La persona y el trabajo: Mirada desde la sociedad

Zell and Baumeister (2013) begin their explanation of religion and self- regulation with standards. As noted above, these standards can exist at broad

abstract levels, such as "be humble," but also include direct goals encompassing everyday behaviors– such as prohibitions on drinking or lying. Regardless of the level of abstraction, the relevant functional aspect of standards is their capacity to guide self-regulatory efforts. Zell and Baumeister along with others (e.g.,

Baumeister & Exline, 2000) suggest that religion’s impact on standards is relatively straightforward: religious systems carry clear and explicit standards for behavior. These standards may be direct rules and ritual prescriptions, such as the Ten Commandments or the Five Pillars of Islam (Zell & Baumeister, 2013), but they can also be carried tacitly by moral exemplars (Oman & Thoresen, 2003).

Laurin and Kay (2016) offer a similar explanation:

A strict moral code that offers clear guidelines for determining right and wrong can serve as a useful heuristic for choosing one's course of action. Making choices can be depleting (e.g., Vohs et al., 2008); to the extent that a religion has a strict moral code, it might alleviate some of that burden. (p. 312)

Here, Laurin and Kay (2016) helpfully articulate the reason having such clear standards would aid in regulation– by alleviating ego-depletion effects.

Furthermore, they are careful to acknowledge that not all religious systems will include strict moral standards– instead, they suggest, this can act as a predictive

variable. Both of these accounts emphasize the role of explicit beliefs about moral behavior within religious systems and the way these influence ego-depletion processes.

McCullough and Carter (2013) take a different route. Instead of focusing on the direct moral codes within religious systems, they argue instead that religions tend to encourage norms that are based in the overarching values of tradition and conformity. Here they are drawing from the Schwartz Value Survey (Schwartz, 2006; 2012), which attempts to distill a set of ten basic values that are apparent cross-culturally. Within this schema, tradition describes the acceptance and respect for customs, while conformity describes acting in accordance with social expectations and norms (Schwartz, 2012). McCullough and Carter's (2013) argument is based on empirical research showing that religious people in the US, Turkey, and Israel tend to endorse these values and that religiosity in all contexts is negatively related to the values of hedonism, stimulation, and self-direction (Saroglou, Delpierre, & Dernelle, 2004). In other words, the moral goals that religious systems tend to endorse are not arbitrary– they are precisely the type of values that demand self-regulation. This association acts as an ultimate explanation for why particular religious standards foster self- regulation. But McCullough and Carter (2013) also offer a proximate explanation

by suggesting that religious systems have the capacity to sanctify particular goals (Emmons, 1999). This process increases the goal's importance and evidence suggests that sanctification has a significant impact on the way individuals regulate in relation to those goals (Pargament & Mahoney, 2005).

In chapters 2 and 3, I will challenge and extend these explanations by situating them more clearly within the dynamics of social processes. In particular, the explanations that depend on explicit moral codes directing behavior and preserving willpower likely overemphasize this pathway of influence. Psychologically there is substantial evidence that most of our moral behaviors are not guided by explicit moral codes (e.g., Ariely, 2010; Haidt, 2001; Lerner, Li, Valdesolo, & Kassam, 2015). And socially, a long tradition in

anthropology has analyzed the ways that moral codes have communal functions which extend beyond explicit prohibitions and have a much greater influence on our behavioral patterns (e.g., Turner, 1969; Rappaport, 1999). In other words, the explicit moral dictates of any religious system are just the tip of the iceberg; most of standards carried within religious systems are operating tacitly beneath the surface.

McCullough and Carter's (2013) explanation gets us further in this

conformity and traditions. This insight, along with their point about

sanctification, will be a launching point for situating religious standards within their broader social context. This broad perspective is necessary to understand the deeply social character of standards and how they are developed and persist. Attending to social context provides a novel perspective on the way religious systems foster self-regulation through standards, which does not rely on their capacity to preserve willpower.

