PESO/TALLA (IMC) 2

Attitud

t is the constant aim and purpose of my Government to keep abreast of the times in every direction, so as to be worthy of their status as member of the League of Nations.”

es and aims of Siam’s League membership

1

This powerful statement made by King Va- jiravudh in his annual speech from the throne in 1923 summarizes the tre- mendous importance of League membership for the internationally-oriented Thai elite during the 1920s in a nutshell. Two years later, the king high- lighted another facet of Siam’s League membership in his speech from the throne, when he pointed out in the context of the League’s efforts to curb opium trafficking that “the League is now pursuing objects which would yield results at which we ourselves have, also, been aiming.”2 Ten years later, after a coup led by progressive civilian bureaucrats and military officers against the absolute monarchy, the new government of Siam issued a public policy statement in December 1932, in which it proclaimed, none less power- fully than King Vajiravudh in 1923: “As regards the League of Nations, the Government are fully alive to its importance and are always prepared to sup- port its activities.”3

I

As we have seen in the previous chapter, Siam became a founding member of the League of Nation as a result of its engagement in the First World War and its participation in the Paris Peace Conference. Siam’s objec- tives for League membership then changed over the following 26 years of the League’s existence. During the immediate post-war period the League was primarily a means for Siam to put pressure on Western powers to live up to the new ideals of international politics and revise their unequal treaties with Siam. As the League of Nations was gradually filled with life, the organiza- tion’s tasks expanded rapidly and so did Siam’s objectives in being a League member. The following chapters will show in detail how the League evolved from being a tool for Siam for regaining sovereignty into a force which in- duced changes in many areas of Siam’s development before the Second 1 _{TNA, Bangkok Times, 3 January 1923.}

2 _{TNA, Bangkok Times, 5 January 1925.} 3

World War and a forum for presenting the kingdom to the world community as a progressive and modern state.

Siam’s overall policy towards the League of Nations remained un- changed over time: to minimize obligations resulting from League member- ship by staying out of the limelight of international politician conflicts in Geneva as far as possible, but at the same time to maximize Siam’s benefits from League membership in social and technical policy areas. For Siam’s foreign policy makers the League of Nations was of great political impor- tance throughout the 1920s and most of the 1930s; Thai governments during this period were, to a large degree, willing to align or subordinate their own policies in certain fields under League initiatives. Opium policy, which was a key sector of the state budget with profound social impacts, featured very prominently in this regard. As everywhere in the world, the League lost credibility in Siam in the course of the 1930s, when member states aban- doned the multilateral experiment and reverted to traditional power politics and rearmament. By the time Luang Phibun tightened his grip on Thai poli- tics at the end of the 1930s, the League played only a minor role, before be- coming completely unimportant during the war years. After the end of the Second World War the League then suddenly became important once again as a legacy which Siam brought into play to gain membership in the new United Nations and to minimize retaliation for its declarations of war on Western states.

Thai diplomats used League membership repeatedly as a means to achieve the overriding goal of Thai foreign policy in the interwar period, the regaining of complete fiscal and juridical autonomy. Although the Paris Peace Conference after the end of the First World War had resulted only in the immediate cancellation of the unequal treaties with Germany and Austria- Hungary and in the revised treaty with the United States of 1920, Siam’s foreign policy objectives remained the same: abolishment of all unequal treaties. As Eldon James, who was Foreign Affairs Adviser to the Thai gov- ernment between 1918 and 1923 and strongly favoured Siam’s admission to the League, put it:

Siam felt that as a modern state, a member of the newly formed League of Nations, it had demonstrated both the desire and the ability to share fully in the life of the international community. A complete revision of the old treaty system was the next logical step.4

