Periodo de recuperación

Taking  a  wider  view  than  the  studies  discussed  above,  Blühdorn  (2017)  proposes   that  because  people  living  in  the  advanced  capitalist  economies  are  reluctant  to  give   up  their  consumer  lifestyles,  a  new  de  facto  ‘social  contract  for  sustaining  the  

unsustainable’  is  emerging  in  order  to  ‘adapt’  and  develop  ‘resilience’.  Disturbingly,   Blühdorn  (2017,  p.  57)  contends  that  an  important  component  of  this  resilience  is   “the  development  of  coping  strategies  for  ever  increasing  levels  of  social  inequality,   injustice  and  exclusion”  that  are  the  inevitable  outcome  of  the  choices  of  the   relatively  affluent.  Hausknost  (2017,  p.  64)  goes  even  further  by  arguing  that  the   social  contract  that  Blühdorn  (2017)  refers  to  as  newly  emergent  has  been  evident   since  the  1950s:  

The priority of the mainstream consumer-citizen since the 1950s has always been (I claim) to maximise their material standard of living and to trust in the state to deal with the ensuing environmental problems in terms of technological and regulatory solutions. The ‘limits to growth’ challenge remained unresolved both in 1972 and in 2016.

Hausknost’s  (2017,  p.  65)  conclusion  is  apocalyptic:  

The bleak prospect implied here is that public support for radical change will emerge only once the global problems turn into painful local ones that severely affect the quality of life in affluent societies. Needless to say that at that point it will be too late to solve them.

Leahy,  Bowden  and  Threadgold  (2010,  p.  865)  also  maintain  that  while  social   collapse  is  ‘not  inevitable’,  on  current  trajectories  it  is  ‘the  most  likely  outcome’   [emphasis  in  original].  Writing  along  similar  lines,  Adelman  (2015,  p.  208)  observes   that:  

The rule of markets has trumped the rule of law, growth and fetishism has trumped environmental protection, and profit has trumped the human rights of peoples. As a consequence, three planetary environmental boundaries have been transgressed – biodiversity loss, climate change, and the nitrogen cycle – and a

further six are under threat (Rockström et al., 2009). The triumph of neoliberalism and green governmentality are Pyrrhic victories.

Like  Blühdorn  (2017),  Hausknost  (2017)  and  Leahy,  Bowden  and  Threadgold  (2010),   Adelman’s  (2015,  p.  208)  final  prognosis  is  also  pessimistic:  

The fact that we persistently refuse to do what is required, feasible and achievable to save ourselves, our fellow species and our descendants – decarbonising the global political-economy – raises the disturbing prospect that human beings are, uniquely, a species too stupid to survive.

While  such  pessimistic  conclusions  are  common,  and  while  they  may  also  be  realistic   and  logical  (at  least  as  things  stand  at  the  moment),  it  is  both  practically  and  morally   untenable  to  allow  such  thinking  to  destabilise  efforts  to  bring  about  the  changes   that  the  science  dictates  if  the  average  global  temperature  increase  is  to  be  limited   to  1.5°C  above  pre-­‐industrial  levels.147  While  an  additional  0.5°C  rise  in  average   global  temperatures  does  not  sound  like  much,  emergent  research  indicates  that   outcomes  for  the  two  scenarios  will  be  profoundly  different.  Some  examples  of  the   differences  in  likely  outcomes  include:  

For heat-related extremes, the additional 0.5°C increase in global- mean temperature marks the difference between events at the upper limit of present-day natural variability and a new climate regime, particularly in tropical regions [emphasis added]. Similarly, this warming difference is likely to be decisive for the future of tropical coral reefs…. Best estimate sea-level rise projections… indicate a 50 cm rise by 2100 relative to year 2000-levels for a 2°C scenario, and about 10 cm lower levels for a 1.5°C scenario. In a 1.5°C scenario, the rate of sea-level rise in 2100 would be reduced by about 30% compared to a 2°C scenario.

(Schleussner, C-F et al., 2016, p. 327)

In  addition,  and  as  the  graph  below  shows,  the  warming  effects  of  the  increasing   concentration  of  GHG  emissions  in  the  atmosphere  are  already  evident;  contrary  to   popular  beliefs,  they  are  not  located  in  some  distant  future.  

147  _{Failing  to  engage  with  the  issue  of  climate  change  is  morally  inexcusable  because,  as}  

discussed  in  other  parts  of  this  thesis:  disadvantaged  people  are  already  suffering  the   worst  effects  of  the  unfolding  multiplicity  of  crises;  we  are  currently  witnessing  the  sixth   mass  extinction  as  a  result  of  environmental  degradation  and  climate  change;  and  the   longer  we  take  to  make  the  necessary  changes,  the  more  the  dangers  of  destabilising  the   Earth  System  increase  so  that  we  may  reach  a  point  (if  we  have  not  reached  this  

already)  when  it  becomes  too  late  to  do  anything,  thus  dooming  future  generations  to  an   even  more  uncertain  and  challenging  future  than  they  already  face.  

