Las piedritas los hacían presentes

To answer the research questions, a composite measure for the performance of each kind of reform in different locations was necessary, that could provide a basis for comparison and policy decision. Since policy choices are neither a-contextual nor value-neutral, whatever claims might be made to the contrary, the attempt was not to develop an ‘objective’ set of measures. Instead, the comparison is made on the basis of universally valued objectives, and logic, and both are made explicit.

In this study, five indicators have been used to assess the effectiveness of water supply, and three indicators to assess extent of women’s participation, as below:

A. Effectiveness –

1. Increase in per capita availability in the village,

2. Change in the extent of disparity between households dependant on private and public sources.

3. Increase in the number of households with private sources/ connections,

4. Improvement in access to public sources, and

5. Reduction in the number of households dependant on unsafe sources. B. Participation –

1. Proportion of earmarked seats occupied

2. Proportion of opportunities for participation in executive meetings that are used, relative to men and

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3. Proportion of opportunites for participation in assemblies that are used, relative to men.

The question is first, whether all the indicators are of equal value or importance in a policy context, and second, whether effectiveness and participation should be equally valued. I have argued before that efficiency is less relevant than effectiveness in assessing the performance of the arrangements for water provision, particularly in developing situations where access to even small quantities is an issue.179 _{For the same} reason, I argue that the propensity of the institutional arrangements to increase

disparities cannot be assigned the same wieght as their capability to improve water availability or access, though it merits more consideration than the question of efficiency. Also, in the context of a publicly provided, essential service, particularly when the provision levels are very close to the minimum required for survival, a wider distribution of moderate benefits is arguably more valuable that substantially greater benefis distributed across much smaller segments of the population. Finally, in the case of essential supplies of domestic water, effective provision cannot be fully discounted on considerations of (non)participation, though the latter certainly must be accorded some weight for the control it accords to users over a critical resource, in addition to its sheer democratic value180_.

179

This is because the supply of life-sustaining quantities of a natural resource cannot be weighed down by considerations of cost or effort. Though the question of who should bear the costs is important and widely debated.

180

This valuation becomes easy if we consider that given a choice between getting water through a completely non-participatory process and having a participatory process that is not effectively making water available, the first emerged as the better option and the choice of users in almost all locations. The criticality of the resource particularly under circumstances of severely reduced availability largely outweighs other concerns. At the same time, ceding complete control over the supply mechanisms for such a critical resource to others is also a dangerous proposition.

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In relation to effectiveness, other considerations such as improvements in quality of water and reliability of supply are also important. The quality dimension is already included as only water supply from ‘safe sources’ have been considered181_{. Similarly,} the extent of spaces created in the structure for women, in how many organizational components (eg., in Panchayats, its Committees, VWSCs, Beneficiary Committees), and the type and extent of provisions (such as quorum requirements) are also

important measures. However, most of these are measures of efficacy – that is, of the potential of the institutional design – rather than actual participation, and since only the latter is being considered here, they have not been included182_.

In view of these considerations, and since per-capita increase in availability, increase in number of households with private connections, improvements in access (i.e., in bringing shared sources closer to users) and reduction in the proportion of the

households dependant on unsafe sources are all important but different measures, they have all been accorded equal value in the composite score.183 The disparity between those with household connections and those without must also be considered, and accorded atleast the same importance as any of these four from a policy perspective. Ofcourse, increase in the disparity before and after the new system was installed is negatively valued and any decrease positively. In a composite score for effectiveness, therefore, all five indicators are accorded 20% weightage each.

181

Despite the ‘safety’ of the new sources, cases of contamination during particular seasons have emerged in the study, such as the SR project in Nilamootil in Kerala. This issue requires separate and further investigation and assessment, which has not been included in this study.

182

The rationale for not considering efficacy is that in making policy, the effects or outcomes are of more interest than a theoretical consideration of efficacy. Moreover, the performance of institutional arrangements is a function of both the efficacy of its design and its appropriateness to the context.

183

Without systematic study to ascertain the importance that users and policy-makers accord to these dimensions, there is no particular basis for privileging any aspect over the other. Moreover, in the policy documents all these are stated objectives, with no emphasis on any one; in practice, however, an overriding concern with achieving minimum per-capita availability – without any measures of disparity in distribution – emerged in the interviews with government officers and in the data that was sourced from them.

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Similarly, all three indicators used to assess participation are, arguably, equally important, and a composite indicator of participation that combines the three in equal measure is justifiable. Also, in this study, women’s participation is assessed in relation to that of men, with the reasoning that this would eliminate the effect of non-gendered factors (such as class or caste considerations) that handicap both men and women.

For an aggregate measure that combines effectiveness and participation in each case, effectiveness is taken to be atleast twice as important as participatory functioning. While this valuation is arbitrary to an extent (why not less, equal, or even more important?), it is based on the conclusion from the months of fieldwork and the conversations with users that faced with a choice between an additional 10 litres of water on a base of 40-60 litres (which is the average in most places), and

unconstrained opportunities to participate in the decision-making process, almost all marginalized users would choose the former immediately. This is true both of lower- income users for whom participation carries non-negligible opportunity costs in livelihood terms, and for higher-income (typically, also upper caste) women who would have to contravene social norms and o not expect participation to yield any additional benefits. In light of these considerations, both from the perspective of users and policy makers who have broader concerns of equity and coverage, the indicators which are considered, their relative weights and method for assigning and combining performance scores for each is described in Table 2.7. The derived scores are more notional than statistical, but they also include a measure of the quantitative changes that are produced by the reforms.

163 Table 2.7

Derivation of composite scores for comparision of devolved and liberalized governance arrangements

The operations on the data shown in Table 2.7 enabled three kinds of comparison: 1. Between devolved arrangements in the three States (cases G-PR, K-PR and MP-

PR).

2. Between liberalized arrangements in the three States (the cases G-SR, K-SR and MP-SR).

3. Between devolved and liberalized arrangements in each State (G-PR and G-SR, K-PR and K-SR and MP-PR and MP-SR)

Para- meter

Indicator % Change in state average

after new project

Performance score = % change / 10 Relative weight EFFECTIVENE SS

Per capitawater availability A = (avg qty after – avg qty before) *100 / avg qty before

A / 10 = A1 20%

12.5%

Households with private connection

B = avg % after – avg % before B / 10 = B1 20% 12.5% Households <50m from

safe pub source

C = avg % after – avg % before C / 10 = C1 20% 12.5% Households dependant on

unsafe safe sources

D= (avg % before – avg % after)

D / 10 = D1 20% 12.5%

Disparity between Hh with pvt conn and hh without

E = (avg disparity before – avg disparity after)

E / 10 = E1 20% 12.5%

TOTAL SCORE FOR EFFECTIVENESS…. EFF= Sum(A1…E1) 100% 62.5%

PARTICIP

ATI

O

N

Earmarked seats occupied by women

X = 100-(State avg % reserved – state avg %occupied)

X / 10 = X1 33.3% 12.5%

% of meetings in executive body attended by women

Y = avg % att by women – avg % att by men

Y / 10 = Y1 33.3% 12.5%

% of meetings in general body attended by women

Z = avg % att by women – avg % att by men

Z / 10 = Z1 33.3% 12.5%

TOTAL SCORE FOR PARTICIPATION….. PART= _Sum(X1…Z1) 100% 37.5%

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Further, from the detailed understanding of the encounters between the governance arrangements and the context at the State and local levels gleaned in the case studies, two kinds of relationships discussed in the literature could be explored – between extent of decentralization and extents of effectiveness and inclusion, and between extent of participation and effectiveness of outcomes.

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CHAPTER III