Perspectiva transfeminista en la musicología

Brezhnev died in November 1982, leaving behind an aged, stagnant political leadership. The politburo was laden with his contemporaries and it was generally felt that the status quo would continue with the appointment of a new Soviet leader. People were somewhat surprised when 68-year-old Yuri Andropov, former KGB leader and Central Committee member, became the new head of the USSR. The final Brezhnev years had been marked by the frequent absences of its leader, who was ill and weakened and seemed increasingly to rely on his protégé Konstantin Chernenko; most insiders felt that Chernenko would be the successor to Brezhnev. However, Andropov somehow managed to outmanoeuver him.

Although those outside of the Soviet Union may have expected policies to remain much the same, Andropov did have some ideas for change. He charged many in the Brezhnev camp with corruption and attempted to negate the “stability of cadres” in favor of more

accountability, in an attempt to improve productivity. He made public the facts of economic stagnation and proposed a solution: people needed to work harder and increase individual productivity. He tried to put into place policies according to which those “illegally absent”

from work would be arrested, so that the Soviet citizenry would have a carrot and a stick to work harder. In 1983, he shut down much of the Soviet space program in an attempt to save money and slow the accelerating foreign debt.

Politically, Andropov tried to remove Brezhnev’s followers (and Chernenko’s supporters) and replace them with a new group of nomenklatura loyal to Andropov and more likely to promote changes needed in the stagnant Soviet system. In particular, he promoted younger Party members to the politburo, and with the help of the emerging Mikhail Gorbachev he tried to replace the elder Party members at the regional level, too. Gorbachev was strengthened by Andropov’s tenure as head of the Soviet state, as he gained a loyal following in spite of Soviet agricultural failures.

To the outside world, the Andropov period was marked by a

continuation of the foreign problems that had begun under Brezhnev.

The situation in Afghanistan, which Andropov had instigated by insisting on a Soviet invasion in 1979, deteriorated and was the main

Nomenklatura Political elites in Soviet society who held positions of power via the Communist Party.

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source of discontent with the government at this time. Poland was under martial law in the Andropov period, and the Soviets

unequivocally backed Wojciech Jaruzelski in his suppression of opposition movements and continued loyalty to the Warsaw Pact.

The already poor relations with the United States were worsened in September 1983, when Soviets shot down a Korean Airlines flight that had strayed into Soviet airspace, killing all 269 people on board.

The Soviets were the first on the crash scene and appropriated the black box, all the while maintaining that they had been provoked by the KAL plane.

In late 1983, Andropov stopped appearing in public due to poor health. In sources later released, it is clear that he intended for Gorbachev to be his successor. However, upon his death in 1984, Andropov was succeeded by Chernenko, who proved to be a very short-lived head of state. This was the Brezhnev generation’s last assertion of their leadership over the state. Chernenko was largely a figurehead who was seen as holding the Soviet Union steady in preparation for a transition to a different level of leadership.

There were very few changes in the Chernenko period. Domestic and foreign policies remained the same, as the gerontocracy spent its last days in charge of the USSR. An increasingly frail Chernenko relied on his deputy, Gorbachev, to chair meetings and make his ideas known. It was his death in March 1985 that marked the real changes in the Soviet regime and signified the end of the Brezhnev era.

Gerontocracy A form of rule in which the leadership of a country is signifi cantly older than the majority of the adult population and in which a small cadre governs the rest. This is not necessarily due to policy but because those who come from the ruling elite are of one generation.

Stability

To give people in the USSR a sense of stability, Brezhnev introduced the concept of “stability of cadres”. Apply this concept to another entity—be it political, economic or educational (you could use your school, for example). How could this help that entity? How could it harm that entity? Do you think this is a good policy?

Activity:

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Source A

Extracts from a speech published in Pravda on

25 September 1968, popularly known as the Brezhnev Doctrine.

The peoples of the socialist countries and Communist parties certainly do have and should have freedom for determining the ways of advance of their respective countries.

However, none of their decisions should damage either socialism in their country or the fundamental interests of other socialist countries, and the whole working class movement, which is working for socialism.

This means that each Communist Party is responsible not only to its own people, but also to all the socialist countries, to the entire Communist movement. Whoever forgets this, in stressing only the independence of the Communist Party, becomes one-sided. He deviates from his international duty.

… The sovereignty of each socialist country cannot be opposed to the interests of the world of socialism, of the world revolutionary movement. …

It is from these same positions that they reject the leftist, adventurist conception of “exporting revolution”, and of

“bringing happiness” to other peoples. …

The weakening of any of the links in the world system of socialism directly affects all the socialist countries, which cannot look indifferently upon this.

Source B

Extract from Memorandum on protocol no. 149 of the meeting of the politburo (CC CPSU), on 12 April 1979.

It concerns Soviet policy regarding Afghanistan prior to direct military intervention by the USSR.

