct a suicide operation. On October 1, the Specialized Criminal Court in Riyadh convicted 19 members of a group of 63

defendants on various terrorism charges. Additionally, the court found a cleric guilty of financing terrorism, issuing fatwas in support of terrorist suicide operations, and interfering in the affairs of foreign sovereign nations.

Saudi Arabia continued to cooperate with the United States to prevent acts of terrorism both through engagement in bilateral programs and through information exchange agreements with the United States.

Countering the Financing of Terrorism: Saudi Arabia is a member of the Middle East and North Africa Financial Action Task Force, a Financial Action Task Force (FATF)-style regional body. Saudi Arabia’s Financial Crimes Unit was accepted into the Egmont Group in 2009. The Saudi government affirmed its commitment to combating terrorist fundraising and sought to further establish itself as a regional leader in disrupting terrorist finance efforts. It provided training programs for bankers,

prosecutors, judges, customs officers, and other officials from government departments and agencies in this area. The Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency has standing requirements for all Saudi financial institutions to implement all the FATF recommendations regarding money laundering and terrorist finance. Notwithstanding Saudi Arabia’s increased control over the formal financial sector, bulk cash smuggling from individual donors and charities has reportedly been a major source of terrorist

financing. For further information on money laundering and financial crimes, see the 2014

International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (INCSR), Volume 2, Money Laundering and Financial Crimes: http://www.state.gov/j/inl/rls/nrcrpt/index.htm.

Regional and International Cooperation: Saudi Arabia cooperated regionally and internationally on counterterrorism issues, including its participation as a founding member of the Global

Counterterrorism Forum (GCTF). In January, the Saudi government participated in a two-day

workshop under the auspices on the GCTF Criminal Justice Sector and Rule of Law Working Group. In February under the auspices of the UN Center for Counter-Terrorism (UNCCT), the Saudi

government hosted an international terrorism conference with participants from 49 governments and representatives from international organizations and counterterrorism centers. On August 8, Saudi Arabia pledged US $100 million to UNCCT.

Saudi Arabia has been a member of the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT) and the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) since 2008. Saudi Arabia is also a member of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). Saudi officials issued statements encouraging enhanced cooperation among GCC and Arab League states on counterterrorism issues, and the government hosted

international counterterrorism conferences on subjects including, but not limited to, combating violent extremist ideology and counterterrorist financing.

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Countering Radicalization to Violence and Violent Extremism: As part of its strategy to counter violent extremism, the Saudi government focused on increasing public awareness campaigns and conducting outreach, counter-radicalization, and rehabilitation programs. Some of these efforts involved seminars that refuted violent Islamist extremist ideology. Public awareness campaigns were aimed at reinforcing the values of the Islamic faith and educating Saudi citizens about the dangers of violent extremism and terrorism. Methods used included advertisements and programs on television, in schools and mosques, and at sporting events. Additionally, in March, Saudi security officers participated in the GCTF Countering Violent Extremism Working Group on Community Engagement and Community-Oriented Policing, held in the United States.

The Ministry of Interior continued to operate its flagship deradicalization program (the Sakina Campaign for Dialogue), as well as its extensive prison rehabilitation program to reduce recidivism among former inmates. The Saudi government also continued its ongoing program to modernize the educational curriculum, including textbooks used in religious training. The Ministry of Islamic Affairs continued to re-educate imams, prohibiting them from incitement of violence, and continued to

monitor mosques and religious education. TUNISIA

Overview: Over the past year, the Tunisian government has increased its counterterrorism

cooperation with the United States. The rise of violent extremist organizations in Tunisia since the January 2011 revolution – most notably Ansar al-Shari’a in Tunisia (AAS-T) – has posed serious security challenges to a post-revolutionary government previously inexperienced in counterterrorism operations. The assassination of two opposition politicians in February and July, as well as the attack on the U.S. Embassy and the American Community School in Tunis in September 2012, demonstrated the extent of the terrorist threat. The Tunisian government continued to face challenges that included the potential for terrorist attacks, the influx of arms and violent extremists from across the Algerian and Libyan borders, and the use of improvised explosive devices. The disproportionate numbers of Tunisians among those traveling to fight in Libya, Mali, and Syria – and the ensuing return of these fighters – is another cause for concern.

In response to these incidents, the government has taken increasingly bolder steps to counter terrorism and violent extremism in Tunisia. Following the revolution, Tunisia experienced the emergence of hard-line Salafists, who sought the reestablishment of an Islamist Caliphate, contended the Tunisian government was too accommodating to the West, despite the presence of the ruling Islamist party a- Nahda in the government, and rejected Western values. Salafists repeatedly disrupted social order in 2013. While the government initially vacillated in responding to excesses by Tunisia’s Salafist

movement, following the assassination of opposition figure Chokri Belaid in February, the government banned AAS-T’s annual conference in Kairouan. Following the July 25 assassination of a second opposition politician, Mohammed Brahmi, the government officially designated AAS-T a terrorist organization and intensified efforts to capture and arrest members of the group.

