continuity and departure in hitler’s “englandpolitik”
By the end of 1938, Hitler’s regime had reached the conclusion that Great Britain would neither support German expansion in central and eastern Europe, nor necessarily go to war against Germany to prevent it. London’s apparent acquiescence in unilateral German rearmament, in Mussolini’s war in Ethiopia, in Germany’s military occupation of the Rhineland, in Axis military intervention in the Spanish civil war, and other factors likely contributed to this conclusion in Berlin. Although a far cry from the formal Anglo-German accommodation or alliance to which Hitler had referred since the early days of the movement, it was nevertheless a rationale that could be used to at least begin his plans for expanding German“living space” in Europe, despite British disapproval. A rationale such as this was apparent at the infamous Reichskanzlei meeting of November 5, 1937, at which Hitler and his civilian and military advisors made the decision to proceed with plans to annex Austria and to dismember the Czechoslovak state beginning in 1938. Their assumption seemed to be that the risk of precipitating a war in Europe was low at that time.
Indeed, at several points in his summary of the meeting, Colonel Hossbach cites Hitler’s references to Britain’s problems throughout its empire, and his consequent assumption that, as a result of those problems, Britain was less likely to risk a war in Europe:“The difficulties in the empire and the prospect of becoming caught up again in a long-lasting European war should be decisive factors in dissuading England from becoming involved in a war against Germany. The English position will certainly have an effect on that of France.”1 In late 1937, Hitler seemed reasonably confident that Britain would accept changes with regard to Austria and Czechoslovakia through peaceful
1 See ADAP: Serie D, Bd. I, Nr. 19.
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international negotiations, based on the principle of German national self-determination. At his meeting with Hitler at Berchtesgaden on November 19, 1937, Lord Halifax indicated Britain’s willingness to accept peaceful changes regarding Austria and Czechoslovakia on the basis of multilateral agreements. From London, Ambassador von Ribbentrop reported on several occasions in early 1938 his conviction that the current British govern-ment would not attempt to militarily resist even a unilateral and forced German annexation of Austria.2Czechoslovakia, of course, involved much more than the principle of national self-determination of the Sudeten Germans as far as Hitler’s intentions were concerned; and these intentions went beyond what the British government was willing to accept. In his May 30, 1938 directive, known as“Operation Green” (Fall Grün), Hitler instructed his military commanders to prepare for the invasion of Czechoslovakia in the near future. Hitler stated in photo 4.1.Joachim von Ribbentrop (no date).
Courtesy Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amts, Berlin.
2 ADAP: Serie D, Bd. I, Nr. 31 (Mit Anlage), 145, 146, 147, 149. See also Halifax, Fullness of Days, 184–190. Halifax also mentions that when the conversation turned to the return of some of Germany’s former colonies, Hitler indicated that he was not interested in North Africa and the Mediterranean area due to competing Anglo-French-Italian interests there.
no uncertain terms:“It is my unalterable decision to smash Czechoslovakia in the foreseeable future through a military action.”3 With these words, Hitler clearly intended to eliminate the state of Czechoslovakia altogether. On May 11, the British ambassador in Berlin, Neville Henderson, informed von Ribben-trop that while Britain was willing to consider peaceful changes in the status of the Sudeten Germans, it could not remain indifferent to a German invasion of Czechoslovakia.4Hitler’s decision to agree to the Munich conference in the fall of 1938, and thus to delay hisfinal plans for Czechoslovakia, indicate that the rationale to proceed in Europe without English support, confidant that England would not resist militarily, was perhapsflawed. He decided not to risk war with Britain in 1938, and agreed to a deal at the Munich conference in the fall that fell significantly short of his intention to eliminate the Czechoslovak state. As a result, and with some reluctance, the German government found it expedient to take advantage of Britain’s imperial problems in the Middle East and elsewhere in an effort to distract London from the situation in central Europe, and thus weaken its willingness to consider war over Hitler’s plans to expand Germany’s living space in Europe.5
German efforts to pressure Britain into acquiescing in his plans for Austria, Czechoslovakia, and Poland in 1938 and 1939 were augmented by an anti-British propaganda campaign. Beginning in late 1937, the anti-British Embassy in Berlin began reporting on the growing anti-British tendencies in the German press that portrayed Great Britain as staunchly opposed to Germany’s equality as a great power.6Through much of 1938, the British government was unsure of German intentions toward Britain, as indicated in a meeting of the Cabinet Committee on Foreign Policy on November 14.7But by the end of 1938 and the start of spring of 1939, reports indicate that London was reasonably satisfied that German propaganda in the Middle East prior to the outbreak of war was merely intended to put pressure on the British position in the region, and thereby turn London’s attention away from Europe, rather than to undermine or damage the security of the British Empire.8The specific aims of the campaign were to impress upon the British government Germany’s determination to
