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Another point of ambiguity regards the nature of evaluative criteria. In cultural anthropology and social/ behavioural science it is common to conduct research and data collection either under etic or emic frames, a notion revitalised in poverty studies by Robert Chambers‟ work on empowerment and participation. Emic, defined as the expression of views, concepts, categories and values of insiders (Chambers, 2007: 11), is to be acknowledged and possibly prioritised over etic expression of views and such,

by outsiders. The contemporary challenge posed by this differentiation is to find a fine evaluative balance between the following combination possibilities:

1. Emic notions of the individual (subjective poverty)

2. Emic notions of the social context (most likely the community) 3. Etic notions of the social context (most likely the community)

4. Etic notions of the researcher/ practitioner/ development professional/ inter alia

While the view of individuals will always be entirely emic (subjective), and the view of outside academics always somehow etic, it is the ambiguous role of the context specific community which is certainly emic, whilst it is being etic to the individual living in that community. This is, because as socio-environmental particularities of communities are indeed the ontology to depart from in any evaluation, they have in turn been identified as particular obstacles for the escape of poverty in great numbers of cases, or to frame it in the terminology of the capability approach, as very “real” unfreedoms to the individual (i.e. race or sexual discrimination, household violence, girls and women suffering from arranged marriages, obligatory dowry payments, or female genital mutilation, just to a name a few). This poses severe challenges for any evaluation, and judgment calls are inevitable. As a rule of thumb it is inter-subjectively agreed upon to focus, if possible, on the emic notions of the communities over etic notions of development practitioners (the role of the researcher in this new research situation will be discussed in greater detail at the end of chapter 5/Part I). However, these emic notions need to be carefully scrutinised when viewed in contrast to emic notions of the individual. While there is no definite answer on how to prioritise in each individual case, which poses severe problems for concepts which are outcome orientated and that depart from perceiving ill-being as a manner of status (such as the

CA), it is, in turn, almost undisputed that sole input (means) oriented frameworks, such as those of monetary and utility kinds, will have even greater difficulty in adjusting to this revitalised anthropological concept and its acknowledged importance in contemporary poverty research.

2.5 Recapitulation and outlook

This thesis departs from the notion that poverty ought to be explicitly distinguished between a (positive) definition of ill-being on the one hand, and a highly individualistic concept of well-being on the other. This is a clarification which is often blurred in the literature, as they are mutually reinforcing. Only by reflecting upon what it means to live well one is able to understand what is meant by living ill, and, to a certain degree, vice versa. It might be a tedious task to carry out, but a simple “reversing the negative” is hardly a satisfying answer. A lack of income as one dimension of ill- being reversed into material abundance is hardly sufficient to postulate with certainty a person‟s well-being. On the other hand is it almost certain that a lack of income, through empathetic reasoning26, constitutes partly a person‟s ill-being and, in most societies, a low ranking on the social latter.

Thus, while understanding/ defining poverty should rather be seen as the accumulation of a problem analysis and academic “inventory” on ill-being, concepts are much more forward-oriented, by hinting towards policy action and targeting to establish a person‟s well-being. Admittedly, this is a complicated task to work on, as it is not only

26 _{Empathy can have at times distinctive advantages over alternative modes of gaining knowledge (der}

Erkenntnisgewinnung), such as empiricism, where truisms are usually formed based on observables alone.

For instance, assuming that deprivations in community health are currently not an identified problem (or a non-observable) of ill-being, it carries the inherent risk of classifying investments in public health systems a low priority. Hence, the concept of poverty as well-being is oriented after what can be observed, which may put people at risk of being more vulnerable to unforeseen shocks. This risk may be limited once empathetic awareness is established. This will, most likely, give deprivations in health (and the vulnerability to suffer from it) always a sufficient amount of attention, and hopefully, a priority stance in a person‟s well-being concept.

a highly politicised area, but also as it strives towards the achievement of the well-being of an ethical individual, in an non-solipsistic world (which might explain the absence of an intersubjective common understanding in this discussion).

From this angle, ill-being analyses are backward-looking and to a lesser degree politicised or moralised; instead, they aim to provide appropriate problem assessments by analysing the characteristics of the poor and the idiosyncratic reasons for their status. Well-being, on the other hand, tends to be defined at the individual level, with varying ideals nonetheless. Notions of living-well differ and interchange, not only interpersonally, but also intra-personal during a life course. At times people strive for utility, monetary wealth and independence, or search for freedom of body and mind. These ideas often conflict, and pose problems for each other, e.g. a highly liberalised lifestyle of person A may inhibit the well-being of person B. Achieving well-being relies on the complex interplay between the physical and intrapsychic conditions of the individual with influential external factors. Due to this complicated interplay, specifying what it means to live well, through empathetic reasoning, causes greater difficulty than understanding (hence defining), what it means to live in misery.

