CAPITULO 5: PRUEBAS Y RESULTADOS
5.1. Perfiles de carga eléctrico
Action Research lives with a number of issues and difficulties. Specifically,
How is knowledge defined in terms of truth in action research?
Lewin’s research paradigm of plan-act-observe-reflect became a taken up conflict. Lewin always believed that the process (‘praxis’-action) was properly adhered to a theoretical framework (‘theoria’-theory). And this is indeed where the first contradiction about action research appears. If the truth for Action Research depends on social relationships and action, on what realm of thought does it rely? This is unclear in action research: the etymological origin of the term conflicts with its philosophical aspect. According to Plato and his followers, ‘theoria’ seeks to approach the divine while ‘praxis’ has to do with human activities, the mundane world of people (Lobkowicz, 1977). The dichotomy echoes the 20th century distinction of ‘pure’ and ‘applied’ science. Positivists
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and pragmatists transcended the Greek dualism as they considered that science offers answers based on logic to problems, and those answers should be dispensed to society (Hammersley, 2004). Pragmatism is in dispute with ‘the Cartesian dualism in regard to the question of action’ (Joas and Kilpinen, 2006:326). Rorty (1999:33) claims that inquiry should not be understood ‘as a means of representing reality, but rather see it as a means of using reality’ (italics in the original); a reality at which judgments, universal criteria or even whole belief-systems are tried (Nielsen, 2006:134). Action is an ongoing cyclical process, to which failure is possible, and if happens, the mind tries to reconstruct the faulty action by reflecting on what went wrong. Acting, for
pragmatists, involves rational choice defined in relation to how a line of action is followed (Joas and Kilpinen, 2006:331).
Carr and Kemmis (1986), in their famous book Becoming Critical, accepted a
separation of theory from action; the two notions are distinct, but they are also linked within the framework of critical theory, as expressed by Habermas. According to Habermas’ theory of rationality (1973), critical thinking can promote self-reflection through the process of enlightment. Being transformed, the person gains practical reasoning to take decisions.
Elliott (2005) doubts that ‘merely a transformed consciousness can derive future action’ and finds the Habermas’ link between critical theory and action very weak. Elliott strongly believes that enlightment is one thing and empowerment is a completely different thing. Carr and Kemmis (1986), by relating their work with that of Habermas’, were not able to explain ‘how teachers may become empowered as moral agents of worthwhile educational change’ (Elliott, 2005). It was actually a point Carr and Kemmis (2005) themselves accepted later that ‘[on the event of] a new edition of Becoming
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[the Aristotelian] practical philosophy is expressed in practical action research’. In this particular philosophy, ‘praxis’ means ‘moral action’ and Elliott (2007) suggests that action research gives a moral agency to teachers to improve school situations. Carr (2006) emphasizes this moral aspect of action research saying that ‘the ‘end’ of praxis is not to make or produce some object or artifact…praxis is a form of ‘doing’ action precisely because its ‘end’- to promote the good life- only exists, and can only be realised, in and through praxis itself’.
Is action and research possible in action research?
The second contradiction again relates to the two components of the term ‘action research’. Is action research a form of research, or is it a form of action? Does action research relate to inquiry, or to acts? As Hammersley (2004) suggests that it seems to be ‘an oscillation between the two components rather than transcendence of the difference between them’.
Additionally, which is the way that one gets to know in action research? Reason and Bradbury (2001:2) argue that ‘knowing’ is an evolving process of life, it has verb rather than noun properties. The ‘primary purpose of action research is to produce practical knowledge that is useful to people in the everyday conduct of their lives’ (ibid, page 2). They suggest that the ways of knowing are not the pursuit of the academics only, but the everyday actions of people who try to create meaning in their lives. Macmurray (1957:84) argues that the starting point for epistemology is ‘I do’ and not ‘I think’.
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Is action research problem-based or impulse-based?
John Dewey (1929), an influential writer and a pragmatist himself, claimed that any inquiry starts when one finds him/herself in a problematic or indeterminate situation (Putnam, 2006:281). Dewey was interested in enabling teachers to apply scientific methods, which were not cut-off from ordinary life, in order to solve practical classroom problems. That was quite revolutionary at that time when science was meant only for specialized agents. Then the issue of the ‘problem’ became puzzling. A problem, according to its Greek origin, means ‘something that is thrown in front of a person’. This may have an ‘imposed relevance’ (Schutz, 1970) to inquiry. And it can definitely be true; when practical problems arise, they need to be investigated and solutions to be found. But inquiry can be instigated by curiosity, too. Aristotle believed instincts to be the principal connection of human beings with their world (Lear, 1988). Therefore, inquiry can also well out of ‘intrinsic relevance’ (Schutz, 1970) and not just out of practically imposed problems (Hammersley, 2004).
How is action research related to teaching practice?
There is also some debate as to what the two components suggest when research involves another activity such as teaching. Does inquiry occur separately from teaching? Stenhouse (1975) sees teaching as the equivalent of inquiry while
Hammersley (2004) accepts that ‘there is an overlap between teaching and inquiry but not an identity’. Teaching and inquiry may share many characteristics but not all. Teachers become researchers as they get engaged with problems. But, usually the teaching goals are different from the inquiry goals and this can cause tension either in teaching or in research.
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Hammersley (2004) suggests a typology of inquiry outlining the value of prime concern and the distance of inquiry with other activities: inquiry-subordinated-to-another-activity and inquiry-treated-primarily. The former offers relevant and usable information to a small social force, but fails to provide a generalization. The latter, does the opposite. The specialised inquiry offers general answers but they may be complex and difficult to decipher. According to this typology, action research is mostly classified as inquiry- subordinated-to-another-activity. And since inquiry subordinates to a practical goal, action research has a transformational power rather than a power to produce knowledge.