Estimación de factores de emisión

Quasi-Legislative Function: Nature

WILMER GREGO vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS G.R. NO. 125955, June 19, 1997

FACTS:

On October 31, 1981, Humberto Basco was removed from his position as Deputy Sheriff by the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) upon finding of serious misconduct in an administrative complaint lodged against him. By virtue of such order, Basco was dismissed from service with forfeiture of all retirement benefits and with prejudice to reinstatement to any position in the national or local government, including its agencies and instrumentalities, or government-owned or controlled corporations. Subsequently, Basco ran as a candidate for Councilor in the 2nd _{District of the City of Manila during the} January 18, 1988 local elections where he won and assumed office. After his term, he sought reelection in the May 11, 1992 synchronized national elections where he succeeded. However, his victory was challenged by his opponents namely, Cenon Ronquillo and Honorio Lopez II, who filed cases against Basco citing the COMELEC ruling mentioned earlier that dismissed Basco from public service. These challenges were dismissed and paved the way for Basco’s continued stay. During the May 8, 1995 local elections, Basco sought for a third and final term where he emerged 6th _{in a battle for six councilor seats.} On May 13, 1995, Wilmer Grego, a registered voter of the 2nd _{District of the City of Manila, filed a petition} to disqualify Basco, suspend his proclamation and declare Romualdo Maranan as the 6th _{duly elected} Councilor in replacement of Basco. On the same day, the Chairman of the Manila City Board of Canvassers (BOC) was duly furnished with a copy of the petition. The COMELEC conducted a hearing of the case on May 14, 1995, where it ordered the parties to submit their respective memoranda. On May 17, 1995, the Manila City BOC proclaimed Basco as a duly elected councilor. Basco immediately took his oath of office before the Honorable Ma. Ruby Bithao-Camarista of the Manila Metropolitan Trial Court- Branch I. Greco contends that pursuant to Section 6 of RA 6646, COMELEC “may” during the pendency of a disqualification case, order the suspension of the proclamation of the candidate in question whenever the evidence of guilt is strong. Moreover, he cited Section 5, Rule 25 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure that says, the candidate’s proclamation “shall” be suspended notwithstanding the fact that he received the winning number of votes in such election.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the COMELEC acted in accordance with the law when it promulgated its rules (COMELEC Rules of Procedure) regarding disqualification cases when it used the word “shall” when RA 6466 only provided the word “may” in suspending a candidate’s proclamation.

RULING:

The Supreme Court reiterated that the power administrative officials to promulgate rules and regulations in the implementation of a statute is necessarily limited only to carrying into effect what is provided in the legislative enactment. The regulations adopted under legislative authority by a particular department must be in harmony with the provisions of the law and for the purpose of carrying into effect its general provisions. By such regulations, the law itself can not be extended. So long, however, as the regulations relate solely to carrying into effect the provision of the law, they are valid. The Supreme Court ruled that since Section 6 of RA 6646, the law which Section 5 of Rule 25 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure seeks to implement, employed the word “may”, it is therefore, improper and highly irregular for the COMELEC to have used instead the word “shall” in its rules. Further, it stated that in case of discrepancy between the basic law and a rule or regulation issued to implement said law, the basic law prevails because said rule or regulations cannot go beyond the terms and provisions of the basic law.

NICO B. VALDERRAMA GROUP 2 Quasi-legislative Function: Right Against Self-Incrimination

MANUEL CABAL vs. RUPERTO KAPUNAN G.R. NO. L-19052, December 29, 1962 FACTS:

On or about August 1961, Col. Jose Maristela of the Philippine Army filed with the Secretary of National Defense a letter-complaint charging Manuel Cabal, then Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, with “graft, corrupt practices, unexplained wealth, conduct unbecoming of an officer and gentleman, dictatorial tendencies, giving false statements of his assets and liabilities in 1958 and other equally reprehensible acts. On September 6, 1961, the President of the Philippines created a committee of five members consisting of three former justices and two generals to investigate the chare of

unexplained wealth contained in the said letter-complaint and submit its report and recommendations as soon as possible. At the beginning of the investigation, on September 15, 1961, the Committee, upon request of complainant Col. Maristela, considered Cabal to take the witness stand and be sworn to as witness for Col. Maristela in support of his charge of unexplained wealth. Cabal objected personally and invoked his constitutional right against self-incrimination. The Committee insisted that Cabal take the witness stand and be sworn to, subject to his right to refuse to answer such questions as may be incriminatory. Still, Cabal refused. The Committee was therefore obliged, in a communication dated September 18, 1961 to refer the matter to the City Fiscal of Manila. On September 28, 1861, the City Fiscal charged Cabal with contempt under Section 580 of the Revised Administrative Code with the Court of First Instance of Manila.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Cabal’s constitutional right against self-incrimination applies in the investigation conducted by the committee.

RULING:

The Supreme Court ruled that since the proceedings instituted by the committee are deemed criminal or penal. Hence, the exemption of Cabal from the obligation to be a witness against himself is available to him. The purpose of the investigation is to apply the provisions of Anti-Graft Law or RA 1379 which authorizes the forfeiture of the State of property of a public officer or employee which is manifestly out of proportion to his salary as such public officer or employee and his other lawful income and the income from legitimately acquired property. Such forfeiture has been held by the Supreme Court to partake a nature of a penalty. The rule protecting a person from being compelled to furnish evidence which would incriminate him exists not only when he is liable criminally to prosecution and punishment but also when his answer would tend to expose him to a forfeiture. In the case at bar, the investigation is deemed to be criminal in nature notwithstanding the fact that the procedure is civil. Thus, Cabal can invoke his constitutional right against self-incrimination.