Thus, to keep the discourse on poverty within a manageable spectrum, it might be more convenient to define well-being as the mere though continuous absence of ill- being (hence, to define it almost entirely ex-negativo, that is in demarcation to what it means to live ill, which, on the other hand, can be “positively” defined). It goes without saying that this alone would be a tremendous achievement, as it would assure the poor with human achievements (or “ends”), such as being well-nourished, clothed, emancipated, at peace, or educated.

Despite the tediousness of the task to embrace such (admittedly abstract) thinking, its advantages should become apparent in light of the challenges the

contemporary, multidimensional definition of poverty as ill-being poses for established evaluative frameworks of well-being. How will utility and monetary concepts of poverty, the dominant evaluative frameworks in development practice, adequately respond to the sensitivities of the poor having their voices heard, ensuring their empowerment, participation in decision-making, or feeling of being cared for? Is this even possible with money, consumption or any form of desire-fulfilment? What about aspects of life considered important, though not incorporated in either of those frameworks, such as personal and social commitments? And probably most importantly, will they assure that investments in human and social capital are continuously advancing into policy areas such as education and health systems, to ensure a sustainable and long-term focus of pro-poor policies that stand their argumentative ground even in times when politicians, academics, the media or others are questioning the exigence of these investments?

Another strand of problems for the classical conceptual frameworks arise when challenged with the anthropological distinction between etic and emic criteria for evaluation. While indeed context-specific/ positional objective criteria are used as base for evaluations and measurements in most cases27, how are innate notions of a good life, thus utterly emic/ subjective understandings of well-being, however dealt with, captured through participatory studies such as those offered by the PO in Mozambique for instance?

These are shortcomings of the classical evaluative frameworks upon which analysis the CA emerged. In acknowledgement of their contributions, it basically took the strong features of both, while excluding their weaknesses, to be outlined in greater detail in the subsequent chapter. There I will argue that poverty conceptualised as

27 _{For the construction of monetary poverty lines, the World Bank looks indeed at context specific}

“capabilities deprivation” is better suited to evaluate poverty as multidimensional ill- being (that is a scant living status in society) than its peers, particularly for the country case Mozambique, as it is an outcome and status oriented framework of well-being, and hence, a suitable match indeed.

Without differentiating though between a poverty definition and a conceptualisation, as conducted in this chapter, it might be possible to argue that the limitations within the classical frameworks to respond adequately to the changed demand to research poverty (as multidimensional ill-being) as an “object of study” would have remained continuously unrecognised. From that point of view, another

raison d'être of the explications in this chapter was the provision of yet another attempt

of interpretation of the current poverty debate from a strong theoretical perspective, through reviewing the main literature on the topic.

3 Introducing Human Development and the Capability Approach

In this part of the thesis the Human Development and Capability Approach will be introduced. In regards to the latter, this is in the absence of one collective handbook to consult with a somewhat complicated task. Amartya Sen alone, the main intellectual property holder of the concept, has wrote on development professionally over 40 years, which accumulated in 17 books, which he either wrote himself or in collaboration with others, most importantly political philosopher Martha Nussbaum, development economist Sudhir Anand and economic theorist James Foster, who thus all deserve their historic place in the creation of the CA as a proposition.

Additionally, Sen wrote over 100 articles, addressing issues of economic development, poverty measurement, justice and inequality, famines and hunger, among others (Alkire, 2009a: 2). More narrowly, he developed his CA over the previous 30 or so years, beginning with the Tanner Lecture “Equality of What?” delivered at Stanford University in 1979 (Clark, 2006: 2), though he has never written a single book or article which explains the CA in its entirety. He rather developed, re-developed, fine-tuned and defended his proposition in the following main writings, which are listed separately in the bibliography: Sen 1980a; 1980/1; 1985 a,b; 1987 b; 1988a; 1990a; 1992a; 1993a; 1994b; 1996a,e; 1997a; 1999; 2004 (extracted from Alkire, 2002: 4, fn. 12). While he owes gratitude to the aforementioned analysts in the philosophical development of the CA, he nevertheless remains the intellectual property holder of the framework. Thus, unless otherwise stated, it is Sen‟s notion of the CA which will be subsequently discussed.

Others have taken a deep profession in analysing these writings and the work of other CA analysts in order to outline and explain the framework in a more comprised and user-friendly way, of which I will mostly use Alkire, Clark, Comim, Deneulin,

Robeyns and others. One can take great confidence in the writings of Alkire and Robeyns especially, as both have received feedback from Professor Sen, which should ensure that their understanding of the core concept is correct and that they do not misrepresent his ideas. Taking into account the “diverse and unconsolidated nature of secondary literature on the capability approach” (Alkire, 2005: 125), I trust that with the consultation of Sen and other authors, who provided overview articles of the approach, I will minimise the risk of misinterpretation. Having said this, it is without saying that any mistakes, misconceptions or misunderstandings of the CA which appear in this thesis are the fault of my own.

To make this primary statement is important, because of several reasons. The first relates to the objective of this first part of the thesis. As stated in the introduction, Part I aims to function firstly as the literature review on poverty, and to frame secondly the research rationale of the subsequent Part II of the thesis; that is, to provide the philosophical base for what then is the empirical operationalization of the CA. Knowing the CA in detail is hence crucial for this endeavour, which requires an analysis and triangulation of primary with secondary sources28/29.

