A variety of qualitative studies have found that external assistance can, despite a number of limitations and potential negative side effects, benefit the state building development of de facto states (see e.g. Zartman 1995; Kolstø & Blakkisrud 2008; Caspersen 2015). Abkhazia, for example, would have been unable “to fulfil its obligations towards the population without relying heavily on external support and infrastructure” (Kolstø & Blakkisrud 2008: 495). Particularly great power patrons appear to play a significant role in shaping the domestic and international realities of de facto states by facilitating wider international recognition and arguably even encouraging a level of state building (Sterio 2010; Coggins 2011; Caspersen 2015: 6).
Table 12 State Building if Patron State is Present (1) or Not (0)
Patron (Florea) Patron (Spanke)
Degrees of State Building 0 1 0 1 Total
Low 227 66 275 18 293
Moderate 97 72 108 61 169
High 92 166 111 147 258
Very High 3 57 3 57 60
Total 419 361 497 283 780
The descriptive statistics of table 12 suggest that de facto states with a patron tend to have higher degrees of state building than de facto states without patron state relationships across both conceptualisations of patron states. De facto states that have most characteristics of the state and relations with external actors (very high degrees of state building) are rare when a de facto state lacks a patron. The caveat of these descriptive statistics is that the results are likely to be driven by a few units that survive for a long period of time. On the basis of the qualitative literature on patron states, this chapter will test the following hypothesis to capture the direct effect of patron states on de facto states:
𝐇𝟏: Patron states increase a de facto state’s degrees of state building and number of governance institutions.
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5.1.1 Triadic Competition: Relative Power of Patron and Parent States
The state and institution building processes of de facto states do not take place in a geopolitical vacuum. The involvement of patron states in de facto states or secessionist regions transforms dyadic relationships between the de facto or secessionist state with its parent state into a triadic relationship. Thereby, patron states have a consequential effect on the equilibrium of the involved parties, their power relations and bargaining positions (Siroky 2009: 38). The relative capabilities of patron states can, for instance, outweigh the economic and military capabilities of the parent state, which may discourage de facto states to pursue further state building in light of the relative security under patron protection. Hence, it is insufficient to account for the presence of patron states, but instead the competitive position and strength of both the parent and patron state need to be considered (Kolstø & Blakkisrud’s 2008: 507). Therefore, this chapter situates the provision of public services and the development of state capacity in the wider geopolitical environment of de facto states including parent and patron state competition and their relative power capabilities to account for the potential indirect diffusion influence of patron states via patron-parent state competition on state and institution building in de facto states.
Most de facto states with a patron state are situated in a geopolitical context where their patrons are militarily stronger (16 out of 17 de facto states), whereas the relative economic capabilities are more evenly divided across parent and patron states (11 out of 17 patrons have a higher GDP per capita). The economic capability results are likely to be informed by the on average higher population counts in patron states compared to parent states, which naturally influences the GDP per capita numbers. Table 13 outlines this division across relative military and economic capabilities (see appendix J for exact breakdown). The above cited literature informs the following hypothesis that captures indirect competitive diffusion influences of patron states on de facto states:
𝐇𝟐: The stronger the parent state compared to the patron state, the likelier de facto states pursue state and institution building.
135 Table 13 Relative Military and Economic Power between Patron and Parent State40
Military Economy
De Facto State More Powerful Patron More Powerful Parent More Powerful Patron More Powerful Parent
Abkhazia √ √ Ajaria √ √ Anjouan √ √ Biafra √ √ Eastern Slavonia √ √ Gaza √ √ Katanga √ √ Kosovo √ √ Krajina √ √ Nagorno- Karabakh √ √ Northern Cyprus √ √ Republika Srpska √ √ South Ossetia √ √ Taiwan √ √ Tamil Eelam √ √ Transnistria √ √ Western Sahara √ √
5.1.2 Patrons and Temporal State Building Patterns of De Facto States
De facto states represent entities that encapsulate a wide spectrum of state building paces and experiences. On the one extreme, cases such as Karen State survive for decades without experiencing any significant state or institution building development. On the other extreme, Taiwan shared most characteristics of a state as early as the first year of its existence. Most de facto states depict at least some state building progress that takes place within either of these extremes, such as Abkhazia, which attained coherent governance structures within a period of seven years.
Yet, the role of time is rarely featured as a central component in the analyses of state and institution building processes in de facto states. Still, temporal considerations occasionally emerge in some de facto state studies. Zabarah (2012), for instance, highlights the relevance of the initial state building phase for the overall success of both Transnistria and Gagauzia. Caspersen (2012: 90) agrees with the relevance of the initial state building process in particular for establishing domestic
40 I compared the Composite indicator of National Capability and GDP per capita variables of
both the parent and patron state. If the difference is negative (parent strength minus patron strength), this indicates that over the measured period, the patron was on average militarily more powerful or had a higher GDP per capita.
136 control. The beginning stages of Somaliland’s independence campaign focused predominantly on ensuring security and obtaining revenue, which encouraged state building by uniting the nation (Johnson & Smaker 2014: 6). Yemelianova (2015: 60- 61) touches on the role of time as a variable in the state building processes of de facto states by determining the year by which Abkhazia had formed all central governance institutions. Blakkisrud and Kolstø (2011: 178) not only argue that “the time factor will eventually transform secessionists into state-builders,” but also offer arguably the most extensive overview of state building from a quasi-temporal perspective by disentangling the state building process into three (overlapping) phases. The first phase involves the securing of physical control over the de facto territory. The second phase establishes the monopoly of legitimate use of force and basic public service provision. The third step focuses on creating state capacity.
This chapter contributes to these findings by testing whether similar temporal patterns as those identified by Zabarah (2012), Caspersen (2012), Johnson and Smaker (2014) and Blakkisrud and Kolstø (2011) can be identified across the 34 de facto states in the data set and in what ways these temporal patterns can be shaped by the patron:
𝐇𝟑: Patrons decrease the time it takes for de facto states to achieve state and institution building.
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