During the first General Assembly meeting of the League of Nations at Geneva in 1920, the three Thai delegates, Prince Charoon, Phraya Bibadh Kosha and Phraya Buri Navarasth (Chuan Singhaseni), gave a reception for delegates and members of the new League Secretariat to acquaint them with 4 _{Eldon R. James, ‘Siam in the Modern World’, Foreign Affairs, IX, 4 (1931), pp. 657-664,}

here p. 663; see also Pensri Duke, ‘Historical Perspective’, in Wiwat Mungkandi and Wil- liam Warren (eds), A Century and a Half of Thai-American Relations, Bangkok: Chulalong- korn University Press, 1982, pp. 1-57, here p. 52.

hitherto nearly unknown Siam. As the delegates reported to Prince Deva- wongse, the reception served the additional purpose of propagating Siam’s desire to rid itself of the unequal treaties, a purpose for which the delegates, by their own account, received much verbal support. Prince Charoon even had the opportunity to describe Siam’s staunch support for the League of Nations and desire for “collaboration of the small and great peoples [for] the salvation of the world” in an interview with the Journal de Genève.5 But Britain and France were slow to accept the rules they had themselves set. Only reluctantly did London and Paris enter into negotiations with Siam for new treaties along the American model. Thai officials, in turn, continued to remind their Western counterparts that unequal treaties were no longer com- patible with the new international system represented by the League. And they made this connection not only in general terms: in 1923, Prince Deva- wongse wrote to the British Minister and explained that Britain’s extraterrito- rial rights seriously limited Siam’s ability to live up to its international com- mitments regarding opium control. To the embarrassment of the British For- eign Office, Prince Devawongse suggested that Britain give up its extraterri- torial rights so that Siam could enforce international agreements to which Britain was party.6 At the same time, however, Prince Devawongse in Bang- kok and Prince Charoon in Paris and Geneva were realistic in their expecta- tions as to what the young League of Nations could do with regard to treaty revision. They understood perfectly well, at least from the second League Assembly in 1921 onwards, that it would be counterproductive to openly put the issue of treaty revision before the League, as this would have certainly alienated the Western Powers.7

It was in this context of realpolitik that officials in Bangkok read article XIX of the League’s covenant, under which the “Assembly may from time to time advise the reconsideration by Members of the League of treaties which have become inapplicable” and, accordingly, did not put their hope in evok- ing it. In addition, the Ministry of Justice in Bangkok was informed by the League Secretariat in February 1923 informally that “it was the opinion of the Director of the Legal Section that Siam could only obtain revision of her treaties by negotiating with the other signatory parties, and that the League had nothing to do with the matter”.8 Ultimately, Siam’s League membership provided additional leverage, which, together with the precedent of the treaty 5

See Report on the First General Assembly of the League of Nations, dated 10 January B.E. 2463 (1921), TNA, KT 96.1.3/2. A transcript of the mentioned interview on 16 December 1920 is included in the report.

6 _{Greg to Lord Curzon, 13 April 1923, Enclosure: Prince Devawongse to Greg, 10 April 1923,}

Doc. 159 and 160 (F 1504/421/87), BDFA, Part II, Series E, vol. 49, p. 198ff.

7

See Report by Prince Charoon and Phraya Bibadh to Prince Devawongse on the Second General Assembly of the League of Nations, dated 17 November B.E. 2464 (1921), TNA, KT 96.1.3/4.

8 _{Leith to Chuen Charuvastra, 16 February 1923, LNA, R 1339/22/26180/26180. For the text}

of the Covenant of the League of Nations see LNA, League of Nations, Official Journal, February 1920, p. 3ff.

with the United States of December 1920, led to renegotiated treaties with Great Britain, France, Germany, Japan and eight further European states during the mid-1920s.9

