At the outset, I make the disclaimer that separating rhetoric from dramaturgical and procedural analyses of performance stems from a purely heuristic requirement of analytical clarity. Rhetorical analysis, as will be argued below, is an indispensable component of the performance of parliamentary debates as it features the techniques of argumentation and their strategic use in discourse. Using the Rhetoric Political Analysis approach (Finlayson 2004b, 2007; Finlayson and Martin 2008), I explore methods of charting the structure of discourse (stasis theory) and modes of
persuasive appeal (ethos, pathos, logos, quasi-logos) to explore the real content of rhetoric on the substance of parliamentary debate, and to understand the forms of rhetoric which appear to have the greatest influence in debate.
In Rhetoric, Aristotle defined rhetoric as “the faculty of observing in any given case the available means of persuasion (Book 1, Chapter 2); other scholars similarly attribute the rhetorical use of words to form “persuasive dimensions of discourse” (Bruner 2011, 407; Leach 2000, 207). The study of rhetoric, has from Aristotelian times, till the present-day been integral to the study of political communication. Garsten (2011, 160-161) has argued that the study of rhetoric is currently in the process of revival within the discipline of political science, owing to political scientists’ dissatisfaction with the forms of reasoning and argumentation stipulated within normative theories of deliberation.
Rhetorical and discursive studies of political institutions have, in recent years, expanded substantially in their scope and depth. For example, Cornelia Ilie (2010, 899) interpreted the rhetorical use of questions and interruptions to subvert the authority of the Speaker (and conduct other forms of face-work) in various forms of parliamentary addresses in the UK and Sweden. The same author (Ilie, 2001) studied the role of insults in parliamentary debates, arguing that they constitute practices of other-ing, as a rich resource for understanding the interpersonal dynamics of debate. Vanderbeck and Johnson (2011, 654) analyzed the rhetorical techniques used in UK parliamentary debates to discursively legitimate opposition to homosexuality on religious grounds (see also Van Djik 2000). Meisel (2009, 245) argues that humour as a rhetorical strategy, “masks… the nature of personal
differently in the hands of political insiders and outsiders.
At this juncture, it is fruitful to mention other discursive approaches and frameworks used within a political context that have facilitated the studies cited above, and many others. Alternate discursive approaches include Critical Discourse Analysis
(Fairclough 1995; Wodak and Meyer 2009) and its sociolinguistic applications, Political Discourse Theory (Laclau and Mouffe 1988; Glynos and Howarth 2007), and Interpretive Policy Analysis (Bevir and Rhodes 2004; 2006; Yanow 2000). Whilst these approaches would have been equally valid choices to use in my analysis, I opted for Rhetoric Political Analysis (described below) owing to the historical relationship between rhetorical analysis and the study of political discourse (Aristotle, n.d.), the conceptual and empirical linkages between rhetoric and the study of rituals, performance, dramaturgy (Blackstock 2008, 100; Turner 1980, 154; Gottweis 2007, 244), and in its suitability for the parliamentary context, whose verbal interactions are characterized by sensational, highly emotive, dramatic engagements – even without the use of embodied dramaturgical techniques.
Within the rhetorical component of my analysis, I adopt the framework of ‘rhetorical political analysis’ to carry out my research (Finlayson 2008, 2004; Finlayson and Martin 2007; Glynos et. al. 2009, 13-17) . Finlayson (2004, 530) argues that political scientists have begun to acknowledge the necessity of understanding the “role of ideas … in politics” because the discipline “tends to conceive of politics as a social ‘output’ and to abstract from the specific, strategic contexts of political action within which, alone, the ideas can be understood”. As Wedeen (2002, 714) argues, political science frameworks tend to dismiss the role of symbolism, emotions and ideas ex- pressed through rhetoric as epiphenomenal, i.e. a secondary phenomenon. The pre-
ferred explanadums for notions of political 'legitimacy', 'authority' and observed 'compliance' are generally material explanations (wealth, weapons, etc.).
Critiquing the treatment of the role of ideas within more traditional rationalistic-pos- itivistic views of political behaviour and in the more recent ‘new institutional’ ap- proaches, Finlayson (2007, 547) argues that the disciplinary emphasis on institutional cultures, habits and routines “obscures the processes by which reasons are produced and decisions made”, necessitating for a more interpretivist approach to the study of ideas (Bevir and Rhodes 2003 in Finlayson 2004b, 129).