1.5.2 Self-monitoring

Within the process of self-regulation, self-monitoring9 _{refers to the}

capacity of individuals to be aware of their current state in relation to their goal state (Carver & Scheier, 1998; 2016). Zell and Baumeister (2013) argue that many religious practices nurture an individual's tendency towards self-awareness or self-examination. Prayer, meditation, and confession all stand out as examples. Furthermore, many religious calendars have seasons set aside for self-

examination: for example, Lent in the Christian calendar or the month of

9 _{This definition of self-monitoring as a cognitive capacity is distinct from Synder’s (1974) use of}

the term as a personality trait describing the extent to which people watch and restrain their actions in response to situational cues about the appropriateness of that behavior (see also, Fuglestad & Snyder, 2010; Gangestad & Snyder, 2000). While Snyder’s use is similar to dynamics I will describe, functionally separating the capacity of self-monitoring from sensitivity to social cues and willingness to abide provides a more conceptually clear framework for explanation.

Ramadan in Islam (Zell & Baumeister, 2013). These associative explanations suggest that religious practices could develop the habit of self-monitoring. As Laurin and Kay put it: "Those who self-monitor regularly are more apt to notice discrepancies between their current and desired states, which is what prompts them to act" (2016, p. 307). This practice based explanation is complemented by other explanations suggesting that believing in watchful supernatural agents will also increase an individual's tendency to self-monitor.

This explanation is prominent within the cognitive science of religion, where Norenzayan (2013) and others (Shariff & Norenzayan, 2007) have argued that supernatural surveillance fosters the self-monitoring necessary for prosocial behaviors. This association draws heavily on experiments which reliably show that people's behavior changes if they believe they are being watched (e.g., Bateson, Nettle, & Roberts, 2006; Bering, McLeod, & Shackelford, 2005; Haley & Fessler, 2005). This explanation is also supported by Carter et al.'s (2012a) study which found that religiosity was significantly related to self-monitoring

tendencies and that this relationship was partially mediated by the perception that one was also being monitored by God. Carter and colleagues (2012a) found that the perception of being monitored by other people also mediated this pathway between religiosity and self-monitoring, but importantly: "monitoring

by God and monitoring by others only partially mediated the relationship between religiosity and self-monitoring. Thus, there remains a substantial amount of variance left to explain regarding the association between religiosity and self-monitoring" (2012a, p. 694). The variance that is left unexplained could be accounted for by those religious practices of self-awareness, or there could be other mediating influences. As McCullough and Carter (2013) note, this

theoretical relationship remains largely unconstrained by empirical evidence and therefore a fruitful ground for future research.

Throughout this dissertation, I will expand on these explanations by arguing that what matters is less that an individual is being watched and more

who is doing the watching. Different watchers belong to different communities

and each of these communities will carry their own norms and standards. Therefore, it is not simply that being watched causes us to self-regulate, instead being watched causes us to act more normally in relation to that group.

Recognizing the social contexts within which self-monitoring occurs also helps us attend to the type of relationship that an individual has with these

communities. The quality of these relationships will largely determine whether an individual self-regulates towards conformity or towards an individualized rejection of the collective standards. Focusing on the quality of one's relationship

with their religious community's symbols will help to clarify why individual differences in religiosity have different predictive value for self-regulation.

Other aspects of who is watching will also likely be salient for regulation. For example, Johnson and colleagues (2013; 2016) show that different

conceptions of god, as either authoritarian or benevolent, lead to divergent behavioral outcomes. This research is part of an ongoing debate within the psychology of religion concerning the relatively efficacy of punishing versus benevolent conceptions of deities for different types of behavior (see Johnson, 2005; Johnson & Cohen, 2016; Norenzayan et al., 2016; Shariff & Norenzayan, 2011; Yilmaz & Bahçekapili, 2016). Regardless of how this debate resolves, this research highlights that holding a belief in supernatural deities may be less important than the ways people relate to the content of that belief. The relational content of belief and the social context endorsing those beliefs will both help to nuance our understanding of the ways religious engagement impacts regulation via self-monitoring.

1.5.3 Motivation

Rather than being another self-regulatory capacity, motivation is an overall disposition or willingness to exercise these other capacities or not. Most often this willingness is expressed in terms of an individual's cost/benefit

analysis. Laurin and Kay (2016) draw from Bandura's (1991; 1997) model of motivation to express this analysis in terms of three questions: Can I do it? Will there be a reward? Do I care? In chapter 4 we will engage this model in more depth. For now it is worth noting to appreciate the way Laurin and Kay (2016) build their theory around each of these questions. Drawing from their work on compensatory control (Laurin, Kay, & Fitzsimons, 2012), Laurin and Kay (2016) describe the complex ways that religious beliefs can lead people to be both overconfident in their ability to regulate —by fostering a sense of protection (Holbrook, Fessler, & Pollack, 2016)— and less confident in these abilities—by encouraging people to relinquish their control (Laurin et al., 2012).