Our future policy in connection with the situation in Afghanistan:

1 To continue to support the leadership of the DRA [Democratic Republic of Afghanistan] in improving the combat efficiency and political awareness of the Afghan army, ensuring its loyalty and dedication to the revolutionary leadership, and in strengthening and improving the efficiency of the security organs, including the border patrol. …

2 As much as is possible, to examine and solve problems connected with provided economic assistance to Afghanistan, especially that which would accelerate and strengthen the political position of the revolutionary-democratic regime in the country. To

advise the Afghan leadership on developing the principal sectors of the economy which would strengthen the productive capacity of the country, resolve social problems, and provide employment to the population.

3 In contacts with the leadership of the DRA at all levels to always emphasize the importance of widening the political base which supports the party and the government. The importance of the consecutive implementation of the planned reforms, such as land reform, should be instilled in the leaders of the DRA.

This has to be done carefully, devoting essential attention to the political and ideological side of reform.

For example, the peasants should be convinced that they are getting the land only because of the revolution and will lose it if they will not protect the revolutionary authority. Similar explanations should be made in cases of other socio-economic reforms.

To widen the political base of the PDPA, the Afghan leadership should be made to understand that it is essential to gradually create electoral organs, yet, of course, the leading role of the party should be maintained and strengthened in the state and political structure of the country. They should also understand that it is advisable to develop and enact a constitution which will secure the democratic rights of the people and regulate the activity of the state organs.

4 It should be emphasized to the Afghan leadership that as the party ranks grow numerically, it is crucial to maintain the unity of the party leadership and membership. They should also be reminded about the advisability of collective decision-making on the most important issues along party and state lines. The People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan and the leadership of DRA should be given practical assistance in establishing the party organization, spreading mass information, and preparing party and state cadres.

5 To continue to draw the attention of the Afghan leadership to the necessity of carrying out appropriate work among the Muslim clergy of the country in order to fractionalize it and reduce the influence of reactionary Muslim leaders on the people. This influence could be diminished by encouraging religious freedom and demonstrating that the new power does not persecute the clergy as a class, but only punishes those who act against the revolutionary system.

6 The DRA leaders should be convinced of the necessity of the introduction and strict observance of law and order, based on revolutionary legality, as well as the

Source analysis

The following sources relate to the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan in the Brezhnev era.

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necessity of a more reasonable approach to the use of repressive measures. This does not mean, however, that repressive measures should not be used against true infidels or those who engage in active

counterrevolutionary activity. A person’s fate should not be decided on the basis of circumstantial and unverifiable evidence, or verdict by two- and three-man commissions, without a true investigation and trial.

This applies both to party and military cadres.

7 Considering the importance of personal contacts in communicating our views and thoughts on the above questions to the DRA leadership, visits on various levels should be practiced on a more regular basis in order to normalize the situation in Afghanistan.

9 To help Afghan friends conduct political work among the people, including radio propaganda, which due to the high percentage of illiteracy plays a special role in Afghanistan. In our propaganda concerning

Afghanistan, the traditional friendship and wide base of mutually beneficial cooperation between our two countries should be emphasized. This relationship not only exists today, but will continue to develop in the future. The achievements in socio-economic

development of the Central Asian republics during the Soviet period should be described in a wide and clearly understandable manner; these republics should be used as an example to demonstrate the falsity of assertions concerning repression of religious expression, the Muslim faith included.

Concrete proposals on the above positions, as well as any other measures, will be included as needed.

Please review these materials.

A. Gromyko. Y. Andropov. D. Ustinov. B.Ponomarev.

April 1, 1979

Source: Documents on the Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan.

E-Dossier, no. 4. http://www.wilsoncenter.org/topics/

pubs/e-dossier_4.pdf.

Source C

Extract from protocol no. 200 of the session of the politburo of the CC CPSU of 19 June 1980.

Measures on Afghanistan.

1 To approve Comrade Brezhnev’s proposals on the immediate measures on Afghanistan.

To proceed with the assumption that the Soviet Union will continue to provide political, military, and economic assistance to Afghanistan in order to help ensure the national independence and territorial integrity of Afghanistan, to strengthen the people’s democratic regime and the leading role of the People’s Democratic Party.

2 To consider expedient to withdraw several military units whose presence in Afghanistan now is not necessary.

To charge the Ministry of Defense of the USSR to make a decision on the number and composition of the troops to be withdrawn and on the time frame and the order of their withdrawal from Afghanistan.

To charge Comrade Andropov to coordinate the issues concerning the withdrawal of some Soviet military units from Afghanistan with B. Karmal.

3 To use the withdrawal of some Soviet military units from Afghanistan as leverage for demanding that Pakistan and Iran cease their hostile actions against the DRA and to stop sending interventions from their territory into Afghanistan.

