Perfiles CTD en la campaña de invierno

Generally speaking, the regulatory frameworks in many countries do not provide an enabling operating environment that contributes to growth in private education (Fielden & LaRocque, 2008: 11), although these authors posit that “governments are fully entitled to exercise rigorous checks and controls on those wishing to establish private providers” and that “private entrepreneurs accept this”. They note that education providers that provide quality services welcome effective regulatory frameworks, including Quality Assurance (QA) mechanisms. They provide a guard against poor quality providers who may offer programmes more cheaply than accredited providers, thereby often duping an unsophisticated market into enrolling with them. It is evident that private providers operate in a quality assurance landscape that is multi-layered, ambiguous, complex and ever-changing, engendering a host of different approaches and quality assurance concerns, as discussed below.

Umalusi’s model of quality assurance differs substantially from the overall model adopted by the SETAs which were given six statutory functions involving activities that include the accreditation of providers, the evaluation of learning programmes, the quality assurance of learner achievements (including the award of credits and qualifications), and the registration of constituent assessors. Umalusi has a centralised model, while the SETAs operate on a decentralised model, as mandated by SAQA, that includes individual programme approval, the verification of internal quality management systems of assessment and the use of registered assessors and moderators. This has to a large extent led to a lack of uniformity in how different SETAs apply the quality assurance model originally devised by SAQA.

Recent developments have obscured the issue even more with the call for comments on the draft qualifications frameworks stating that “Umalusi's document anticipates that certain level 5 qualifications will fall within its sub-framework, although Umalusi's scope is currently restricted to levels 1-4 on the NQF. Also, the scope of CHE's revised HEQF proposals seems

to be confined to higher education institutions, whereas certain higher education programmes may be offered in appropriately equipped and staffed FET colleges” (DHET, 2011: 4). The boundaries are thus blurred and it is clear that this leads to a problem of overlapping jurisdiction and duplication of effort for the providers and the regulatory authorities alike. Umalusi (2008: 6) states that “most of the occupational and sector-specific qualifications with which SETAs are concerned fall in the FET band, and therefore form part of provision by FET private colleges”. However, QCTO which was formed to quality assure occupational qualifications has jurisdiction over all bands of the NQF from levels 1-10, although the DHET (2012e: 6) has disputed that it should quality assure qualifications higher than NQF6. Although HEQC supports the principle that the responsibility for quality of provision rests primarily with higher education institutions themselves, it uses a centralised model of accreditation, similar to that used by Umalusi. The role of HEQC is thus to provide external validation and verification of the self-evaluation report of the higher education provider, which is submitted as part of its audit portfolio. This portfolio is the basis of the institutional quality audit. An external panel of peers and experts conducts a site visit during which they gather information, which they compare with what is contained in the self-evaluation report. Using HEQC Audit Criteria (see Fig 2.8), the panel then prepares an audit report based on their assessment of the effectiveness of the institutional quality management systems. Audits of all public and qualifying private higher education institutions are conducted once within a six-year audit cycle (CHE, 2012: n.p.)

The QCTO takes a completely different approach, leading to processes that are currently fraught with contention and lack of clarity. Their model is centralised with quality assurance being delegated to assessment quality partners. There is no guarantee that this will lead to uniform application of the standards, and as a consequence, QCTO will inevitably experience problems similar to those of the SETAs.

These differences are inevitable, reflecting the nature of the various providers, learning systems and learning programmes with which the regulatory bodies have primarily been involved. However, in the unfolding of the NQF and its related quality assurance models and agencies, the regulatory terrain for private providers has become very complex, with an “incoherent duplication of accreditation” (Umalusi, 2008: 6) that is expensive and time- consuming to both providers and quality assurance bodies. As Akoojee (2005: 4) points out, “regulation has a dual purpose – to ensure consumer protection as well as to create an

enabling environment for the sector to exist”. While this is true, it seems that the regulatory environment in South Africa has become unacceptably top-heavy. In December 2012, the Minister acknowledged that a “generally stable and predictable policy environment is required” (DHET, 2012e: 2).

Registration as a means of recording the existence of colleges, and tracking issues such as company registration compliance and financial viability, is fairly straightforward. However, the situation becomes more difficult when considering more qualitative procedures linked to quality assurance and accreditation.