While an individual's perceived ability to exercise regulation clearly impacts their willingness to regulate, the heart of motivation within this model is whether people perceive a reward and whether they care. Laurin and Kay (2016) suggest that "religion provides more or less clear ideas about what kinds of behaviors will receive divine reward. As a result, religion may motivate people to engage their self-regulatory efforts in moral domains, or domains that they believe God will reward" (p. 316).10 Similarly, Zell and Baumeister (2013) suggest

10. This focus on moral domains helps explain some seemingly contradictory findings associated with religiosity. While most research shows religiosity is related to norm conforming behaviors, other studies have shown that reminders of religious deities also increases risky behaviors

that religious beliefs about the afterlife, salvation, and enlightenment are among the strongest incentives for following moral standards (p. 507-508). Within a strict cost/benefit analysis, the promises of ultimate fulfillment or punishment are powerful motivators.

Whether or not individuals care about these rewards is interwoven with this analysis– belief in divine rewards or punishments would imply a sense of their value. Zell and Baumeister (2013) extend this element of motivation to note that religions provide overarching principles that imbue behaviors with a larger purpose (e.g., Sansone, Weir, Harpster, & Morgan, 1992). This overarching sense of purpose, a high level goal, illustrates the ways standards and motivation are interconnected, while also providing an example of the way rewards may not always be postponed into an afterlife. Many of these explanations highlight the ways in which religious systems provide positive incentives, so it is also

important to note that motivation can also work through feelings of guilt, which may be fostered by religious involvement (Albertsen, O'Connor, & Berry, 2006; Zell & Baumeister, 2013).

(Kupor, Laurin, & Levav, 2105). Here Laurin and Kay (2016) argue that this difference depends on whether a particular domain of behavior is viable for receiving divine rewards or not.

Using divine rewards and punishments to explain the relationship between religion and motivation depends heavily on a form of rational choice theory. There are abundant critiques of rational choice theory as an explanation for individual behavior (Ingold, 1996; Tversky & Kahneman, 1986), although the theory is quite useful at describing aggregate behaviors across a group (Becker, 1993). The strongest critique, at least for our current inquiry, is that rational choice theory assumes that human action is thoroughly instrumental (Boudon, 1998). As Weber (1922/1978) noted almost a century ago, some action is clearly pursued as a means towards a desired end, but other actions are value-rational– "determined by a conscious belief in the value for its own sake of some ethical, aesthetic, religious, or other form of behavior, independently of its prospects of success" (p. 25). In other words, analyzing religiously motivated behaviors as directed towards an instrumental reward may miss the way that these behaviors are valued fundamentally in and of themselves. For example, when Laurin and Kay (2016) describe the self-control required by religious standards they suggest that “dietary rules require Jews to resist the delicious smell of pepperoni pizza” (p. 317). I too love pepperoni pizza, but this description may fundamentally miss the social dimensions of motivation in which keeping kosher is an end unto itself, not a means to compel rewards from one’s god. This theoretical point is

supported by empirical work showing that religiosity is highly related to deontological moral reasoning, which is resistant to manipulation by

instrumental ends (e.g., Ginges, Atran, Medin, & Shikaki, 2007; Sheikh, Ginges, Coman, & Atran, 2012). If we should not frame religiosity's relationship to motivation in terms of shifting incentives, then how are we to model this influence?

In chapters 3 and 4 I will provide an alternative account to the current model's overemphasis on cost/benefit analysis. Rather than suggesting that religious beliefs shift incentives within an objectively given value-landscape, this chapter argues that religious engagement can change the contours of those value- landscapes. This argument hinges on the relationship between religiosity and moral reasoning, paying specific attention to the role of moral emotions. A growing research program in psychology suggests that most moral behavior is driven by various combinations of emotional inclinations (Haidt, 2012). These moral emotions are evolutionarily rooted (Curry, 2016; Tomasello, 2016) and deeply social (Greene, 2013). Understanding these emotions and the way they are shaped by religious practices and beliefs will provide a model connecting

religiosity and motivation that recognizes the way moral actions are socially endorsed ends unto themselves.

