The increased involvement of non-state actors in policy making in China can be traced back to former President Jiang Zemin’s call for “consultative democracy” in 1991 and the 17th Party
Congress (2007) specification that all national policies must be deliberated in the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (He & Warren, 2011). One explanation for this is that administrations in China do not have enough resources and information to rely on “command” and therefore have to resort to deliberation. Factors that drive this change include market based development, the increasing size of the middle class and their rising political demands, as well as social issues, such as inequalities. Deliberation can be used to manage rising social demands and it has therefore been describes as a tool to “co-opt dissent and maintain social order” (Ibid, p.281). He and Warren (Ibid, p.271) refer to this phenomenon as “authoritarian deliberation”, defined a system in which “problems of governance in complex, multi-actor, high-information, high-resistance environments may provide elites with incentives to rely on deliberation in the absence of democratic empowerments”.
The conversion of government departments into companies has been followed by a shift of power, knowledge and expertise from bureaucracies to enterprises, which has left many policy making institutions “paper tigers” (Rosen & Houser, 2007). Large corporations (in particular SOEs) have a pronounced influence over agenda setting and often have their own policy and research institutes that are regularly consulted (Meidan et al, 2009; Tsang & Kolk, 2010). At the same time, the state also maintains control over the SOEs. As ownership of SOEs is exercised by the State Owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC), top-positions within the SOEs are appointed by the Ministry of Personnel (MOP) that broadly represents the interests of the CPC (Rosen & Houser, 2007). For example, national oil firms have campaigned fiercely for protection from market based price setting, which removes their cost burdens and allows a high production to continue (Ibid). In 2008, an attempt to create a new energy ministry was resisted by a number of large energy SOEs, apparently because the centralization of power would have limited their scope of influence (Tsang & Kolk, 2010). Private business have gained power since they were accepted in the CPC and accepted as consultative bodies, although they have not moved far towards deliberate political mobilization (Tsai, 2007).
Key think tanks and research centres are regularly consulted in environmental policy making processes. Dumbaugh and Martin (2011) observe that these organizations in part were established to provide officials with professional advice, analysis and assessments in complex policy issues. Organizations that tend to be involved in energy policy are the Development Research Centre, operating under the State Council, and the NDRC Energy Research Institute (CAS) (Meidan et al, 2009). As these institutions are based directly under the State Council and the NDRC, they operate in line with the political inclination of the upper leadership. Academic institutes and universities (e.g. Tsinghua University and Beijing University) are often involved as well (Meidan et al, 2009). Although the universities are formally independent, CPC agendas influence their research by providing funding and guidance for their activities (Meidan et al, 2009).
The position of semi-independent research organizations and think tanks is debated. It has been argued that central level think tanks are in a strategic position to influence policy directions by
67
working from within the system (Francesch-Huidobro & Mai, 2012). For example, in the formulation of energy policy under the leadership of Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao, the Development Research Centre of the State Council and the NDRC Energy Research Institute were instrumental (Median et al, 2009). Government owned NGOs (GONGOs) have, on the other hand, been described as social groups co-opted by the government in order to perform functions on behalf of the state (Wu, 2003). These groups have sometimes, unintentionally, gained positions of influence over environmental policy, as a form of stand in for green grassroots movements, but often remain vessels of the party (Ibid).
Green NGOs only emerged in the 1990s in China, but some environmental organizations are now important in mobilization of public opinion (Ho, 2007). Environmental NGOs are among the most powerful in China’s emerging civil society and the number of environmental organizations registered as “social organizations” has grown quickly (Cui, 2008). A number of environmental NGOs have begun to take an active stance in policy processes. In recent years, some organizations have engaged in campaigns and lobbying, and in some instances, blocked policy options (Meidan et al, 2009). Other organizations have provided open letters calling for more stringent law enforcement, better information disclosure, and public participation, as well as openly opposed projects (Zhan & Tang, 2013). Green NGOs have contributed to climate campaigns, such as the Green Commuting Network program run by China Association for NGO Cooperation (CANGO) and Environmental Defense Fund (EDF), which have encouraged public transport and restricted car use (Schroder, 2011). As mentioned in Chapter 1, China’s new Environmental Protection Law (2015) recognizes green NGOs as important actors, especially through their potential to protect public interest (Xinhua, 2014).
At the same time, activities of green organizations and media are tightly controlled by the government (Ho, 2007). Many green movements have a weak grassroots connection, poor organizational capacity, lack of local funding, difficulties related to legal registration, and avoid sensitive political issues such as consequences and victims of pollution (Lu, 2007; Zhan & Tang, 2013). Following on Diamond’s categorization of types of activities that NGOs can engage in (express ideas; exchange information; achieve collective goals; make demands on the state; improve the functioning of the state; and hold state officials accountable), Tang and Zhan (2008) find that only the first three are usually available to Chinese environmental NGOs. The most common activities are educational programs and non-controversial nature conservation projects; NGOs operating with foreign funding are particularly careful of avoiding sensitive projects (Zhan & Tang, 2013). In recent years, the room to spread information through online forums has been limited and the websites of some environmental NGOs shut down (Zhan & Tang, 2013).
Pressure from the public is indirectly contributing to placing environmental issues higher on the political agenda (Lo & Leung, 2000). The unearthing of scandals, such as soil pollution that caused injury and death, creates anger and frustration in the population (He, 2014; China Daily, 2016). Environmental related “mass incidents” (which is how the communist party chooses to describe protests and demonstrations) have been increasing with about 30% every year since around 2005 (WCT, 2012; Zhang, 2014). Environmental issues are cited as the leading cause behind civil unrest and a main factor behind demonstrations and public uprisings. Growing environmental awareness of the expanding middle class is thought to contribute to this trend (Duggan, 2013; Bloomberg, 2014).
Finally, foreign organizations are involved in shaping policy on a national level. An example is capacity building for the establishment of China’s emission trading scheme, which among other elements has involved bilateral cooperation between GIZ and the NDRC through knowledge and experience exchange, for example through workshops (GIZ, 2016). Chinese NGOs are participating in international conferences, which can function as platforms for information sharing in relation to policy development (Schroder, 2011). Chinese organizations participating in transnational networks can, moreover, introduce new climate policy elements into Chinese politics (Schroeder, 2008). Sharing of scientific information (knowledge and
68
arguments) between international and domestic epistemic communities, and informal information sharing with political decision makers, are mechanisms through which this is realized (Ibid).