As is the case in most countries at most times, foreign policy was not of general public concern in pre-war Siam; it was the domain of a small elite of society. Among this elite, the League of Nations was highly important as a cornerstone of Siam’s foreign policy during most of the two interwar dec- ades. An interesting source sheds light on this attitude; in 1924, the British Foreign Office enquired across the globe on attitudes of countries towards the League of Nations, also in Bangkok. The report which the British legation sent to London in reply, entitled “Report on the Attitude of the Siamese Gov- ernment and People towards the League of Nations”, highlights the enthusi- asm with which the creation of the League was welcomed in Siam. The re- port explains that for Siam it was not only the guarantee of rights and inde- pendence of small nations, for which the League stood, but the fact that it meant that Siam was placed “more or less on a footing of equality with the Great Powers”, which generated this enthusiasm. Although, the report con- tinued, Thai policy makers were somewhat more sober in their expectations four years later, they continued to value and support the League. The report went on to quote at length a public speech made by Prince Varn, a prominent diplomat, which he gave to a large audience at Chulalongkorn University on 7 August 1924 and in which he emphasized the collective security system and the new, open form of diplomacy and information exchange, which the League was propagating. Prince Varn also pointed to the League’s limitations and stressed that it had no armed forces at its disposal to enforce decisions, but could merely expel a member from the international community. The British Minister Johns considered Prince Varn’s speech with its enthusiastic support of the League’s ideals to reflect the general sentiment among the elite in Bangkok and, at the same time, pointed out to his superiors in London that it was inappropriate to speak of a general public opinion in Siam:

The peasants are for the most part illiterate. There is practically no middle class, and few Siamese, even those of the highest rank, take any interest in foreign political or matters generally considered of world-wide interest unless brought into contact with them in the course of their official duties.

This absence of a sizeable, politically interested public in Siam was also the reason why, other than in most Western League member states and in Japan and China, no Thai League of Nations society was every founded to promote the League’s ideals and work in Siam. “However”, Johns summed 9 _{The authoritative study on treaty revision in the 1920s is Oblas, Siam’s Efforts; a collection}

of the revised treaties in English and French can be found in Francis B. Sayre (Phya Kalyan Maitri) (ed.), Siam: Treaties with Foreign Powers, 1920-1927, Bangkok: Royal Siamese Government, 1928; see also Arnold J. Toynbee, ‘1. The Liquidation of Foreign Extra- territorial Privileges in Siam. 2. The Revision of the Régime along the Frontier between Siam and the French Possession and Protectorates in Indo-China’, Survey of International Affairs, 1929, London: Oxford University Press, 1930, pp. 405-421.

up, “such public opinion as there is in Siam is certainly in favour of the League of Nations.”10

Twelve years later, in 1936, a British consular report evaluated attitudes of the Thai elite towards the League of Nations and came to the conclusion that Siam was, at this time, still a “loyal member of the League”, but that the League’s prestige had suffered from the failures over Japan’s invasion of Manchuria and Italy’s invasion of Ethiopia. The report also accurately judged that Luang Pradist Manudharm (Pridi Phanomyong), then Minister of Foreign Affairs, was the foremost champion of the League’s ideals of international cooperation and collective security among the governing elite in Bangkok.11

Luang Pradist gave a policy statement that same year, in which he underlined Siam’s “principle to maintain friendliness in our relations with all foreign powers” without favouring one country over another – a policy designed with a view of shaking off the final remnants of extraterritorial rights held by foreign powers in Siam.12

Siam’s policy towards major Western states in a League framework re- flected the kingdom’s general foreign policy priorities during the interwar years: general non-alignment with a bias towards Great Britain. Interestingly, Siam never joined together with the two other Far Eastern League members China and Japan in the League of Nations in any form of an Asian block or an

Asian coalition. This policy – a consequence of the Western orientation of Siam’s foreign policy in general – was clearly indicated already during the formative years of the League, as Japan and China lobbied for a stronger Asian role in the European-dominated League of Nations. They repeatedly – and unsuccessfully – pressed for something of an “Asian quota” in League bodies and even for an amendment to the League’s Covenant, laying down the equality of Asian people to those of Western countries.13 Japan, in par- ticular, was pressing for such a racial equality clause from early 1919, but, because of the strong opposition from Britain and France, for whose Asian colonies this would have entailed serious problems, Siam was careful not to associate itself with this proposal. After Japan’s proposal was defeated for the first time, it again brought it up twice, only to see it defeated twice again. Strikingly, while for Siam League membership was to be obtained under more or less any circumstance, the repeated defeat of the racial equality pro- posal – and the perceived position of inferiority it entailed – led Japanese

10 _{Foreign Office Circular, 24 June 1924, PRO, FO 371/10575, W 5281/5281/98; Johns to}

MacDonald, 25 August 1924, PRO, FO 371/10575, W 8322/5281/98.