3 ADAP: Serie D, Bd. II, Nr. 221 (Anlage). 4 ADAP: Serie D, Bd. II, Nr. 154 (Anlage).
5 This tactic is outlined in a memo from Werner-Otto von Hentig, the head of the Near East department (Abteilung VII) in the German Foreign Office, to Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop in late June 1938. See IfZ: Nachlaß Werner-Otto von Hentig, ED 113/6,“Vorschläge zur Behan-dlung von Arabern und Indern,“ 27. Juni 1938.
6 See Henke, England in Hitlers politischem Kalkül, 79–80, 120; and Aigner, Das Ringen, 310 ff.
7 See NAL: FO371/21658-14396 (Secret 1938), Committee on Foreign Policy, 32nd Meeting, November 14, 1938.
8 See NAL: FO371/22988-C551618, Report of the Press Attaché of the British Embassy in Berlin, December 28, 1938; FO371/21665-C14758, Foreign Office Memorandum of November 22, 1938; and FO371/23232-E2274, War Office Memoranda of March 2 and May 7, 1939. See also Herf, Nazi Propaganda to the Arab World, Chap. 3; and Henke, England in Hitlers politischem Kalkül, 201 ff.
achieve its aims in central Europe by war if necessary, and to distract British attention from Europe by publicly attacking Britain’s imperial policies, but not its strategic position or security. Much of the content for this campaign was provided by the volatile situation in the Middle East, especially in Palestine following the publication of the Peel Commission’s report in July 1937.9Early in 1938, Germany began broadcasting in Arabic to the Middle East from a transmitter at Zeesen near Berlin. The broadcasts stressed Arab-German friend-ship, and they were critical of British and French policy in the Middle East.
Palestine was a particularly convenient source for anti-British propaganda; yet the German attacks on British policy that appeared in the German press and on German radio did not call for the elimination of British power in the eastern Mediterranean, or for anything that would significantly alter the post–World War I settlement and status quo in the Arab world. Vague references to the legitimate national aspirations of the Arab people were not necessarily meant to promote the end of British power and influence in the Middle East, an end to the Jewish National Home in Palestine, or the achievement of Arab independ-ence anywhere in the Arabic-speaking world. Once again, this was a conclusion reached at the time by British officials in London and the Middle East.
In 1938 and 1939, Hitler involved himself personally in the effort to focus attention abroad on Britain’s problems in the Middle East, especially in Palestine. In a speech before the Reichstag on February 20, 1938, he publicly rebuked the British parliament and press for their persistent criticism of Nazi political oppression and the persecution of the Jews in Germany.10Referring to the harsh punishment of Arab rebels by British military courts, he advised the members of the British parliament to look into the judgments of British courts in Jerusalem rather than the decisions of the German People’s Court, and suggested that he would never permit members of the German Reichstag to publicly question British justice. He expressed understanding and respect for the problems and for the legitimate interests of the British world empire, but then advised the British to, in effect, mind their own business and tend to their own problems. In his speech at the annual Nuremberg Party rally on September 12, 1938, he compared the plight of the Sudeten Germans with that of the Palestinian Arabs with the words:“I am not inclined to permit the establishment of a second Palestine here in the heart of Germany through the cleverness of other statesmen.”11In a speech at Saarbrücken on October 9, Hitler demanded that Britain respect Germany’s legitimate sphere of interest in central Europe, just as Germany respects and accepts British authority in Palestine and elsewhere in the world. Again, stressing the quid pro quo logic behind his idealized conception of Anglo-German relations, he advised London:
9 See the articles and editorials published during this period in the Völkischer Beobachter, 8.-13., 26. Juli 1938; 2., 9., 21. August 1938; 19., 21., 23. Oktober 1938; and 15.-23., 25. November 1938.