There are various reasons for this:

Firstly, the legislation governing quality assurance responsibility causes some confusion. There are at least three Acts that govern various aspects of quality assurance, each with its own requirements.

Secondly, many providers find themselves in the position of offering programmes and qualifications that fall under the authority of Umalusi, SETAs (sometimes more than one), CHE and QCTO – they are so-called multi-purpose providers. This means that there will inevitably be overlaps of jurisdiction and confusion as to which should take priority or be considered more important.

The registration requirements also demand that all FET private providers offering qualifications must be accredited by Umalusi in order to be registered by the DoE (without clarity on precedence) while private providers offering higher education qualifications must be registered with the Registrar of Private Higher Education Institutions (under the jurisdiction of DHET). There have been instances of registration and accreditation not being granted because the regulatory bodies argue about which process must precede the other, leaving the provider stranded in bureaucratic red tape. Colleges must first register as a private higher education institution with the Department of Higher Education and Training (DHET) to have the legal authority to offer higher education programmes. This should take place at least 18 months before starting to offer any programmes (South African Government Services, 2013: n.p.). In my personal conversation with the principal of Rissik Business School, Mrs Michelle Rissik, (2012) stated that she had been trying to register her college for five years, but because the DHET “kept shifting the goalposts”, and asking for her accreditation with the HEQC, she had given up. Fielden and LaRocque (2008: 4) maintain

that “too often, government regulation appears designed to discourage private investment without any commensurate gain in the quality of education”.

Thirdly, because officials in the accrediting body have considerable leeway and discretion in assessing applications for institutional registration, there is inconsistent application of the rules and significant scope for arbitrary (and possibly corrupt) decision-making (Fielden & LaRocque, 2008: 13).

This situation has had various unintended consequences. Technically speaking, the ETQA regulation stating that a provider cannot be accredited by more than one ETQA (SAQA, 2000: 9) contradicts the requirements of other legislation: for example, where the provider must be accredited by the DHET and Umalusi, or the DHET and a SETA; this has caused some confusion in the field. Nevertheless, many providers (sometimes under pressure from clients, or because of funding opportunities such as tenders for grant funding) have applied for, and been given, accreditation with various SETAs. Baumgardt (2011: 5) reports one provider as saying “We've been quality-assured by the ETDP SETA, BANKSETA, INSETA, CHE/HEQC (pending), Umalusi (almost finalised)”. They are thus in the position of having to meet differing accreditation requirements and to go through costly and sometimes confusing procedures for different programmes. According to Umalusi (2008: 6), the mechanism of memoranda of understanding, which was intended to facilitate the relationships between different ETQAs and support effective delivery, has proved almost impossible to implement. In enquiring about this with FASSET, the researcher was advised that there are many attempts at getting such agreements in place, especially with CHE, but these have proved fruitless (Faustino, 2010: personal conversation) with CHE either ignoring requests altogether or refusing them.

By way of explanation, a memorandum of understanding (MOU) is an agreement signed between two ETQAs to establish a working relationship setting out the roles and responsibilities of the two parties for relevant and common issues of concern. An MOU between two ETQAs generally makes provision for coordinated roles and responsibilities for activities of providers in case of overlap. It will predefine the processes, procedures and different roles where a constituent provider operating predominantly in the sector of ETQA “A” might offer a training programme, unit standard, skills programme, or qualifications belonging to the scope of ETQA “B” (CATHSSETA, 2012: n.p.). It is not hard to see the problems that providers face in this kind of environment.

Finally, there are progression issues for many learners exiting private FET providers despite the fact that they have earned NQF-registered qualifications. These include the fact that the status of some of the qualifications offered is not clear, and learners may therefore have problems accessing further opportunities in the higher education sector. Blom (2006: 131) noted that there are perceived difficulties about articulation between unit-standards-based qualifications and non-unit-standards-based qualifications: “The systemic arrangements to achieve such routes are seen to be neglected by the authorities responsible for systemic coherence”. The DHET (2012: 13) also cites a lack of coherence and articulation, as well as fragmentation in the post-school system, despite the vision and mission of the Department to create a “rational, seamless, higher education system” (DoE, 2003: 5)