Given the salience of moral emotions, an essential part of this perspective on motivation is emotional regulation. Emotional regulation is commonly

portrayed as the strategies that people employ to deal with positive and negative emotions (Gross, 2014). But the perception of different emotional experiences as positive or negative depends largely on prior evaluative processes that are guided by socialization (Hofmann, De Houwer, Perugini, Baeyens, & Crombez, 2010). In other words, the best way to avoid temptation is not to effectively restrain the tempting impulse, but to emotionally regulate such that you do not experience temptation in the first-place (e.g., Lamm et al., 2017). In chapter 4 I will argue that religion’s relationship to motivation is determined in part by these socialized and implicit emotional regulatory processes that can shape an individual’s experience of their moral world.

1.5.4 Willpower

Willpower plays a pivotal role in the current explanations for this

relationship. While we have looked at willpower primarily as a resource within the ego-depletion model of self-control (Baumeister, 2014), it is also considered to work like a muscle insofar as it can be exercised and strengthened (Muraven, Baumeister, & Tice., 1999). With this capacity for change in mind, some explanations suggest that religious engagement may boost self-regulation

through rituals that demand the exercise and presumed strengthening of willpower (Zell & Baumeister, 2013). Evidence for this strengthening effect comes from studies suggesting that people consider religious environments to be high-constraint settings where only very specific behaviors are appropriate (Kenrick, McCreath, Govern, King, & Bordin, 1990; McCullough & Willoughby, 2009; Price & Bouffard, 1974). Furthermore, various religious practices explicitly involve restraint, whether sitting in long periods of meditation, fasting during Ramadan, or undergoing dysphoric experiences (e.g., Xygalatas et al., 2013).

Despite the validity of objections that we cannot assume religious practices require subjective experiences of restraint (e.g., Koenig, 2016), there nevertheless does appear to be a positive relationship between religious

engagement and effortful inhibition. Laurin and Kay (2016) make this argument by reviewing the set of experimental studies outlined above (Friese et al., 2014; Friese & Wänke, 2014; Rounding et al., 2010; Watterson & Gieseler, 2012), which explicitly depend on the ego-depletion model and support this positive

relationship. The question, however, is not whether religiosity is related to willpower, but the extent to which this relationship helps explain the broader association between religious engagement and self-regulation.

Within Laurin and Kay's (2016) explanation, ego-depletion and willpower play an essential role: "recent controversy notwithstanding (e.g., Job et al., 2010; Molden et al., 2012), it is undeniable that exerting self-control relies on some forms of limited resources" (p. 313). Insofar as they are restricting themselves to instances of self-control, this is a fair point because self-control is defined in terms of this limited resource (Baumeister et al., 2007). But throughout their review, Laurin and Kay (2016) use self-control and self-regulation

interchangeably. Similarly, Zell and Baumeister (2013) use self-control as the overarching framework for all regulatory processes. The problem with blurring these concepts is that it is quite deniable that self-regulation relies on a limited resource. An entire branch of psychological researchers and thinkers explicitly argue against this dependence (Bargh, 1997; Carter, Kofler, Forster, &

McCullough, 2015; Inzlicht, Schmeichel, & Macrae, 2014; Papies & Aartes, 2016). If religion's influence on willpower is taken to explain its relationship to self- regulation, then it is crucial to understand the extent to which willpower is necessary for regulation.

Fortunately, McCullough and Carter's (2013) review suggests that

religion's relationship to self-regulation may occur through implicit or automatic processes, not simply through effortful inhibition. This suggestion draws from an

earlier theoretical review from Koole and colleagues (2010). The basic argument is that rather than fostering an effortful inhibition of impulses, religion may lead to a mode of efficient and flexible implicit self-regulation. These theorists are using Kuhl's (2000; Kuhl & Fuhrmann,1998) framework of regulation, which distinguishes implicit regulation as akin to an inner democracy that organizes and integrates various automatic psychological processes, from explicit control, which is like an internal dictatorship consciously and effortfully inhibiting other processes. Koole and colleagues (2010) draw from this distinction to suggest that such implicit modes of regulation would allow religious individuals to act in accord with high standards while maintaining a high emotional well-being that would otherwise be taxed by inhibitory efforts. Theoretically this association between religious engagement and implicit regulation is well motivated, but how might this influence occur?

As an explanation, Koole and colleagues note how religion is oriented towards the whole person, not just specific thoughts or behaviors (2010, p. 97). This suggests that religious values are holistic and thorough in their range,