2013 Terrorist Incidents: There was a marked increase in the number of incidents fueled by violent extremism, which was in part a reaction to the government’s escalating campaign against terrorist groups. The list of incidents below highlights some of the most significant terrorist attacks that occurred during the year.

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 On February 6, head of the leftist Popular Front coalition Chokri Belaid was assassinated in front of his home by unknown assailants. The killing prompted nationwide protests against the government for failing to address security concerns that eventually resulted in the resignation of the Prime Minister and a cabinet reshuffle. The government has since blamed AAS-T violent extremists with reported connections to al-Qa’ida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) for the killing.

 In defiance of the Ministry of Interior order banning its annual conference, members of AAS-T clashed with police in Kairouan on May 18 and in the Tunis suburb of Ettadhamen on May 19, resulting in the death of a protester. Several hundred AAS-T supporters, armed with rocks, knives, and Molotov cocktails, stormed a National Guard office and police station.

 On July 25, opposition member of the National Constituent Assembly Mohamed Brahmi was assassinated outside his home on Tunisia’s Republic Day. The Ministry of Interior announced the following day that the same individuals reportedly responsible for the murder of Chokri Belaid had also killed Brahmi.

 On October 17, two National Guard members were killed in clashes with an armed group in the town of Goubellat, when their vehicle reportedly came under fire. A third National Guard member was injured.

 On October 23, a total of six police officers were killed in clashes with militants near the central town of Sidi Bouzid. Two militants were also killed. The killings resulted in a two-day postponement of the National Dialogue aimed at negotiating a solution to the ongoing political impasse spurred by the July 25 killing of Mohamed Brahmi.

 On October 30, a man wearing explosives blew himself up outside a hotel in the resort town of Sousse after being chased by security, but killed no others. That same day, police prevented a suicide bombing in Monastir when they arrested a would-be bomber at the Tomb of Habib Bourguiba. Five other men were detained in Sousse. The government claimed the arrested men had ties to AAS-T and that both bombers were Tunisian. The Sousse bombing was the first attempted suicide attack in Tunisia since 2002 when 21 people were killed in a bombing at a synagogue on the island of Djerba.

 On November 30, the Ministry of Interior reported clashes in El Kef following the arrest of 10 alleged members of AAS-T. Some of the group’s supporters attempted to storm a police station while others tried to block roads by setting tires on fire.

Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security: The 2003 counterterrorism law remains the primary piece of legislation for dealing with terrorism offenses, although lesser offenses can still be charged under the penal code. A new law, designed to address concerns raised by human rights groups, has been approved by the cabinet and was before the National Constituent Assembly at year’s end. On August 27, the Tunisian government designated AAS-T as a terrorist organization. The designation makes it a crime to be a member of the group or to offer it logistical or financial support and allows the government to freeze the group’s assets. AAS-T is the first group to be designated a terrorist organization in Tunisia since January 2011. The group has been implicated in attacks against Tunisian security forces, assassinations of Tunisian political figures (including Belaid and Brahmi), and an attempted bombing of a tourist hotel. AAS-T is ideologically aligned with AQ and has links to AQIM.

The Ministry of Interior and Ministry of Defense share responsibility for detecting, deterring, and preventing acts of terrorism in Tunisia. In particular, the Antiterrorism Brigade (BAT) – an elite unit under the Ministry of Interior’s National Police – is responsible for SWAT and tactical operations related to counterterrorism. The newly formed National Unit for the Investigation of Terrorist Crimes

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(UNECT) is a key partner to the BAT and takes the lead in investigating and liaising with the judicial system to encourage successful prosecutions. The military’s role in counterterrorism increased substantially since the spring of 2013 when fighting around Mount Chaambi began and again in fall 2013 when the military reinforced its control of the southern third of the country.

Tunisian security services suffer from the legacy of the previous regime, which created a culture of red tape and a lack of communication and coordination between ministries. Security forces were also inexperienced in tackling terrorist threats and lacked appropriate equipment and training. In the past year, the government’s efforts have intensified, with successes including the seizure of weapons, arrests, and operations against armed groups throughout the country. At the tactical level, Ministry of Interior and Ministry of Defense forces reportedly work together, but communication and coordination between the military and law enforcement could be enhanced, especially with regard to strategic and operational planning.