Finlayson (2007, 552) goes on to say that ideational and interpretive studies of polit- ics ought not to focus on ideas, but rather arguments – as it is the conflict between differing ideas/beliefs or points of view that is of interest in the political analysis, rather than the presence or existence of those beliefs themselves. In line with her in- terpretation, I view political culture and (as a subset of it) political rhetoric as a series of semiotic practices that instil processes of meaning-making (ways of knowing and doing) of subjects – consonant with the interpretation of ritual-as-cognitive-mapping- tool presented above. Moreover, as Triadafilopoulos (1999, 743) argues in his at- tempt to interpret the creation of a Habermasian public sphere using Aristotelian rhetorical techniques, given the “centrality of speech” in deliberation it is “surpris- ing” that contemporary theorists have not engaged with it extensively. As Paine (1981 in Triadafilopoulos 1999, 743) argues, the issue of political legitimacy is “re- lated to the problem of getting people to listen to and accept what is said”, i.e. to the persuasiveness (or rhetorical abilities) of speakers. The “formation, effects and fate” of such arguments are part of the “activity of persuading”, which ‘rhetorical political analysis’ aims to explicate (Finlayson 2007, 552).
As within performance studies and dramaturgical approaches, rhetorical political analysis begins with a statement of what is the “rhetorical situation”, i.e. the “context of relations” within which rhetoric is uttered (Bitzer 1999 in Finlayson 2007. 554; Leach 2000, 211). The effects of rhetoric within this framework, as with dramatur- gical perspectives, is to bring an “acceptance of certain roles… [or] positions vis-à- vis one another”, or various impressions/performances of self to the context (Fin- layson 2007, 554).In the parliamentary context, Finlayson (2007, 554) argues that the rhetorical context is “ambiguous” owing to the presence of audiovisual media that can ‘collect, disseminate and interpret” political communication to a far wider audi- ence than the immediate observers of rhetoric.
Within this rhetorical context, speakers then must present the content (substance) and form (or type) of argument to establish their definition of the situation (similar to dramaturgical acts of self-presentation and impression management) (Finlayson 2007, 554). Within my analysis of Indian parliamentary debates, I use two analytical frameworks within RPA that pertain to the invention (or “finding the means of per- suasion”) in of rhetoric (Larson 1968, 126), stasis theory and the modes of persuasive appeal.
Stasis refers to the “method” or procedure whereby speakers would identify the problem, or area of disagreement within a situation (Carter 1988, 98). Stasis theory identifies four overlapping categories of questions which speakers directly or indirectly address in their speeches, namely, conjecture (did something happen), definition (what happened), quality (was it a fair or desirable outcome), translation (what is the right produce/context to address the issue) (Finlayson 2007, 554-555; Leach 2000, 213; Aristotle n.d. Book 1, Chapter 2, 1356 a). As will be shown in the
analysis of the Prevention of Terrorism Act Debates and the Women’s Reservation Bill Debates, MPs vary in their articulation of stasis points depending upon their gendered, religious, party and professional orientations. The stasis framework provides an accurate mapping device to chart the points of rhetorical conflict and consensus amongst speakers, along with the general progression (or stagnation) of the content of debate.
Alongside the analysis of stasis procedures in debate, I also identify different modes of persuasive appeal used by speakers, namely , ethos (appeals to moral authority, personality and charisma); pathos (appeals to passion); Logos (appeals to reason, facts, objectivity on clear axiomatic grounds) and quasi-logos (similar process, but with premises that are more uncertain, ambiguous, or hidden) (Finlayson 2007, 557; Triadafilopoulos 1999, 744-745; Leach 2000, 214) . Ethos based appeals rely upon the “credibility of the author or speaker” who possesses authority, competence, similarity (of identity) charismatic appeal, etc. (Leach 2000, 214; Finlayson 2007, 557). Pathos based appeals seek to move the audience to emotional states such as “anger, pity, fear” to arouse them towards a specific action (Finalyson 2007, 557), e.g. by asking for funds for medical research to prevent children from dying (Leach 2000, 214). Logos based and quasi logos appeals rely upon the logical method where the validity of a particular argument rests upon and follows from its premises; the premises of logos appeals can be verified, whereas they are not verifiable, i.e. they are probable, in quasi logos appeals (Finlayson 2007, 557). Therefore, arguments such as ‘you will get wet once you leave the house unless you take an umbrella” based on a verifiable premises such as ‘it is raining outside’ are logical. Arguments such as ‘you will get wet once you leave the house unless you take an umbrella’ based on unverifiable premises such as ‘it might rain today’ are quasi-logical, but no
less effective, as a mode of persuasion.
The modes of persuasive appeal framework can just as easily be applied to embodied dramaturgical forms as communication of meaning can take place in both verbalized and non-verbalized forms (Gottweis 2007, 245). For instance, physical dramaturgy such as crowding the Speaker’s dais or surrounding the Law Minister en masse as he attempts to introduce a contested Bill whilst shouting, grabbing and tearing papers may appeal to the passions of the Law Minister (e.g. of intimidation to withdraw the Bill, of righteous indignation to pass it regardless, etc.) – this would be an example of pathos-centric dramaturgy (Gottweis 2007, 245). Similarly, depending on the modes of appeal that dramaturgy elicits, one can find ethos-centric, pathos-centric and logo/quasi-logo centric appeals.
Having reviewed the concept of rhetoric and its revival in political analysis, I now move onto the final sub-component of performance in my analytical framework, procedure.