  Source:  Joshi  (2017)  

The  graph  showing  possible  futures  for  different  generations  was  developed  by   Australian  biology  professor  and  climate  change  researcher  Lesley  Hughes,  and  it   shows  not  only  that  average  global  temperatures  are  already  increasing  but  also  the   possible  future  warming  trajectories  that  today’s  young  people  and  their  children   will  have  to  deal  with.  Which  of  these  possible  scenarios  current  and  future     generations  will  face  depends  on  what  actions  are  taken  (or  not  taken)  now  (Joshi   2017;  Rogelj  et  al.  2015;  Schleussner  et  al.,  2016).  Climate  movement  activists  and   many  academics  working  within  the  social  sciences  who  are  concerned  about  the   consequences  of  global  warming  are  therefore  focusing  their  attention  on  trying  to   identify  and  address  the  barriers  to  a  more  active  civil  society  engagement  with  the   issue.    

Research  suggests  that  personal  psychological  dispositions  such  as  those  identified   previously  are  often  constructed  and/or  compounded  by  successful  climate  change   denialist  strategies  designed  to  delay  the  adoption  of  measures  that  will  adversely   affect  their  industries  (McCright  et  al.  2016;  Stoutenborough  et  al.’s  2014  study  cited   in  Drews  &  van  den  Bergh  2016).  Climate  change  denialist  narratives  work  together  

with  conservative  political  beliefs  and  the  hegemonic  and  politically  charged  

neoliberalising  discourse  that  regulating  capital  will  impact  negatively  on  ‘economic   growth’  and  hence  on  jobs  (Corner  et  al.  2015;  Heath  &  Gifford  2006;  Hornsey  et  al.   2016).148  Widespread  economic  insecurities  among  working  people  in  the  advanced   capitalist  economies  since  the  1980s,  which  have  become  even  more  pronounced  in   the  aftermath  of  the  2008  GFC,  and  the  related  (and  very  understandable)  general   tendency  of  people  living  in  precarious  circumstances  to  prioritise  immediate   concerns  such  as  jobs,  housing,  and  career  prospects  at  the  expense  of  future   possible  catastrophes  (Corner  et  al.,  2015),  make  them  susceptible  to  arguments   that  dealing  with  climate  change  will  damage  the  economy  and  make  it  more   difficult  to  find  work.  However,  even  people  who  claim  to  be  both  very  

knowledgeable  and  very  concerned  about  climate  change  often  fail  to  take  action  to   try  to  influence  public  policy,  and  Doherty  and  Webler  (2016)  identify  several  

possible  reasons  for  this,  including  that  many  people  do  not  believe  that  their   actions  can  make  a  difference  and  that  ‘similar  others’  (their  peers)  are  not  taking   action  either.  

Perceived  self-­‐efficacy  is  a  particularly  important  determinant  of  whether  or  not   young  people  engage  with  the  issue  of  climate  change:  “Feelings  of  powerlessness  in   the  face  of  global  climate  change  and  the  sense  that  personal  actions  would  not   make  a  difference  have  been  reported  in  several  youth  studies”  (Corner  et  al.  2015,   p.  527).  In  addition,  like  the  rest  of  the  population,  young  people  living  in  advanced   capitalist  economies  also  prioritise  more  immediate  issues  such  as  finding  work  and   establishing  careers  (Corner  et  al.  2015).  Moreover,  while  they  do  not  trust  

politicians  and  are  generally  dissatisfied  with  formal  political  processes,  “young   people  tend  to  see  governments  as  having  the  greatest  responsibility  for  catalysing  a   response  to  climate  change”  (Corner  et  al.  2015,  p.  530).  

148  _{Hoffarth  &  Hodson  (2016)  find  that  conservatives’  beliefs  and  attitudes  about  climate}  

change  in  the  US  are  frequently  less  motivated  by  economic  concerns  than  by  a  more   general  antagonism  to  environmentalists,  who  are  perceived  as  ‘green  on  the  outside,   red  on  the  inside.’  In  their  meta-­‐analyses  of  studies  examining  determinants  of  belief  in   climate  change,  Hornsey  et  al.  (2016,  p.  622)  find  that  while  there  are  links  between   political  ideology  and  climate  change  beliefs,  these  beliefs  are  “more  aligned  to  specific   identification  with  political  parties  than  to  underlying  political  ideologies.”  

Despite  the  general  lack  of  active  public  engagement  in  formal  political  processes,   there  are  nevertheless  some  people  in  the  advanced  capitalist  economies  who  are   not  only  concerned  about  the  ineffectiveness  of  official  responses  to  climate  change   and  the  many  other  current  crises  but  also  try  to  engage  with  these  issues  in  a   variety  of  ways,  including  by  participating  in  the  heterogeneous  climate  movement   that  emerged  in  the  late  1980s.  I  precede  my  discussion  of  the  climate  movement   with  an  overview  of  the  environmental  movement,  elements  of  which  started  paying   attention  to  global  warming  from  the  early  days  of  its  emergence  as  an  issue  of   global  concern.  I  then  discuss  the  way  in  which  the  ineffectiveness  of  official  

institutional  responses  to  the  climate  change  crisis  led  to  the  development  of  overtly   political  disagreements  within  the  climate  movement,  which  has  grown  in  both   numbers  and  complexity  over  the  more  than  two  decades  of  failed  official  climate   change  negotiations.  Ecosocialist  contributions  to  the  social  dynamics  and  

contending  ideas  within  the  climate  movement  are  extensive  and,  while  referred  to   briefly  at  various  points  in  this  chapter,  are  discussed  in  detail  in  Chapters  7  and  8.  

A  neo-­‐Gramscian  analysis  of  the  development  of  the  modern