Perspectivas de desarrollo económico mundial

In 1998, Zhu Rongji was appointed Chinese Premier.114 _{He attended a national university} consultation meeting at the Great Hall of the People and delivered a speech to university presidents and party secretaries. During that conference, many observed the then Education Minister Chen Zhili slowly walked to Zhu Rongji on the stage and handed him a note. After the discussion session ended, Zhu spoke assertively yet positively: ‘Just now Comrade Chen Zhili handed over a handwritten note to me, and it read “Dear Premier, please give some support to education” … I would like to promise an annual increase of 1% from the central financial budgetary expenditure for education.’ This surprising move was considered a significant annual growth and was warmly welcomed by universities.

In the Chinese political system, top party-state leaders, including the CPC Politburo and its Standing Committee, hold paramount decision-making power. They may overturn and overrule any established policies and procedures as well as authorise new initiatives. The Chinese leaders’ supreme authority is evident in education policy areas. It is well documented that a number of most significant national science and education programs in China were often associated with individual national leaders’ personal decisions. Examples include Deng Xiaoping and the National High-tech R&D Programme (or Programme 863) (MoST, 2010b), Jiang Zemin and Project 985 (Min & Wen, 2010; MoE, 2011a; Guobing Zhang, 2010) and the Knowledge Innovation Project (KIP) (CAS, 1998a, 2012), as well as Hu Jintao and the 2011 Scheme (MoF, 2014c). Many university leaders I spoke to suggested that the top leaders’ personal endorsement of these programs was vital for their successful implementation. The case of the drastic university enrolment expansion in 1999 is a good example of how the Politburo overturned existing education policies developed by the MoE. The Politburo authorised the State Council to abandon MoE’s standardised education policymaking procedures and immediately increase college enrolment, with the political goal to maintain social stability and economic growth, reduce unemployment rate, and strengthen its regime during financial crisis (Q. Wang, 2014, p. 151).

Such intervention on education policies from top leaders was repeated in 2013. A university’s dean of undergraduate studies explained to me:

This year [2013] [Chinese Premier] Li Keqiang suddenly asked all national universities to revise the existing university recruitment numbers for students from western regions, that was an increase of 30,000 student quota for the western regions. This directive came through long after the MoE had already developed and finalised its 2013 national student recruitment plan … It is a governance model ruled by men. In this case, it is all about a political agenda and equity … It is a huge decision … It is difficult for the MoE or universities to change or influence big decisions like this, but it is an ‘easy as pie’ matter for the national leaders such as premier and vice premiers.

As another example, in 2009 universities and a number of key central organs, including the MoF and MoE, jointly proposed and endorsed a new policy on deregulating postgraduate tuition fees. However, then Premier Wen Jiabao refused to sign it off. The progress of the policy was blocked and its final implementation was held up by Wen until after the end of his term.

Universities recognise the critical importance of interacting with top leaders. Having connections to top leaders and their support can be a game changer during the process of lobbying—as it opens up all opportunities and maximise chances of success. Through networking with top leaders and seeking their attention on significant, urgent or challenging policy matters, university actors can take advantage of the supreme decision power and topmost authority to receive special treatment and enjoy bureaucratic shortcuts and immediate results.

Chinese scholars have provided evidence of such situations. Pan suggests that the personal relations between the Tsinghua leadership and national leaders created opportunities for the university to affect the government’s decisions, helped Tsinghua break the restrictions and constraints of national policy, and increased its capacity to make autonomous policies in pursuit of its own goals (Pan, 2007, pp. 138-139). As mentioned in Chapter 3, leaders of Tsinghua and PKU directly lobbied top leaders (Jiang Zemin and Li Lanqing) and successfully proposed an unprecedented national university funding policy, Project 985, which allowed them to fulfil their ambition to build world-class universities (Min & Wen, 2010, pp. 114-116; Guobing Zhang, 2010, pp. 65-67).

A vice university president shared with me his experience:

In the face of endless issues caused by the ‘countersigning system’ and the complexity of central politics, universities are often frustrated and exhausted. Every day we have

to deal with different views and attitudes from various central agencies, and it seems to take us forever to get a conclusion, decision, closure or final approval. We have found that the attention and intervention from a top leader can quickly resolve these issues, like a charm!

Due to its sensitive nature and personal concerns, my interviewees appeared discreet when sharing details of specific examples about how they interacted with national leaders, whom they normally targeted and what policies or decisions they influenced. However, they assured me repeatedly that such strategies have worked well for them. One interviewee said:

In the Chinese central governance, there is one top leader for each policy portfolio and policy area. When speaking about significant reforms, large policies or institutional changes requiring several layers of consideration and approval, the final decision ultimately comes down to the individual top leaders. It is vital to engage with and seek support from that particular person.

