preferences of trade union leaders and members. In making the transition from description to explanation, I explore Frege and Kelly’s (2003) social movement model of union strategic choice. I argue that this approach would benefit greatly from drawing more from the social movement literature from where it originates.
Boxes and arrows lost in translation
Frege and Kelly (2003) argue that their model is based on a ‘classic model’ used in the social movement literature (McAdam et al., 2001). This is strictly speaking, incorrect. The ‘model’ they refer to is instead a graphic representation of what is known as the ‘social movement classic agenda’, or the evolution of social movement thinking over the last three decades. By the late 1980s, social movement researchers began to emphasise the importance of a set of common factors in trying to analyse and explain the emergence and development of social movements and revolutions. By the mid-1990s this ‘emerging synthesis’ included three factors: the structure of political opportunities and constraints confronting the movement; mobilising structures or the forms of organisation (informal as well as formal); and framing processes or the collective processes of interpretation, attribution, and social construction that mediate between opportunity and action (McAdam
et al., 1996). A fourth factor, repertoires of contention, or the culturally encoded ways in which people act in contentious politics, was added in 2001 (McAdam et al., 2001).
Figure 3.1: Classic Social Movement Agenda for Explaining Contentious Politics
Source: McAdam et al. (2001: 17)
What Frege and Kelly (2003) essentially do is to make a model out of this agenda, replacing social movement concepts with industrial relations ones. This is evident from comparing Figures 3.1(above) and 2.2 (in previous chapter). There is nothing wrong with doing this except that, without the appropriate social movement theory background, their ‘translation’ into industrial relations loses the explanatory power contained in the original social movement concepts. As I will elaborate in the remaining of this section, each and one of these concepts bring about valuable sets of ideas. For example, the idea of a semi- detached ‘context’ in the field of industrial relations is very different to that entailed in the social movement’s notion of structure of opportunity, constraining and enabling collective
Opportunity and Threat Framing Processes Mobilising Structures Repertoires of Contention Contentious Interaction Social Change
action. Similarly, discussing ‘union structures’ is not necessarily equivalent to the formal and informal forms of collective organisation embodied in the idea of ‘mobilising structures’.
Furthermore, the model loses explanatory power because the relations between these factors are not made explicit. What is actually happening within those unspecified arrows? The model loses the action categories of mobilisation and counter-mobilisation that social movement theorists have used to explain the dynamic relations among the factors and the form of collective action. In so doing, the model becomes unnecessarily static and devoid of conflict, to an extent alien to the idea of contentious dynamics underpinning the study of social movements. As it stands, the model may work well as a map of relevant factors, but far less so as the comprehensive explanatory framework that it could be should it incorporate more explicitly the insights of social movement theory.
External challenges
From ‘context’ to the structure of political opportunities. The importance of studying the wider political economy of industrial relations when investigating trade unions has long been recognised in the industrial relations literature (Hyman, 1975; Hyman and Fryer, 1975). As Frege and Kelly (2003) indicate in their model, relevant contextual factors for workers and trade unions involve the policies and actions of employers and the state as well as industrial relations institutions. Mainstream industrial relations research has sought to explain the fortunes of trade unions on the basis of changes in the ‘context’ in which they operate. The problem however, is that this literature often conceives of the context in an overtly ‘systemic’, anodyne, and detached manner. Furthermore, there is no agreement on the specific role of contextual elements, the nature of the dynamic relations between them, or the meaning and implications of factors and dynamics as a whole.
In contrast, the notion of ‘political opportunities’ employed in the social movement literature, is far more specific than a ‘semi-detached context’. It refers to the importance of the broader political system in structuring opportunities and constraints for collective action and the extent and form of the same (McAdam et al., 1996). McAdam et al. (1996: 3) argue that in employing this concept ‘social movement researchers have tried to explain the emergence of a particular movement on the basis of changes in the institutional structure or informal power relations of a given political system. (From a comparative
perspective, they) have sought to account for cross-national differences in the structure, extent, and success of comparable movements on the basis of differences in the political characteristics of the nation states in which they are embedded’. Such a research agenda maps closely that of comparative research on union strategy.