Tunisia has an Automated Fingerprint Identification System (AFIS) and maintains fingerprint records for identification cards, criminal records, and latent prints. Tunisia currently has only one AFIS system and it is not known if the records can be shared with other government agencies via automated responses. Tunisia also maintains a DNA data base and has expressed an interest in becoming a Combined DNA Index System (CODIS) member. Tunisia does not currently share its biometric data with any counties.

Regional insecurity, particularly in Libya and in Mali, presents an additional challenge. Border

security remained a priority in 2013 as Tunisian authorities sought to collaborate with their Libyan and Algerian counterparts in stemming the flow of weapons and insurgents across their common borders. Algeria and Tunisia signed an agreement in December 2012 to strengthen border security coordination, including the creation of joint patrols to combat terrorism, human trafficking, smuggling, and illegal migration. Efforts to root out militants in the Mount Chaambi region continued at year’s end. While the operation has achieved some success, it has been hampered by Tunisian security forces’

inexperience in this type of engagement.

The year has seen increased arrests and raids by security forces. The Government of Tunisia claimed to have arrested and detained hundreds of members of AAS-T, although successful prosecutions lagged behind. Significant law enforcement and proactive disruptions, arrests and prosecutions related to counterterrorism activities included:

 On February 20, the Tunisian National Guard seized a large weapons cache in the Ariana Governorate in northeastern Tunisia, including rocket propelled grenades and Kalashnikov assault rifles.

 On September 10, security forces arrested AAS-T military wing leader Mohamed Aouadi and Mohamed Khiari. Both were allegedly involved in the assassinations of opposition politicians Chokri Belaid and Mohamed Brahmi, according to a statement by the Ministry of Interior.

 On September 28, National Guard units conducted a raid in the town of Mornaguia in Tunisia’s interior region, seizing home-made bombs, explosives, and tasers. Security forces arrested two terrorists allegedly affiliated with AAS-T.

 On October 19, following the launch of an operation to apprehend terrorists who killed two National Guard officers and injured a third on October 17, security forces arrested AAS-T leaders Abdelouehed Alargoubi in Jendouba and Adel Hanachi in Beja. Eight other alleged

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members of the terrorist group were killed in military operations in response to the deaths of the National Guard officers.

 On November 30, the Ministry of the Interior announced special security forces had arrested 10 members of AAS-T in El Kef, in Tunisia’s northwest.

The Government of Tunisia arrested more than 120 individuals for their alleged involvement in the September 14, 2012 attacks on the U.S. Embassy and American Cooperative School of Tunis. Out of those arrested, many suspects were released or subjected to small fines. Several court cases related to the attacks were ongoing or on appeal at year’s end. In one instance, 20 suspects were issued two-year suspended sentences in May 2013, and those still in custody were released. The public prosecutor was appealing this case, which has been postponed several times.

Tunisia continued to participate in the Department of State’s Antiterrorism Assistance (ATA) program. Tunisian Ministry of Interior professionals received ATA training in 2013 in the areas of crisis

response and tactical and command training. Department of State International Narcotics and Law Enforcement programs supported leadership development, police reform, prison reform, hostage rescue, and crowd control management for the Justice and Interior ministries, and provided vehicles to enhance internal and border security. Leadership development included travel for Tunisian police and corrections professionals to the United States to meet U.S. law enforcement counterparts. In

September, Tunisia and the United States signed an amendment to the 2012 letter of agreement to expand programming to reform and improve the capacity of the police and corrections officials. The Tunisian Armed Forces consider counterterrorism and border security their principal mission. The armed forces have successfully employed U.S.-funded patrol craft, equipment, and training in border security and counterterrorism operations. In 2013, the special operations Joint Combined Exchange Training program restarted.

Countering the Financing of Terrorism: Tunisia is a member of the Middle East and North Africa Financial Action Task Force, a Financial Action Task Force-style regional body. Since Tunisia has strict currency controls, it is likely that remittance systems such as hawala are operating. Trade-based money laundering is also a concern. Throughout the region, invoice manipulation and customs fraud were often involved in the process of hawala financial reconciliations. Tunisia’s financial intelligence unit, the Tunisian Financial Analysis Commission (CTAF), is headed by the governor of the Central Bank and includes representatives from a range of other agencies. The Tunisian penal code provides for the seizure of assets and property tied to narcotics trafficking and terrorist activities. For further information on money laundering and financial crimes, see the 2014 International Narcotics Control

Strategy Report (INCSR), Volume 2, Money Laundering and Financial Crimes:

http://www.state.gov/j/inl/rls/nrcrpt/index.htm.

Regional and International Cooperation: Tunisia participates in multinational efforts to counter terrorism, such as those at the UN, the Global Counterterrorism Forum, and the AU. Tunisia is an