Interviewees from leading research universities explained that they sometimes directly reach senior officials and leaders and seek their support through informal contacts (e.g., alumni network and personal guanxi) and private interactions (e.g., private chats and sending special personal letters). They also indirectly lobby them, such as through voicing their opinions at the ‘neican’ (内参, known as ‘Internal reference’ or guonei dongtai qingyang 国内动态清样), an internally circulated paper that is read by high-ranking officials.

According to my interviewees, in 2004, Tsinghua and PKU prepared a joint letter on the future of Project 985, which was signed by 20 prestigious academics and professors (ten professors from each university), and submitted to then Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao. During a more recent lobbying attempt for a new policy proposal for a joint PhD program in biology, a number of influential professors and overseas returnees sent a jointly signed letter to a CPC Politburo member and Chinese Vice Premier (for education) Liu Yandong, pleading her to grant the two universities a special policy green light for a new ‘policy trial’. They succeeded.

One university leader shared with me his insights:

Based on my experience and observation, many things that froze for a period of time saw a sudden breakthrough once they received the highest level’s attention. It helped universities cut through layers of bureaucratic procedures and barriers. Once the top- level decision-makers provided personal views and instructions, the relevant central organs would quickly organise themselves and reach a consensus, leading to immediate results and actions. The most effective lobbying we have ever done and cannot restrain

from doing over and over again is the strategy of ‘reaching the top’ (zhijie zhaolingdao 直接找领导).

It is important to note that not all universities have the capacity to ‘reach the top’. Even for the elite universities that often have special connections with and access to the national leaders, this strategy has limitations. ‘Requesting top-level attention and support’, said one university leader, ‘is only saved for critical, challenging and urgent matters. You don’t want to overuse such relationships and invaluable power.’ I illustrate further how universities develop their ties and interact with national leaders in the next chapter.

Concluding remarks

This chapter presents some outstanding and peculiar characteristics of university lobbying practices in China. One striking finding is the contradiction between the prevalent, important practices of lobbying and the contentious language around lobbying: they do it but do not say it.

Lobbying is a de facto common practice. Chinese national universities are so familiar and accustomed to lobbying that they see it as a most significant, regular and effective component of university–government interactions and is of extreme importance to the university sector. Nevertheless, youshui, the Chinese word of lobbying, is still politically and socially sensitive, lacks legitimacy and bears negative connotations which inhibit the formalisation of its practices. Scholars suggest that lobbying is not institutionalised in China and lobby groups often face legitimacy issues (Cheng, 2006, pp. 44,47-48; Cheng et al., 2003, p. 63; Kennedy, 2009, pp. 213-214; Yue Wang, 2008, p. 40), and this includes the higher education sector (S. He, 2009, p. 8). As Scott Kennedy suggests, this situation to a large extent reflects a deep dilemma for the government: although the central leadership wants to appear more consultative on public policy, it fears the political consequences of permitting greater social activism (Kennedy, 2009, p. 213). The higher education sector is not an outlier in this pattern. On one side, the government needs increasing input and feedback from universities, informally accommodates and tolerate lobbying practice, and is indeed subject to influence; on the other, it is more comfortable with top-down communications and dislikes appearing vulnerable or subject to influence.

Consequently, universities rely on various informal tactics and private interactions with the officialdom. University executives, especially those whose careers are controlled by the state, generally adopt covert, cautious and low-key approaches when dealing with government officials, and adjust their language and desensitise their actions accordingly. They hardly ever label their lobbying behaviour as ‘an attempt to influence the government’ to mitigate the

risks of confrontation. They tend to use alternative, non-confrontational, neutral expressions to describe youshui, such as ‘participation in policy discussions’, ‘providing policy feedback’, and ‘bottom-up reporting’, which reflect legitimate policy interactions, or recall acceptable bureaucratic practices.

In addition, as another salient feature, lobbying in this sector is highly fragmented. Universities mostly lobby in an individual, self-focused, and specific issue-based form as opposed to the interest alignment and collective actions that I portrayed in the last chapter, even for a range of important issues of collective interest which require cooperative and joint actions by individuals.

