Los pilares de la educación

Experience of the last decades show that whether or not an innovation is adopted by farmers depends not on technical and economic aspects alone, but also on the farmer's life-context – in other words: it depends on the farmer's livelihood system as a whole. To illustrate this we use the example of a typical cotton farmer in the research region. Though fictive in nature, the example is a synthesis based on exploratory interviews with organic farmers associated with Maikaal bioRe. For easier reference we call the farmer Vishnu Gangaram.

The example of Vishnu Gangaram

Vishnu Gangaram and his wife Santubai belong to the Patidar community, a farmer caste. Together with their two sons and their daughter they live in a simple house in the village Choli, some 20 km off the Narmada River. The family owns 10 acres (4 ha) of land, half of which can be irrigated from a well, while the remaining is solely rainfed and of low fertility. It is used to cultivate fodder crops for a small cattle herd consisting of two bullocks and 2 milk cows. The family grows cotton as their main cash crop, and sorghum, maize, wheat and pulses for both home consumption and selling. Vishnu Gangaram feels strongly attached to his land that he inherited from his parents, and would not consider selling even the less fertile pieces of land.

As most farmers in the region, Vishnu Gangaram started using chemical fertilizers, pesticides and cotton hybrid varieties in the mid 1970s, following the example of the wealthier farmers in his village. At that time, the agricultural department promoted the use of the modern technology and provided fertilizers at subsidised prices. In the beginning, the village elders had a sceptic attitude to applying fertilizers and pesticides, as they feared it would harm ‘mother earth’. But as the new technology package resulted in a considerable boost of yields, it soon was adopted by a majority of the farmers, and the application of fertilizers and pesticides became a status symbol. From the mid 1980s, however, Vishnu Gangaram observed changes in the fertility of the soil – the fields became more difficult to plough, and the soil became so hard that he had to give up groundnut cultivation. He also noticed that he required more rounds of irrigation to sustain the crop – “the soil had become thirstier”.

As cotton yields declined and the crop was affected by pests that had not been a problem before, he increased the quantity of fertilizers and pesticides. At times, there were rumours in the village that the traders cheated the farmers by selling inputs of inferior quality, but

this claim could not be substantiated. The rising production costs eventually caused a considerable decline in his farm income. At the start of the new cropping season in 1990, he again purchased fertilizers and pesticides on loan basis from the cooperative society27_,

hoping that he would be able to gain more profit this time. As the monsoon was late, the crop did not grow well and the harvest was insufficient to cover the production costs. In the following year, to pay back the loan at the cooperative society and to get new farm inputs, he took up a loan from a money lender, at 35% annual interest. Over the years, his debt burden rose to more than Rs. 100’000 – an amount which he was unlikely to pay back even with years of good production. Although he started realizing that the high-input strategy that once looked so promising had led his family into indebtedness28_{, he saw no}

other option than trying even harder to raise the productivity of his fields with fertilizers and pesticides.

When Maikaal bioRe started promoting organic cotton production in the region in 1992, Vishnu Gangaram took interest in the method that allegedly allowed producing cotton without chemicals, and participated in a farmer meeting organized by the company. However, he feared that his production would go down if he stopped using fertilizers and pesticides, getting him into bigger troubles than he already was facing. He therefore decided to first observe whether the few farmers from his village who had immediately joined the initiative were successful. When two farmers who were known as the most progressive farmers of the village registered with Maikaal bioRe in 1995, he also joined and converted his entire farm to organic management. He attended trainings provided by extension staff of Maikaal bioRe where he learnt that fertilizers are “sucking the soil” and “one needs to give back organic material to the soil to keep it healthy”. Subsequently, he started intercropping pulses, producing compost and liquid organic manures, and preparing botanical pest management agents.

In the first two years of conversion, a period with bad monsoons, his cotton crop did not come up well, and he doubted whether he had taken the right decision. Although the workload for the family had increased for preparing compost and botanical pesticides, his wife insisted trying organic farming for another year. In the third year, yields recovered, as rains were better and the fertility of the soil had improved remarkably. Due to reduced production costs and the 20% price premium for the certified cotton he attained a higher income than before conversion. Even during the dry years 1999–2002, when overall cotton yields declined and some fields completely failed, the family felt that they were better off than their non-organic neighbours, as the organic cultivation involved less input costs. In addition, the crop in organically managed fields seemed to be less affected by the drought, as the soil absorbed and retained moisture better.

During the routine organic inspection of 2003, a year with normal rainfall, it was found that Vishnu Gangaram had applied synthetic fertilizers in his cotton and chilli crop. He was excluded from the organic farmer group, with the result that he had to sell his cotton harvest in the open market at prevailing rates. Economically, the loss of the organic price premium on cotton by far outreached the marginal gain in yields achieved by using fertilizers.

27 _{The cooperative societies in the region provide agricultural loans and distribute fertilizers. For an} overview on cooperatives in India, see http://www.ncui.nic.in/issue.htm.

28 _{Debts need not necessarily be a problem for farmers, as long as their profits allow them to pay for} interests and amortisation. We use the term 'indebtedness' for the situation where the debt burden

Economic and non-economic aspects of livelihoods

The example of Vishnu Gangaram raises a number of questions concerning his decision- making rationale? What was the reasoning behind adopting organic farming? What were the actual and the perceived impacts of conversion on the household? How did they influence their thinking and their relation to farming? Why did he apply chemical fertilizers? If only technological or economic issues were involved in decision-making, why did not all farmers in similar conditions like him adopt organic farming, and why did not all organic farmers apply chemicals in the year of good monsoon? The example illustrates that understanding the adoption and the impact of the innovation ‘organic farming’ requires looking at a multitude of dimensions in the two fields:

• Dimensions of impact: What is the impact of organic farming on the material level (input use, irrigation, yields, soil fertility, etc.)? What changes in the cropping system (crop rotation patterns, intercropping, pest and nutrient management), and what know-how and skills need to be acquired to implement these changes? What effect does conversion have on workload and on gender relations? What is the economic impact (production costs, prices, incomes, debts)? What changes do the individual family members perceive, and how do they interpret them? What risk is involved in conversion, and how do dependencies change? How does conversion influence the social status and the self-image of the farmer?

• Dimensions of adoption: How does the decision-making process leading to adoption take place? What effect do farmers expect from conversion? What is the perceived risk of conversion, and how do farmers cope with it? How do the individual family members value the actual outcome of adopting the innovation? How does the opinion of others influence decision-making, and who are the role models? What role does the promotion of innovations through government or private agencies play? How does the changing context – droughts, market prices, policies, etc. – influence decisions? Altogether, how does conversion to organic farming fit into the livelihood strategy of a household?

To deal with this complexity, we need an approach that covers the relevant dimensions of rural livelihoods and allows us to better understand farmers’ decision-making. In the following section we look at what approaches are available in development theory.