Globalisation was a defining issue of the 1990s but, despite the increasingly frequent use of the word,35 it was a poorly understood concept (Ellwood 2002:8.) At the time, globalisation was often framed in public discourse as a new phenomenon: even the British monarch observed: ‘(It) is not only transforming our economies, it is changing every aspect of our lives’ (Windsor in Hamilton 1999) and the then Archbishop of Canterbury noted: ‘the forces of globalisation and the temptations of self-obsession and gratification are powerful and disorientating’ (Carey 1999.) In reality, however, globalisation has existed for as long as humans have traded beyond political and national boundaries. Robbie Robertson (2003) suggests that it began with the pioneering navigators of the fifteenth century, accelerated during the Industrial Revolution and then adopted its modern complexion after WWII with the creation of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT.) The liberalisation of global trade was boosted in the late 1970s with the free market reforms in China and, a decade later, the demise of communism in eastern Europe (Conway 2009:162.) For some, notably Francis Fukuyama (1992), these events represented the natural convergence of humanity’s political and economic systems into a universally-applicable duet of liberal democracy and free market capitalism. This so-called
‘Washington Consensus’ appeared, in the 1990s, to be unassailable (MacEwan 1999:3) and there was agreement among British political parties that the trend was, as Tony Blair said in 1998: ‘irreversible and irresistible’(in Buckman 2004:5.)
GATT was the forerunner of the World Trade Organisation (WTO) which was established in 1995 with the remit of further reducing tariffs to promote free trade.
Contemporary opinion polls, however, hinted at widespread ignorance about the central role of the WTO in determining the rules of the globalised economy (Vidal 1999a, Waller 1999) but equally, there was public concern that globalisation threatened democracy (Bremner 1999b.) Following the completion of the Uruguay Round of WTO trade talks and the advent of NAFTA in 1994, the impact of a liberalised trading regime on workers and the environment, and other social consequences, became apparent and critics became more vocal and better
organised (Buckman 2004.) Although there was consensus among political parties in the developed world that the deregulated model of economic globalisation promoted
35 Chanda (2007:246-247) analysed a database of 8,000 newspapers, magazines and reports and found that ‘globalization’ appeared in just two items in 1981. Appearances increased significantly in the late-1990s and hit 57,235 in 2001
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and legitimated by the WTO was desirable and inevitable (Riddell 1999, Owen 1999a, Smith 1999b, Moore in Juniper 1999a, Blair in Guardian 1999d, Short 1999a), a considerable body of opinion argued it was designed by a neoliberal elite, with no public consultation and little regard for worker and human rights, the poor and the environment (Jawara and Kwa 2003, Monbiot 2003, Peet 2003, Stiglitz 2002, Jospin in Bremner 1999d, Riddell 1999b, Pilger 2002, Gray 1998.)
1 - The WTO Ministerial Conference
To assess the extent and depth of the mediated debate about economic globalisation, this case study focuses on the WTO Ministerial Conference in Seattle from
November 30 to December 3 1999. Hence, for a 61 day period straddling the event, the LexisNexis database was searched for articles in The Guardian and The
Observer and The Times and The Sunday Times36. The BBC News website archive was also searched using the same terms, namely: ‘globalisation’; ‘anti-globalisation’;
‘World Trade Organisation’; ‘WTO’ and ‘anti-WTO.’ The Conference was a pivotal event in the development of economic globalisation (Mortishead 1999b, Elliott 1999d) and was preceded by the signing of an historic trade deal between the United States and China, which, after 13 years’ of negotiations, brought the latter a significant step nearer to becoming a full member of the WTO (BBC 1999e, BBC 1999m.) The Conference itself marked the beginning of the ‘Millennium Round’ of talks at which representatives from 135 member nations would negotiate the terms of the next stage of trade liberalisation with tariff cuts at the top of the agenda (BBC 1999j.) If the Conference achieved its stated goals, the WTO would move closer toward the
ultimate goal of: ‘freeing international movements of commodities and services from government restraint’ (Peet 2003:146.) Conference delegates were united in their commitment to the WTO as ‘the global policeman of free trade’ (Curwen 1999) but there were considerable and complex differences between the developed and developing worlds, and individual countries. There were also divisions between European centre-left parties (Bremner 1999a, 1999c, Guardian 1999a.)
Also, outside the Conference, a plethora of opponents of the WTO per se broadly agreed that economic globalisation as advocated by the corporate-political elite would create a less just world (Burke 1999.) Consequently, Seattle also attracted
‘50,000 critics of global capitalism’ (BBC 1999a) including some 1,200 NGOs (Times
36 The Guardian/Observer will be henceforth be called ‘The Guardian’ and The Times/Sunday Times will be called ‘The Times.’ If relevant, the narrative will differentiate between the daily and Sunday versions
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1999a) which promoted an alternative agenda encapsulated in the phrase ‘fair trade, not free trade’ (Yuen 2002.) With such a diversity of opinion, it would be misguided to simply divide the political positions at Seattle into ‘pro’ and ‘anti’, or ‘right’ and ‘left.’
Hence, the following four classifications are more accurate representations of the debate. These are guided by related American content studies of the WTO
Conference (Wall 2003, Bennett 2004, Jha 2007) and augmented by the delineations of debate gleaned from a sample of British news items analysed during the pilot study.
Liberalisation
This position represents the ultimate objective of the WTO (Hutton 1999b) and was typified by actors that argued for faster, broader and deeper liberalisation. For
example, the Cairns Group of 15 agricultural exporting nations lobbied for the ending of subsidies in the EU and Japan (Jawara and Kwa 2003:24, BBC 1999f) and many developing countries argued for unfettered access to the markets of rich countries (BBC 1999c, 1999e, Denny 1999a.) This viewpoint was shared by some
development charities, such as Christian Aid and Oxfam, which saw free trade in agriculture as the fastest route out of poverty (BBC 1999f, Mortishead 1999b.)
Accelerated liberalisation was also promoted by some from the developed world who, for example, pressed for lower taxation and lighter regulation (Hague in BBC 1999b.)
Protectionism
Few argued for protectionism in the long-term, but some countries advocated a gradual liberalisation, which amounted to a more selective transition toward free trade. Typically, this meant the retention of certain restrictions such as tariffs or quotas to protect fragile industries or to garner support from interest groups. This was the position of many industrialised countries who were eager to maintain, for example, subsidies for farmers (such as the EU’s Common Agricultural Policy) or, in the case of the US, extended quotas on Chinese steel and textile exports (Binyon 1999a, BBC 1999d.) Also, some developing countries called for slower liberalisation of their own markets (Elliott 1999c.) Protectionists were differentiated from the progressive reformers because the former argued for the maintenance or gradual phasing out of existing protectionist measures rather than a new agenda37 .
37 A contemporary paper published by the Institute of Economic Affairs branded the ‘progressive reformers’ as ‘The New Protectionists’ and described them as ‘anti-trade’ (Smith 1999a)