Perfil estratégico interno

expenditure comes from the President Hall. The figures in 1997 are based on N SC ’s 1997 plan. The NSC 1997 budget proposal has been cut from N T SI6.9I9 million down to N T SI3.807 million by the Legislature Yuan

there is a substantial proportion of NSC money spent on non-basic research.

1.2.3. The Ministry> o f National D efence (MONO) a m i the Chung-Shan Institute o f S cien ce and Technology (CIS)

MOND is responsible for the development of military technology. It was the largest recipient o f the R&D budget at the time when Taiwan could not get necessary weapons from the advanced countries, in particular, the US government, due to its ambiguous political identity in world politics. Thus, Taiwan had to develop its own weapons, such as Skybow missile and Indigenous Defence Fighter (IDF), to replace obsolete ones. Before 1992 when Taiwan finally made agreements for sales on F-16 and Mirage 2000 fighters with both US and French government21 * * * * * * 28, the military R&D body, CIS, had received a larger budget more than those of MOEA, NSC and Academia Sinica put together. After Taiwan was able to purchase F-16, Mirage 2000, and other desired arms, many of the R&D projects developing at CIS ceased or diminished their scope, for instance, the Taiwan-made IDF aircraft reduced its proposed production from 300 to

12029.

The expenditure for military R&D reached its peak at NTS 18.2 billion in 1991, was halved at NTS9.2 billion in 1993 and dropped nearly 60% to NTS7.6 billion in 1997. Meanwhile, the R&D expenditure of MOEA increased steadily. MOEA’s

21 The 1979 Taiwan Relations Act, a replacement of previous US-ROC Mutual Defence Treat}’ after Washington built its diplomatic relationship with Peking, was not only intended to reassure the Taiwanese and deter China from any attempt to use force against Taiwan, but also to provide Taiwan with arms of a defensive character The 1982 US- China Joint Communique constrained the US arms sales to Taiwan in qualitative and quantitative terms and intended gradually to reduce its sales of arms to Taiwan. This reflected the US view of China as a strategic partner and balanced the threat of the former Soviet Union in the 1980s. Arms sales declined from around US$830 million in 1979 to around US$670 million m 1990 gradually (Klintworth. 1995:66). In 1992, the Bush Administration in its final stage at White House agreed to sell 150 F-16 fighter aircraft and related parts and weapons to Taiwan in a deal worth US$5 8 billion based on reasons to redress balance in Taiwan straits (China got sophisticated Su-27 from Russia) and that China never gives up the idea of reunification by using force In fact, the US changed its attitude to selling F-16 to Taiwan only after Taiwan had signed a procurement agreement on 150 Mirage 2000-5 aircraft and warships with France. The US feared that il might lose this big business to France and announced that it had lifted the ban on selling F-16 to Taiwan. Taiwan soon announced that it would sign a contract with US and reduce the procurement number of Mirage 2000-5 down to only 60 on the grounds that Taiwan's Air Force was used to US aircraft and logistic systems. This shows that Taiwan leans heavily on the US and can’t afTord to lose this ‘big brother’.

29 Taiwan wanted to buy US advanced lighter jets and missiles since 1979, but the US government didn't approve those deals until 1992. Therefore, Taiwan has no other choice but to develop its own IDF and missile in the 1980s That's why the MOND had the largest expenditure on SAT. Once more advanced weapons could be imported from foreign countries, there is no need to support so much military RAD.

expenditure was only one third o f MOND's in 1980s and it was half in 1991. It has dramatically exceeded MOND's since 1992, and is about 2.3 times of MOND's in 1997. It shows a substantial shift o f R&D resources from the field of defence to that of industry in the 1990s. Taiwan could not have reached its current level of technological capacity if it had continued spending R&D resources on arms, not on industrial R&D.

The use of the manpower and facilities of the CIS to assist the development of industrial technology is an ongoing effort of government. Its aim is to accelerate the pace o f industrial upgrading and to transform the functions of CIS. Since the budget of CIS has been reduced to a large extent, its primary task will be to find ways of maintaining its operations in order to avoid the waste of hard-won researchers and heavy investment in facilities30.

CIS is open to public access instead of being a closed military research institute. Four special research parks affiliated to the CIS (see Table 4.15) designed by the government in 1995 under a plan to develop military and civilian common technology and to accept research projects on new technology and new products from private enterprise and government agencies. The MOEA entrusted the CIS with special technology projects amounting to NTS800 million in 1995, and it is estimated that there will be a further NT$6 billion from MOEA’s special technology projects up to the year 2000. Besides, CIS is also entrusted with research projects from private enterprise and its research outcomes are transferable to the respective enterprises. An Industrial Cooperation Group of the CIS serves as a means of exchanging the views of the CIS and the entrepreneurial insights of industries so as to prevent overlapping investment and keep the CIS up-to-date on current economic trends and needs.

The MOEA, in association with the CIS, is engaged in promoting investment and

30 National defence industries were hardly developed in Taiwan before 1979 because the national defence and the