But what the concept of opportunity distinctively offers, both as static opportunity structures and as changing political environments, is a way of inquiring the ‘context’ in terms of the extent to which its constituent elements facilitate or repress the development of collective action. In other words, the notion of opportunity provides a description, as well as an explanation and an interpretation, of the role of contextual factors and the nature of their dynamic interaction. This is not to say that some industrial relations literature does not share the premises of the concept of opportunity. For the purposes of this thesis, I can think of three areas where ‘alternative’ industrial relations literature –in turn heavily informed by ‘mobilisation theory’, political science, and international political economy- closely maps the insights of social movement literature with regard to the nature of opportunity faced by trade unions.
From state and employer ‘strategies’ to ruling groups ‘countermobilisation’. It has long been argued that the strategies of employers and the state bear a significant influence in the fortunes of trade unions (Kochan et al., 1986). There is considerable variation in the form, extent, and depth of national and firm regulatory regimes (Friedman, 1977; Gordon, 1996; Hyman, 1987, 1997a; Streeck, 1987). Roy Adams (1993), for example, sustains that governmental policy toward unions and collective bargaining ranges from suppression through toleration to encouragement. Writing in 1993, he argues that in most contemporary countries, independent unions and free collective bargaining are, even if grudgingly, tolerated, and that states tend to choose toleration over repression largely because it is more effective. It does not follow however that the propensity of state and employers is to tolerate unions and collective bargaining. On the contrary, he shows, the propensity of employers, whether in the private or public sector, is to resist unionisation and collective bargaining, and to monopolise control of employment decision making (Adams, 1993: 286). Crouch (1982) for example, has classified employer strategies in resisting unionisation in terms of evil, fear, and sweet stuff. Unsurprisingly, policies of active encouragement are rare and occur ‘only in special circumstances’ (e.g. war effort).
It is evident from the above that ‘state and employer strategies’ is too neutral a term to describe the antagonistic relationship established between state and employers and workers and their collective organisations in the great majority of cases. This is why it is far more accurate to think about state and employers as ruling groups whose strategies and actions may facilitate or impede the development of collective action. Following Kelly (1998), ‘ruling groups may be said to engage in counter-mobilisation in order to change subordinate definitions of interests, to thwart the creation of effective collective organisation and to repress attempts at mobilisation and collective action’.
Collective organisation has come under attack through employer decisions to reduce the numbers of, and facilities for, union stewards and in the extreme case to derecognise unions for collective bargaining. Antiunion laws have hindered the mobilisation of workers for collective action as well as the effectiveness of any action that does get organised. The concept of countermobilisation actually conveys the antagonistic relationship of employers towards collective organisation and action amongst their own labour forces (…)
In a similar vein the capitalist state is understood primarily, though by no means exclusively, as a class agency whose chief function is to maintain and reproduce the conditions of capital accumulation. In so doing the state acts as a key agent of counter-mobilisation against organised labour, particularly through its repressive organs such as the police, the army and the intelligence services. This critical perspective is a far cry from the anodyne formulations of the state as legislator, as employer and as economic manager.
(Kelly, 1998: 129)
External dynamics
From coordination to conflict. Frege and Kelly (2003) acknowledge the role of ‘socio- economic change’ and ‘industrial relations institutions’ in their model. The problem is that they do not determine the nature of the relationship between them, and as the model stands, they appear largely as conceived of in terms of ‘mechanisms of coordination’, providing stability to the firm or system. In contrast, the notion of opportunity emphasises the conflictual nature of the relationship between actors.