10 Domarus, Hitler, Vol. 2, 793–804. 11 Ibid., 904.
“We would like to advise all of these gentlemen to concern themselves with their own problems, and leave us in peace.”12 He continued this line of argument at the Bürgerbräukeller in Munich on November 8 with the words:
“The gentlemen of the British Parliament are surely very much at home in the British world Empire, but they are not in Central Europe. Here they lack knowledge of the conditions, events, and the relationships. . .in the end, we ourselves don’t know our way around very well in India, or in Egypt, or even in Palestine.”13 Finally, in Wilhelmshaven on April 1, as he rejected British criticism of Germany’s March 15, 1939 occupation of Bohemia and Moravia, Hitler actually endorsed Britain’s insistence that Germany had no business in Palestine with the words: “We do not seek anything in Palestine. Just as we Germans have so little business in Palestine, so too does England have so little business in our German living space.”14
The original orders for Operation Green were based on the expectation that German demands would be unacceptable to the Czechoslovak government, and therefore a pretext for military action. However, developments through the summer and fall of 1938 produced sufficient doubt in Hitler’s mind about the likely British reaction to a German military assault to force him to cancel plans for a German invasion of Czechoslovakia. On July 18, the German Embassy in London submitted a comprehensive report to the German Foreign Office in Berlin on Anglo-German relations in light of the recent German annexation of Austria and the developing crisis over the Sudetenland and Czechoslovakia. The contents of the report likely added to the confusion in Hitler’s mind about how he might proceed with the Sudetenland issue.
The report began with a very negative view of the state of bilateral relations between Berlin and London, and cited as causes several factors: fears aroused in Britain over Germany’s recent annexation of Austria; general war-like tenden-cies throughout Europe, allegedly fed by world Jewry, the Communist International, and various nationalist groups within individual countries;
Britain’s rearmament program, and particularly its air defense system; and the political polarization in British domestic politics between the Chamberlain and Churchill factions and their perceived different approaches toward German demands in Europe. The report further observed that the great majority of the British population preferred an understanding with Germany. It concluded that although the current state of bilateral relations was unsettled and filled with tension, the current British government supported the negative German view of the Soviet Union, and Germany’s demand that the issue of the Sudetenland be resolved through bilateral agreements rather than through the League of Nations. However, the report cautioned that only a peaceful resolution of the Sudeten German crisis was acceptable to London, and that Britain would undoubtedly side with France if Germany chose the path of
12 Ibid., 956. 13 Ibid., 969. 14 Ibid., Vol. 3, 1121.
military action against Czechoslovakia. Ambassador von Dirksen then suggested:“The attempt to achieve an understanding with England will there-fore have to be the urgent task of our there-foreign policy, as soon as the proper conditions for it can be established.”15
Thus, Hitler was confronted with the choice between the free pursuit of German policy in its own self-defined sphere of influence in Europe and peaceful relations with Great Britain, a choice that he had always hoped to avoid. On September 26, Sir Horace Wilson, an advisor to Neville Cham-berlain, warned Hitler that Britain would support France in any Franco-German conflict that might arise from the crisis over the Sudetenland.16Two days later, the German Embassy in London warned the Foreign Office in Berlin by telephone that the British government would likely intervene militarily in any German military action against Czechoslovakia.17 Given Mussolini’s apparent desire for an international meeting to peacefully resolve the Sudeten issue, Hitler was isolated internationally and forced to settle at least temporarily for a compromise over the Sudetenland, one that fell far short of his intention to erase the Czechoslovak state from the map of Europe.
In the months following the Munich Agreement and the cession of the Sudetenland to Germany, Hitler seemed to regret his decision to back away from his initial intention to invade Czechoslovakia. He concluded that Britain in fact would not have declared war merely to ensure the survival of Czechoslovakia. This is apparent in speeches he delivered in Saarbrücken on October 9, in Weimar on November 6, and in Munich on November 8.18In all three, he implied that he would no longer tolerate British interference in Germany’s sphere of influence in Europe, and that Germany’s legitimate rights would no longer be sacrificed through needless negotiations with other powers.
By the start of the new year 1939, therefore, Hitler was prepared to pursue his aims in Europe even if it meant war with Great Britain. On March 15, having concluded that the British had been bluffing a few months earlier, Hitler ordered German troops to occupy Bohemia and Moravia, and to enter Prague.
In the end, he did carry out his intention to eliminate the Czechoslovak state.