NICO B. VALDERRAMA GROUP 2 Judicial Review: Effect on Compliance

ELMER ESPINA vs. COURT OF APPEALS G.R. NO. 97903, August 24, 1998 FACTS:

Elmer Espina and Miguel Cotiamco were candidates for director of Leyte IV Electric Cooperative (LEYECO IV), representing the Baybay South District. On May 23, 1990, Espina filed with the LEYECO IV District Election Committee (DECOM) a petition to disqualify Cotiamco on the ground that Cotiamco was not a bonafide member of the LEYECO IV. The DECOM endorsed the petition to the National Electrification Administration (NEA) on May 26, 1990. On May 27, 1990, the election for the position of director of the LEYECO IV, Baybay South District was held where Cotiamco garnered 636 votes while Espina got 599 votes. Accordingly, Cotiamco was proclaimed winner by the DECOM and sworn in as member of the board on June 6, 1990. On June 27, 1990, the NEA remanded the petition for disqualification filed by Espina to the DECOM for proper disposition on the ground that the latter had original jurisdiction over the case. After hearing, the DECOM rendered a decision on July 28, 1990 disqualifying Cotiamco. Consequently, Espina took his oath and assumed office. Cotiamco appealed to the NEA on October 1, 1990. The NEA found that Cotiamco was a bonafide member of the LEYECO IV. It reversed the DECOM and declared Cotiamco duly elected director of LEYECO IV, Baybay South District. On October 23, 1990, Espina filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari and prohibition with an urgent prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and a writ of preliminary and permanent injunction. Cotiamco moved for the dismissal on the ground of lack of jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals, failure of Espina to exhaust administrative remedies and lack of merit of the petition. On March 15, 1991, the Court of Appeals upheld the order of the NEA. It found the order of the NEA dated October 1, 1990 issued in the exercise of its power of supervision and control over electric cooperatives, and that the findings of the NEA were supported by substantial evidence. Espina then filed a petition to the Supreme Court to review the ruling of the Court of Appeals.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Espina’s failure to exhaust administrative remedies warrants the dismissal of his petition for review

RULING:

The Supreme Court said that the rule of exhaustion of administrative remedies is not absolute but admits of exceptions. One of these exceptions is when only a question of law is involved and nothing of an administrative in nature is to be done or can be done. The case at bar, the issue whether private respondent Cotiamco is a member of the cooperative is one which calls for the interpretation and application of both the law creating the NEA and the by-laws of the LEYECO IV. Moreover, the exhaustion of administrative remedies can be disregarded if there was a grave abuse of discretion. The ruling of the NEA that Cotiamco is a bonafide member of the cooperative and for that reason was qualified to be a director contravenes both the provisions of PD 269 and the by-laws of the LEYECO IV. It was an error for the Court of Appeals to affirm such ruling which was clearly rendered with grave abuse of discretion.

NICO B. VALDERRAMA GROUP 2 Quasi-Legislative Function: Necessity for Notice of Hearing

COMMISSION OF INTERNAL REVENUE vs. COURT OF APPEALS G.R. NO. 119322, June 4, 1996

FACTS:

On June 1, 1993, the President of the Philippines issued a Memorandum creating a Task Force to investigate the tax liabilities of manufacturers engaged in tax evasion scheme, such as selling products through dummy marketing corporations to avoid payment of correct internal revenue tax, to collect from any tax liabilities discovered from such investigation and to file the necessary criminal actions against those who may have violated the tax code. The task force was composed of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, a representative of the Department of Justice and a representative of the Executive Secretary. On July 1, 1993, the Commissioner issued a Revenue Memorandum Circular No. 37-93 reclassifying best selling cigarettes bearing the brands “Hope”, “More” and “Champion” as cigarettes of foreign brands subject to a higher rate of tax without notice of hearing to Fortune Tobacco Corporation who sells the mentioned brands. On August 3, 1993, Fortune questioned the validity of the reclassification of said brands as violative of its right to due process and equal protection of law. Parenthetically, the Court of Appeals ruled on September 8, 1993 that the reclassification made by the Commissioner is of “doubtful legality” and enjoined its enforcement.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Revenue Memorandum Circular No. 37-93 is valid despite the lack of notice of hearing to Fortune Tobacco Corporation

RULING:

The Supreme Court ruled that the Revenue Memorandum Circular No. 37-93 which reclassified the cigarette brands and subjected them to higher tax rate, is invalid for lack of notice, publication and public hearing. A revenue regulation, even if quasi-legislative in nature should observe due process. The subject revenue memorandum circular affects a private entity which is about to suffer from the consequences of such circular. Therefore, the private entity, which is Fortune Tobacco Corporation in the case at bar, should be given the opportunity to be notified and be heard before they can be covered by the circular. Administrative regulations in general are not required to strictly follow the constitutional requirement on notice of hearing. However, the rule is not absolute. In case an administrative regulation affects a particular entity and separable from the general public, notice of hearing should be required in the observance of the due process. Revenue Memorandum Circular No. 37-93 is not a administrative regulation for the general public but pertains only to Fortune Tobacco Corporation. Hence, notice of hearing is required, otherwise, it is invalid.

Quasi-Legislative Function: Second Requisite Voltaire Acosta

Group 2

Cebu Oxygen and Acetylene Co., Inc. Vs. Drilon

176 SCRA 24