A way of conceiving of the political economy of trade unions in terms of opportunity and contention –and of exploring the relationships between employer and state strategies, socio-economic change, and industrial relations institutions for that matter- is that of Howell (2005). From a political science perspective, he stands explicitly against the varieties of capitalism approach and its overtly static focus on the firm,
stability, and coordination. Howell’s account focuses on the process of development,
breakdown, and reconstruction of industrial relations institutions. Industrial relations
institutions refer to ‘the set of conventions, norms, and rules which govern the relationship between management and labour, their bargaining over revenues and rights of control’ (Visser, 1996: 4). They are ‘socially constructed in the particular sense that they are a congealed form of class power: they reflect a particular moment of class power at the time of their construction’ (Howell, 2005: 23). Conversely, ‘creating or altering institutions involves conflict and struggles for domination between class actors’. For Howell, a comparative political economy capable of offering an adequate account of the institutional development of industrial relations is one that recognises three factors: economic growth, institutions structuring relationships between actors, ruptures and continuities.
There are two linked processes here. ‘(F)irst, how economic change brings about change in institutions and, second, how institutions subsequently regulate and stabilise economic growth’ (Howell, 2005: 22). Howell argues (2005: 21-23) that industrial relations institutions rest upon a stable pattern of economic growth, the breakdown of which goes hand in hand with heightened levels of industrial conflict. This is because the transition from one pattern of economic growth to another will pose different sets of problems to states and industrial actors and shift the balance of class power and the economic interests of those actors. These problems are not easily resolvable using existing industrial relations institutions, triggering in turn their crisis and encouraging the search for new regulatory mechanisms. In this, states occupy a privileged position, having ‘unique capacities both to narrate an authoritative interpretation of industrial relations crises (a discursive capacity) and to solve collective action problems for employers and
unions (an institutional capacity)’ (2005: 21).3
A process of reconstruction may involve the creation of entirely new institutions or the investing of new functions and meanings in existing institutions. Once in place, institutions become a part of the landscape of the workplace and the wider economy; they are difficult to dislodge and continue to influence the conduct of industrial relations well after the conditions of their original construction have passed. Howell argues that no pattern of economic growth has attached a fixed set of industrial relations institutions. That multiple regulatory forms are compatible with a given growth regime however, is not to say that states (or employers for that matter) are unconstrained in their policy choices. Howell (2003: 42) contends that states autonomy in particular is constrained by the failure
of existing institutions and intensification of industrial conflict, and by the strength, organisation, and influence of industrial actors, all of which limit the possible set of new industrial relations institutions.
Appreciating the evolution of union opportunity in terms of the dynamics surrounding the development of industrial relations institutions has also implications for a better understanding of the some of the processes normally associated with ‘globalisation’. On the one hand, the apparent convergence in policy responses across countries hides important differences in degree, direction and power of the national actors involved and it is therefore preferable to speak of ‘bunching’ of countries around certain policies rather than of universal trends (Howell, 2005). There is, therefore, nothing necessarily predetermined in this process, not least a convergence of institutions emanating from ‘global forces’. In a manner consistent with this view, Bamber, Lansbury and Wailes (2004a, 2004b, 2004c) explain the differences in changing patterns of industrial relations on the basis of the changing economic interests of workers and employers. They argue that these interests are likely to be decisive in understanding both the form and direction of institutional change, and that they, in turn, will vary according to the way countries are linked to the international economy (Wailes, 2000; Wailes et al., 2003).
On the other hand, although the above discussion may have implied that the national and firm levels are still the main levels of analysis, it is important to recognise that from the 1970s onwards, ‘this two-fold distinction has become difficult to hold not only because of the traditional subdivisions within these levels, but because of the emergence of new levels in which industrial relations take place, such as supranational, regional, global/international, sub-national, territorial, and multinational corporations’ (Regalia, 2007: 2). Accepting the existence of a plurality of levels requires as a result to empirically deconstruct the nature of opportunity and institutional development account presented above according to the different levels of analysis involved. This is because industrial relations regimes are likely to be highly specific to each case reflecting the power relations unions find themselves embedded in.