Direct lobbying remains the norm and main course of action because the state is especially wary about a collective voice and united policy initiative from universities that may lead to undesirable threat and challenge to its political authority, thus treats university lobby groups as an illegitimate form of policy communication and restrains their collective political activities. It is also partially due to the conflicted priorities, self-interested focus and competitions

amongst universities, as well as the fragmentation of the central bureaucracy that complicates the sponsorships and government reporting of universities. The political factors seem more predominant than the other reasons, because university leaders have made serious attempts to lobby collectively on some policy issues but pulled back due to concerns on the potential political consequences.

Nevertheless, although formal coalitions remain exceptional, universities developed an alternative solution within the confined authoritarian political and regulatory environment: they may ‘coordinate’ their lobbying efforts by acting simultaneously and separately on an important matter of common interest and consensus. This means talking to the same office at a similar time on the same issue with the same position, rather than taking concrete, joint action. Such an ‘alternative’ strategy avoids ‘political risks’ and circumvents the political constraints against formal organisation and alignment of interests. Although it can help achieving their goals, such a custom of ‘coordinated’ lobbying is unlikely to evolve into a formalised form of allies and organisation.

This behaviour also demonstrates that despite their various strategies and activities of different natures, universities still largely act within the perceived rules and boundaries of statesociety interactions and remain cautious not to push the sensitive buttons of the government.

Furthermore, universities’ capacity to successfully produce opportunities and exercise

political environment, and how well they identify the crucial central decision-makers (various state actors and targets) and exploit the fissures within the authoritarian system. Universities constantly monitor the central bureaucracy to have a clear sight of opportunities and changes in the system.

Fragmentation, rivalry and hierarchy amongst central organs, and the supreme power of the top leaders are the most important characteristics of the central bureaucracy that universities try to exploit in the ‘Fragmented Authoritarianism’(FA) framework (Lieberthal & Lampton, 1992, pp. 2-24; Lieberthal & Oksenberg, 1988, p. 4).115 _{They identify and adjust their lobbying} targets and strategies based on internal power relationships in the central bureaucracy. For instance, they explore and interact with multiple agencies simultaneously to maximise resources and policy support due to the fragmentation and power rivalry. They access the top leadership to cut through the limitation of the bureaucratic structure and receive policy shortcuts due to the supreme power of the national leaders. They also go over the head of their supervisory MoE and reach out to other central bodies to improve the standing of education or help the MoE to overcome its weakness in the power hierarchy. By monitoring, adapting themselves to and penetrating the central bureaucratic system, universities have shown their capacity to influence the government’s decisions and effectively seek comparative advantages.

The universities’ lobbying experiences portrayed in Chapters 3 and 4 have demonstrated how universities strategically adapt what language to use, what matters to influence, when to act, who to network with, as well as how to share intelligence and experiences to overcome difficulties coming from formal collective activities. In this process, the political factors and regulatory environment, including the restrictive rules imposed on universities and the political power structure within the central bureaucracy, have a significant impact on universities’ positioning, choices and behaviour, including their lobbying targets, expressions, and both coordinated and uncoordinated actions as well as tactics. Universities shape their lobbying strategies and practices for specific policy issues or events based on their understanding and

115 _{The FA refers to a model for understanding policy process in the Chinese polity, including structural distribution}

of resources and authority; and processes of decision-making and policy implementation. The fragmented

authoritarianism model argues that authority below the very peak of the Chinese political system is fragmented and disjointed. The fragmentation is structurally based and has been enhanced by reform policies regarding procedures. The fragmentation, moreover, grew increasingly pronounced under the reforms beginning in the late 1970s (Lieberthal & Lampton, 1992, p. 8; Lieberthal & Oksenberg, 1988).

knowledge of the regulatory and political conditions, and their estimation and judgement of what works the best in this system for the contingents.

Meanwhile, by playing by the ‘rules of the game’ within the system to strategically influence specific policy issues and decisions/contingents (in either a coordinated or uncoordinated manner), universities have shown capacity to produce opportunities for certain elements of change, such as obtaining a competitive advantage, loosening up a specific regulatory constraint and attracting additional resources to the sector.

However, the game of lobbying is not an even playing field, as elite universities in general have much more capacity, resources and personal connections to effectively utilise those strategies in this central system than those smaller, lower-tiered institutions. Thus, the latter is largely disadvantaged in competition.

As a repository of scientific knowledge, social and political influence and connections, and as central players in delivering the national developmental strategy, would universities gain more influence and leverage in the governmental process? The next chapter examines the most significant aspects of the universities’ toolkit and tactics when adapting to this complex bureaucracy and lobbying government officials in various scenarios.

Chapter 5—Lobbying imperfect institutions: human