Cota de Elias

A review of the core documents and literature reveal that proliferation concerns are built upon a nation-state paradigm. The role of individual (non-governmental actors) were not considered threats for WMD terrorism and instead only referenced threats from nation-states resulting in war.149 _{Until very recently, the non-proliferation regime never} even considered non-state actors. However, with the advent of 9/11, the international community began to consider how to include elements to combat terrorism in the existing, and evolving norms. No multilateral regime before the PSI and Resolution 1540 directly addressed these crucial avenues by which WMD materials are traded. The matter was largely left to law enforcement and border patrol in individual nation-states.150

One of the first acknowledgements of terrorism as a security threat was in the 2002 National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction National Security Presidential Directive 17, (NSPD-17), which the president signed in September 2002.151 In it, the strategy stated “WMD (WMD)—nuclear, biological, and chemical,—in the presence of hostile states and terrorists represent one of the greatest security challenges facing the United States.”152 _{According to the strategy, the Bush Administration’s} approach to dealing with WMD rests upon “three pillars:” counterproliferation, nonproliferation, and WMD consequence management.153 _{In his statements, President} Bush said,

We will not permit the world’s most dangerous regimes and terrorists to threaten our Nation and our friends and allies with the world’s most destructive weapons.154

149 _{See as example, The Nonproliferation Treaty.}

150 _{Scott Shefloe, The Proliferation Security Initiative and United Nations Security Council Resolution}

1540: International Law and the World’s Recent Efforts to Combat the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction,” McGill University, Montreal, June 2008, 33.

151 _{White House, President George W. Bush, NSPD-17/HSPD 4 (unclassified version), National}

Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction, December 2002.

152 _{White House, President George W. Bush, The National Security Strategy of the United States of}

America, September 17, 2002.

153 _{2002 National Security Strategy.} 154 _Ibid.

F. 2010 NUCLEAR POSTURE REVIEW

Despite the language put forward in the Strategy to Combat WMD by the Bush Administration in September 2002, in the Nuclear Posture Review released just eight months before 9/11, declassified portions contained no mention of “preventing nuclear terrorism.”155 _{However, in 2010, the Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) released by the} Obama Administration places the prevention of nuclear terrorism and proliferation at the “top of the policy agenda.”156

In his April 2009 speech in Prague, President Obama highlighted 21st century nuclear dangers, declaring that to overcome these grave and growing threats, the United States will “seek the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons.”157 _The 2010 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) outlines the Administration’s approach to promoting the President’s agenda for reducing nuclear dangers and pursuing the goal of a world without nuclear weapons as he outlined in his 2009 speech in Prague. The NPR describes fundamental changes in the international security environment, and focuses on five key objectives of the U.S.’ nuclear weapons policies and posture.

• Preventing nuclear proliferation and nuclear terrorism

• Reducing the role of U.S. nuclear weapons in U.S. national security strategy

• Maintaining strategic deterrence and stability at reduced nuclear force levels

• Strengthening regional deterrence and reassuring U.S. allies and partners • Sustaining a safe, secure, and effective nuclear arsenal158

155 _{Micah Zenko and Michael Levi, “Three Steps to Reducing Nuclear Terrorism,” Christian Science}

Monitor, January 25, 2010. See also excerpts from the 2002 Nuclear Posture Review are available at

http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/policy/dod/npr.htm; J. D. Crouch, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy, “Special Briefing on the Nuclear Posture Review, U.S.

Department of Defense, January 9, 2002, http://www.defense.gov/Transcripts/Transcript.aspx?

TranscriptID=1108.

156 _{Department of Defense, 2010 Nuclear Posture Review, Forward by Robert Gates, U.S. Defense}

Secretary, i.

157 _{White House, “Remarks by President Barak Obama, Hradcany Square, Prague, Czech Republic.”} 158 _{Department of Defense, 2010 Nuclear Posture Review, April 6, 2010, iii–iv.}

The NPR reflects the President’s national security priorities and the supporting defense strategy objectives identified in the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review. Most importantly, for the first time, a national strategy clearly recognizes America’s nuclear arsenal, and the threat of nuclear terrorism are interconnected issues, and that unless proliferation trends are reversed, the likelihood of terrorists obtaining nuclear weapons increases, which indicates that it may mean that the manner in which the United States handles its nuclear weapons will have to change. As is stated in the 2010 NPR:

As President Obama has made clear, today’s most immediate and extreme danger is nuclear terrorism. Al Qaeda and their extremist allies are seeking nuclear weapons. We must assume they would use such weapons if they managed to obtain them. The vulnerability to theft or seizure of vast stocks of such nuclear materials around the world, and the availability of sensitive equipment and technologies in the nuclear black market, create a serious risk that terrorists may acquire what they need to build a nuclear weapon.159

For the first time, the United States explicitly stated its approach to preventing nuclear proliferation and nuclear terrorism to include three key elements. The first is to “seek to bolster the nuclear non-proliferation regime and its centerpiece, the NPT, by reversing the nuclear ambitions of North Korea and Iran, strengthening International Atomic Energy safeguards and enforcing compliance with them, impeding illicit nuclear trade, and promoting the peaceful uses of nuclear energy without increasing proliferation risks.” The second includes an acceleration of efforts to implement policies to secure all vulnerable nuclear materials worldwide in four years, and finally to strengthen arms control efforts—including the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, and negotiation of a verifiable Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty—as a means of “strengthening our ability to mobilize broad international support for the measures needed to reinforce the non-proliferation regime and secure nuclear materials worldwide.”160

Relative to goals specific to terrorism is the call for enhancing national and international capabilities to disrupt illicit proliferation networks and interdict smuggled

159 _{Department of Defense, 2010 Nuclear Posture Review, iv.} 160 _{Ibid., vi–vii.}

nuclear materials, and continuing to expand U.S. nuclear forensics efforts to improve the ability to identify the source of nuclear material used or intended for use in a terrorist nuclear explosive device. Also of note is the renewed commitment of the United States to hold any state, terrorist group, or other non-state actor fully accountable that supports or enables terrorist efforts to obtain or use weapons of mass destruction, whether by facilitating, financing, or providing expertise or safe haven for such efforts.161