Politburo CC CPSU

Source: Documents on the Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan.

E-Dossier, no. 4. http://www.wilsoncenter.org/topics/

pubs/e-dossier_4.pdf.

Source D

Extract from US president Jimmy Carter’s address to the nation on the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. It was delivered on 4 January 1980.

The Soviets must understand our deep concern. We will delay opening of any new American or Soviet consular facilities, and most of the cultural and economic exchanges currently under consideration will be deferred. Trade with the Soviet Union will be severely restricted.

I have decided to halt or to reduce exports to the Soviet Union in three areas that are particularly important to them. These new policies are being and will be coordinated with those of our allies.

I’ve directed that no high technology or other strategic items will be licensed for sale to the Soviet Union until further notice, while we revise our licensing policy.

Fishing privileges for the Soviet Union in United States waters will be severely curtailed.

The 17 million tons of grain ordered by the Soviet Union in excess of that amount which we are committed to sell will not be delivered. This grain was not intended for human consumption but was to be used for building up Soviet livestock herds. …

These actions will require some sacrifice on the part of all Americans, but there is absolutely no doubt that these actions are in the interest of world peace and in the interest of the security of our own Nation, and they are also compatible with actions being taken by our own major trading partners and others who share our deep concern about this new Soviet threat to world stability.

Although the United States would prefer not to withdraw from the Olympic games scheduled in Moscow this summer, the Soviet Union must realize that its continued aggressive actions will endanger both the participation of athletes and the travel to Moscow by spectators who would normally wish to attend the Olympic games.

185 Along with other countries, we will provide military

equipment, food, and other assistance to help Pakistan defend its independence and its national security against the seriously increased threat it now faces from the north.

The United States also stands ready to help other nations in the region in similar ways. …

The response of the international community to the Soviet attempt to crush Afghanistan must match the gravity of the Soviet action.

With the support of the American people and working with other nations, we will deter aggression, we will protect our Nation’s security, and we will preserve the peace. The United States will meet its responsibilities.

Source: President Jimmy Carter, "Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan:

Address to the Nation." Primary Documents at www.techtrain.org.

Source E

Extract from a scholarly journal that includes analyses of actions taken by military forces throughout the world. In this case, an officer in the US army is analyzing Soviet mistakes in their war against Afghanistan.

The Soviet leadership completely miscalculated the political and military situation in Afghanistan. They were unable to anticipate the anti-Soviet reaction that was generated in the United States and around the world. They failed to understand their enemy and the power Islamic Nationalism had on the will of the Afghani people to endure extreme hardships. They were unable or unwilling to prevent the Mujahideen from operating from sanctuaries in Pakistan.

Source: McGhee, Major James T. 14 June 2008. “The Soviet Experience in Afghanistan: Lessons Learned” in Military History Online. http://www.militaryhistoryonline.com/20thcentury/articles/

sovietexperience.aspx.

Source F

Photograph showing Soviet forces leaving Afghanistan in 1989.

Source: Timeline: Afghanistan. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_

asia/1162108.stm; accessed 5 December 2008.

Source-based questions

1 What is the message in Source F?

2 Is President Carter’s statement of American actions in Source D consistent with the US policy of containment? Support your answer using your own knowledge.

3 How far do Sources B and C support the policy expressed in Source A?

4 With reference to origins and purpose, assess the value and limitations of Sources B and E.

5 Using these sources and your own knowledge, explain why and with what results the USSR became involved in Afghanistan.

TOK link

The USSR launched an invasion that led to a ten-year intervention in Afghanistan. The war was very unpopular, even though knowledge of casualties was limited in the Brezhnev era.

How did the Soviet citizens know the war wasn’t going well?

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When Mikhail Gorbachev came to power in 1985, he was the third successor in less than three years. The first four leaders of the USSR governed for over 60 years collectively; the final three would be in power for less than a decade. The Soviet state had been stagnant for too long and there was rising dissent. Gorbachev, himself a member of the Soviet nomenklatura, recognized that it was time for much needed reforms to try and bring the USSR back to a level competitive with the West and an emerging China.

Marking a trend in the new Soviet leadership, Gorbachev was relatively young and began his career outside of Moscow. Somewhat unusual for the time and place, he was trained as a lawyer and then was elected a Party member. He became a regional Party official in Stavropol (Caucasus) and in 1978 he was elected to the Central Committee and became the secretary responsible for agriculture. In 1980 Brezhnev made him a full politburo member at the age of 49, in an organization where the average age was over 70.

Gorbachev attracted the attention and support of Andropov, who had also felt the need for changes in Soviet society but knew that they would not be put into place during his tenure. Following

Chernenko’s death, Soviet Foreign Minister Andre Gromyko nominated Gorbachev for the position of General Secretary, and he was duly elected by the politburo, whose membership was in a period of transition.

Domestic policies—glasnost, perestroika and