11 _{Annual Report on Siam for 1936, PRO, FO 371/21053, F 1067/1067/40, p. 14.} 12

“Unimpaired Balance in World Friendships is Watchword of Thai Foreign Policy”, in: Siam Today, Illustrated Review, First Issue, July B.E. 2479 (1936), published by the Government Publicity Bureau, Bangkok, p. 9, in: PRO, FO 371/20300, F 6050/216/40.

13 _{See Naoko Shimazu, Japan, Race and Equality: The Racial Equality Proposal of 1919,}

London and New York: Routledge, 1998; Masatoshi Matsushita, Japan in the League of Na- tions, New York: Columbia University Press, 1929, p. 25ff.

diplomats to even seriously reconsider joining the League of Nations at all.14 During the League General Assembly of 1921, this movement also resounded in Bangkok, where the Bangkok Times noted somewhat bemused that the whole Far East was suddenly crying for equality, democracy and autonomy. Siam was, according to the paper, luckily showing “modesty and at least avoids making herself ridiculous.”15 But much more than modesty, Siam’s striking absence from this movement reflected its traditional foreign policy focus on Britain and France, rather than on Japan and China, as well as its traditional policy of neutrality, which it would have left by aligning itself with its two Asian neighbours. Thai foreign policy during the post-war years was clearly avoiding any move which would offend Britain or France and jeopardize the overriding policy aim of revising the unequal treaties. Prince Charoon expressed his anxiety over this the racial equality proposal in 1919:

The Japanese are considering whether they will bring up the question before the full sitting of the Conference for a final vote. If so, it will be awkward for us, because as a principle for our self-respect we are bound to vote for it, but it may not be politic to do so in view of our aims.16

Although the situation anticipated by Prince Charoon did not arise, his note underscores the priority of Siam’s foreign policy during the immediate post-war years: to avoid any action which would offend the Western Powers and make it more difficult to press them for revised treaties with Siam. Ja- pan’s failure during the formative stage of the League, despite its position as the dominant power in East Asia, served as a prime example for Siam of how

not to act in the new multilateral stage.

An expression of the same policy could be witnessed during the General Assembly in 1921, when Japan proposed that the League undertake a feasi- bility study as to whether Esperanto should be taught in League member states – a proposal which was designed to symbolically counter European cultural dominance. The proposal, which eventually disappeared from the agenda without any follow-up, was supported by all Asian member states except Siam. Again, Siam took care not to support any motion which could potentially disturb France or Britain.17

Siam had high hopes for the League of Nations. But Thai officials in charge of foreign policy during the post-war years were also very much real- ists; Prince Devawongse and Prince Charoon did not believe that complete sovereignty would be regained overnight. And they quickly realized that the aims of the League’s covenant and the policies of Great Britain, France and other League members were, to put it mildly, not always fully consistent. It 14 _{Shimazu, Japan, Race and Equality, p. 49. Shimazu provides no evidence that Japanese}

diplomats approached Prince Charoon or his colleagues, and Siam is not mentioned at all in the study.

15 _{TNA, Bangkok Times, 13 September 1921.}

16 _{Prince Charoon to Prince Devawongse, 17 April 1919, TNA, KT 96.1/1.}

17 _{See Matsushita, Japan and the League, p. 51f. See also Prince Devawongse to Nitobe}

was this sense realism which prevented Thai diplomats from forcing their demands for treaty revision onto the League’s agenda and into the interna-