The second reason relates to the contemporary state of arts within the CA itself. The question is what work on the CA has been done and with what objective one starts his/hers research. Currently, that is of 2009, there is no great demand for yet another

28 _{Certainly, not all points theoretically discussed in Part I will be of the same relevance for the practical}

translation of the CA for Mozambique in Part II. Analysing the CA in its interity, which includes the theoretical discussion of research methodologies for the selection of capabilities in chapter 5/Part I, remains crucial though nevertheless, not only for its theoretical and hermeneutic wealth, but also because empirical developments are not static but ever-evolving, and because the CA has to be tailored onto the empirical case study at hand. Hence, in order to be able to adapt the CA to changing demands, one needs to be familiar with the framework entirely, and the various research methodologies for its application. This will then be also beneficial for my planned post-doc research, to be outlined in the General Conclusion, which aims to bring the CA from the macro- onto the microlevel and into Mozambique‟s field.

29 _{There has also been a very practical reason to triangulate sources, which is that financial and other}

constraints have inhibited me of acquiring and accessing the plethora of books and journal articles these (primary) scholars have produced on this topic. Therefore, I had to rely on secondary scholars who took

text to explain or introduce the CA beyond what is readily available30, wherefore it is justifiable to consult those who have done this work. The emphasis for future research is clearly on empirical application and theoretical discussion and critique. Turning the proposition into a development paradigm, that is, “a captivating vision or insight, linked to a set of technical tools that are propelled expertly by a set of people with communication, coordination, and feedback mechanism” (Alkire, 2003: 9) is currently considered the crucial task for anybody interested in facilitating this endeavour. After all, the CA is beside its intellectual and moral attractiveness still on the brink of becoming yet another visionary, but unpractical/ non-user-friendly set of ideas (as the Basic Needs Approach (BNA) (Alkire, 2005: 117)). I thus consider my current work a contribution to this transformation process, in the way that I will discuss the CA in Part I beyond its mere presentation, in which I will share some internal and external thoughts and reflections on the CA and its critiques prior to its application for the country case Mozambique. This will outline the reasons why I want to facilitate the aforementioned transition, something which should be done with caution and responsibility, because in development, as Sen writes, “a misconceived theory can kill” (Sen, 1999: 209).

The last reason relates to the also aforementioned danger of misinterpretation, may it consciously or unconsciously. The CA is a very complex concept that uses expressions (capabilities, functionings, well-being, agency, etc.) that can be confusing if not dealt with carefully. It definitely requires some cognitive effort to grasp the main insights. Especially academics and practitioners interested in operationalizing the CA should have the necessary patience and caution to study with the same thoroughness the philosophy as one will devote the time to get the work done. Although this should be a given, practical instances show the danger of misinterpretations in hasty applications.

30

As Alkire worked out, the first World Bank reports that outlined poverty reduction strategies actually misquoted the term capabilities as merely health and education, meaning that freedom had been omitted, as had the functioning vector to have the ability to walk around without shame (2005: 117). Another example is offered by Robeyns (2003: 11, fn 1), in which she points towards a poverty and deprivation study by Klasen (2000), which claims to measure capabilities while in fact achieved functioning levels were measured31. It is ambitioned in this thesis to minimise the danger of misinterpretations, by triangulating Sen‟s (and other CA analysts‟ writings) with explanatorily texts.

Ultimately though, what this thesis (and particularly Part I) will offer is my own interpretation of the CA. It provides an overview and interpretation which is to a certain extent distinct from those offered by Alkire, Robeyns, Clark, Comim, and others, but which is considered relevant, as the CA is not a closed theory or dogma (Robeyns, 2003a: 17), but a framework with many loose ends and “deliberate incompleteness”‟ (Sen, 1993: 47), in which value judgements are explicitly required (to be outlined in the upcoming chapter 3 and 4/Part I). Thus, while the presentation aims to not misrepresent the framework, its interpretation won‟t certainly be a copy of those writers who have already done this (and who are continuing of doing so)32.

31 _{As will be outlined, measuring functionings within a capabilities application is per se not a problem, as}

long as it is recognized as a divergence from the ideal (chapter 4.3/Part II. This also holds true for any other practical divergence from the philosophy, which can be accepted as long as it is sufficiently highlighted (see for instance chapter 4.6/Part II). Additionally, it is possible to recognize captured functionings as “indirect indicators of the freedom to choose” (Kerstenetzky and Santos, 2009: 192). What should be avoided though is to label functionings as capabilities.

32

Please note though that my personal differentiation into “poverty as ill-being” and “poverty as well- being” (of chapter 1 and 2/Part I) will not feature in the upcoming chapters which will present, discuss and analyse the CA. That is because these chapters rely on primary and secondary sources, which operate, as previously highlighted, with different terminologies (such as the continuous usage and differentiation