Internal challenges
From union structures to mobilising structures. The influence of the structure of opportunity on the form and prospects of union strategy is not independent of the various types of union structures through which workers organise. Frege and Kelly (2003: 14) argue that union structures ‘comprise the horizontal and hierarchical organisation of the union movement (centralised or decentralised, unitary or multiple-peak) as well as contacts among unions with other social movements’. This is one of the elements of their framework more consistent with social movement theory. Social movement scholars refer to such organisational arrangements as mobilising structures, ‘those collective vehicles, informal as well as formal, through which people mobilise and engage in collective action’ (McAdam et al., 1996: 3). In this way, they focus on meso-level groups, organisations, and informal networks that comprise the collective building blocks of social movements and revolutions (McAdam et al., 1996).
As it was the case with the work on political opportunities, the insights of social movement theory on the organisational dynamics of collective action can contribute to our understanding of the factors and dynamics of union strategy. It is important to distinguish two broad approaches (McAdam et al., 1996). On the one hand, ‘resource mobilisation theory’ focuses on mobilisation processes and the formal organisational manifestations of those processes (so-called ‘social movement organisations’ as opposed to ‘social movements’). Research in this approach has mostly focus on trying to describe and explain the form of particular social movements. On the other hand, the ‘political process model’ tradition dissents from resource mobilisation theory in the latter’s equation of social movements with formal organisation highlighting instead the critical role of various grassroots settings in facilitating and structuring collective action (Tilly, 1978). It is drawing on this tradition that Kelly has sought to apply the insights of ‘mobilisation theory’ to the field industrial relations.
These two approaches and their contrasting emphases are not mutually exclusive. The distinction between formal and informal vehicles is however highly relevant in understanding union revitalisation since it redirects our attention from formal organisations –our typical understanding of what a union is- to the diversity of collective settings in which trade unions develop and the organisational forms to which they give rise. Furthermore, the existence of formal and informal mobilising vehicles is usually
intertwined and hence the boundaries of a union must be thought as highly permeable. Giving diffuse networks of activists or groups of unorganised workers the same ontological value than large union bureaucracies may allow us to develop more convincing arguments about the future of trade unionism.
Internal dynamics
From ‘union identity’ to micromobilisation and the social processes of collective action. The influence of opportunity and of the types of mobilising structures is not independent of the social contexts of interaction that constitute a social movement’s internal factors. Indeed, the last, and arguably most relevant, element in Frege and Kelly’s model is to underline the importance for trade unions’ of such internal factors and dynamics. Their model however is not entirely successful in advancing our understanding of the specific elements and processes involved because they aggregate them in a broadly defined ‘framing processes’ black box which also includes ‘union identities and repertoires of contention’. These social movement concepts have specific meanings and have the potential to provide for a more methodical understanding of ‘internal factors’.
Social movement theorists have long argued the importance of social dynamics in understanding the relationship between opportunity, mobilising structures, and collective action.
If the combination of political opportunities and mobilising structures affords groups a certain structural potential for action, they remain, in the absence of one other factor, insufficient to account for collective action. Mediating between opportunity, organisation, and action are the shared meanings and definitions that people bring to their situation. At a minimum people need to feel both aggrieved about some aspect of their lives and optimistic that, acting collectively, they can redress the problem. Lacking either one or both of these perceptions, it is highly unlikely that people will mobilise even when afforded the opportunity to do so.
(McAdam et al., 1996: 5)
While the industrial relations literature has long argued the importance of the relationship between representatives and represented -and of the processes of interest definition and mobilisation that occur between them- the social movement literature adds to our traditional perspective on union organisations a more systematic analysis of the ‘social context of interaction’ entailed in the relationship between leaders and members. In other words, the group context for constructing grievance, opportunities, and resources (McClurg Mueller, 1992). There are several lines of thought in this regard but I would like
to briefly refer to only four of them: micromobilisation, leadership, framing processes and repertoires of contention.
Figure 3.2: Mc Adam’s Model of Collective Action
Source: Kelly (1998)
The notion of micromobilisation describes ‘a variety of contexts in which face-to- face interaction is the social setting from which meanings critical to the interpretation of collective identities, grievances, and opportunities are created, interpreted, and transformed. It also focuses on the way group loyalties and commitments to the movement