Hitler had not given up his illusions of reaching some sort of geopolitical accommodation with Great Britain, based on mutual recognition and support for separate German and British spheres of interest. When he ordered German troops into Bohemia and Moravia on March 15, his acceptance of the
15 BArch: R43 II/1436 (Auswärtige Angelegenheiten), DB/London an AA/Berlin, A. 3161 (Geheim),“Der gegenwärtigen Stand der deutsch-englischen Beziehungen,” 18. Juli 1938.
16 ADAP: Serie D, Bd. II, Nr. 634. See also Paul-Otto Schmidt, Statist auf diplomatischer Bühne 1923–1945: Erlebnisse des Chefdolmetschers im Auswärtigen Amt mit den Staatsmännern Europas (Bonn: Athenäum Verlag, 1949), 409–410.
17 ADAP: Serie D, Bd. II, Nr. 657. See also Ulrich von Hassell, Die Hassell-Tagebücher1938–1944.
Aufzeichnungen vom anderen Deutschland (Munich: Siedler Verlag, 1989), 54–55.
18 See Domarus, Vol. 2, 956, 965, 967–969.
possibility of war represented an attempt to force Britain into the sort of partnership he had long favored, rather than a desire to undermine or destroy the British Empire.19He hoped to neutralize France and thereby deny Britain a foothold on the European continent. He would then turn his attention to the invasion and defeat of the Soviet Union, and the conquest of German Lebens-raum in eastern Europe. In his meeting with military commanders in the Reich-skanzlei on May 23, 1939, Hitler reiterated his primary goal:“Danzig is not the object here. For us it is about the expansion of our living space in the east. . .”20 Hitler also concluded that since there was little likelihood of achieving this aim without provoking a war with the western powers at some point, plans were drawn up for the defeat and occupation of the Netherlands, Belgium, and France. While an air and naval campaign would be carried out from airfields and ports along the North Sea and English Channel until the British accepted Germany’s new position of hegemony in Europe, there were as yet no plans for the occupation of Great Britain, and certainly none for the destruction of the British Empire.
By the summer of 1939, Hitler had decided that, despite a continuing desire for some sort of bilateral understanding with Great Britain, he was now prepared to go to war against Britain and France rather than postpone any longer his quest for Lebensraum in eastern Europe. This included his last-minute agreement with the Soviet Union less than two weeks before the German invasion of Poland. On the other hand, he continued to harbor hopes for some sort of last-minute understanding with the British government, and the avoidance of an all-out war in the west. In his meetings with British ambassador Henderson on August 23 and 25, 1939, just a week before the German invasion of Poland, he spoke of his many attempts to reach an understanding with Britain in the past, and London’s refusal to respond posi-tively to those overtures.21 He warned Henderson that Germany was deter-mined to resolve its problems with Poland unilaterally, that it now had the military and political means to do so, and that the recently concluded pact with Stalin freed Germany from the burden of a major two-front war. His rationale remained a bilateral agreement between Germany and Great Britain that estab-lished mutually recognized spheres of influence for each, with Germany’s sphere primarily in Europe and Britain’s overseas. For Hitler, the inherent problems in Anglo-German relations had always been centered in Britain’s refusal to grant Germany that free hand in Europe. From Hitler’s perspective, and certainly prior to September 1, 1939, it never had anything to do with
19 See Henke, England in Hitlers politischem Kalkül, 155, 204 ff.
20 ADAP: Serie D, Bd. VI, Nr. 433.
21 See ADAP: Serie D, Bd. VII, Nr. 200, 265. See also Hitler’s August 11, 1939 discussions with Carl Burckhardt, the League of Nations Commissioner for Danzig, in Carl Burckhardt, Meine Danziger Mission1937–1939 (Munich: Verlag Georg D. W. Callwey, 1960), 348.
disagreements or conflicts over British imperial interests outside of Europe in general, or with the Mediterranean region and the Middle East in particular.
In December 1937, Schwarz van Berk from the Nazi newspaper Der Angriff was in Cairo where he was collecting information on the situation in Palestine.
He sent a rather long report to Werner-Otto von Hentig of the Near East Department (Abteilung VII) in the German Foreign Office in Berlin with his observation on the high level of violence in Palestine since the outbreak of the
He sent a rather long report to Werner-Otto von Hentig of the Near East Department (Abteilung VII) in the German Foreign Office in Berlin with his observation on the high level of violence in Palestine since the outbreak of the