Dimensión II: Actitudinal Participativa.
A: Pioneros que culminan la etapa Moncadista.
3.1. Parfit favors prioritarianism over egalitarianism partly because he feels the
force of the levelling down objection. This objection is meant to reveal the
implausibility of claiming that equality has non-instrumental value and thus the
implausibility of telic egalitarianism. If the objection succeeds the telic
egalitarian component of Cohen’s egalitarian-prioritarian ethic is implausible, and we ought to instead favor some form of deontic egalitarianism or
prioritarianism, since neither is committed to the claim that equality has non-
instrumental value, and thus neither is susceptible to the levelling down
objection. But, as Parfit recognizes, the levelling down objection does not
decisively show telic egalitarianism to be implausible. 24
If an individual believes an egalitarian state of affairs has non-
instrumental value, even if she believes we ought not to pursue it all things
considered, she nevertheless believes it is in one way better than the relevant
inequality regardless of how it is realized. To illustrate, let us consider that
famous example of Robert Nozick’s where the realization of equality of outcome requires the coercive redistribution of body parts (Nozick, 1974, p. 206). In a
world where half the population is sighted and the other half is blind, equality of
outcome requires that we redistribute one eye from each of the sighted to each of
the blind. If any of the sighted is unwilling to donate an eye to the blind, then,
equality of outcome requires coercive redistribution. Of course, to believe that
the egalitarian state of affairs in which everyone has one eye is in one way better
than the relevant inequality, is not to believe that we ought to engage in coercive
redistribution of people’s eyes. One can believe that the egalitarian state of affairs has non-instrumental value, and believe it does because it is fair, whilst
maintaining that other considerations (e.g., Rawlsian basic liberties; control
rights of self-ownership; Shefflerian agent-centered prerogatives25) trump
equality in this case. But, egalitarian states of affairs can be realized by levelling
down; that is, by making everyone as badly off as the worst-off. In Nozick’s
example this requires making everyone blind. To believe an egalitarian state of
affairs has non-instrumental value is therefore to believe that making everyone as
relevantly badly off as the worst-off is in one way better than the relevant
inequality. According to the levelling down objection that belief is implausible,
because a state of affairs cannot be in any way better than another when it is
better for no one. Thus, equality does not have non-instrumental value.
The levelling down objection: To believe an egalitarian state of affairs has
non-instrumental value is to believe that its realization by making
everyone as badly off as the worst-off is in one way better than the
relevant inequality. That is implausible, because a state of affairs is not in
any way better than another state of affairs when it is better for no one.
Thus, equality does not have non-instrumental value.26
3.2. Cohen has little to say about the levelling down objection. He points out, as I
have (and in a manner that supports my interpretation of his view), only that to
believe equality has non-instrumental value is not to believe we ought to level
down all things considered.
[T]he egalitarian can say that she would not level down, because
equality isn’t everything, but nevertheless maintain that equality, as such, is in one way better than its absence: something of value
is lost, because there is an unfairness, and therefore a kind of
injustice, when some have more than others through no relevant
fault or choice of anyone. The levelling down objection is not
thereby eliminated, for some would deny that a world in which
everyone is blind is in any way better than one in which some, but
not all, can see… But, however that may be, it is important that those who think that the all-blind world is in one way better are
not thereby committed to plucking out the eyes of the sighted in a
world where some are blind and some are not.
(Cohen, 2011h, p. 231)
This pluralist response to the levelling down objection does, as Cohen
says, make an important point, but it does not, as Cohen recognizes, refute the
objection. The levelling down objection does not hold that to believe equality has
non-instrumental value is to be implausibly committed to levelling down all
things considered. Rather, it holds that to believe equality has non-instrumental
value is to implausibly believe levelling down would be in one way better when
it cannot be in any way better because it is better for no one. In order to refute the
levelling down objection telic egalitarians must therefore refute the person-
affecting claim27, which says that states of affairs cannot be in any way better or
worse than another when there are no persons for whom it affects for better or
worse. If the person-affecting claim is false, if states of affairs can be in one way
better or worse than another when there are no persons for whom it is better or
worse, and an egalitarian state of affairs realized by leveling down is an example
of this, it is plausible to claim that levelling down (e.g., the all-blind world) is in
one way better (because fair) than the relevant inequality, and the levelling down
objection fails to disprove the non-instrumental value of equality.
27 Temkin refers to the person-affecting claim as ‘the Slogan’ (Temkin, 2002, p. 132). I prefer to
Temkin mounts a sustained challenge to the person-affecting claim on the
grounds that it runs contrary to other commonly held beliefs (Temkin, 2002, pp.
137-146).28 For example, in his ‘saints and sinners’ example he appeals to
commonly held beliefs about desert. If A represents people who live ethically
whereas B represents mass murders, we tend to believe state of affairs x: A 8, B
2, is in one way better than state of affairs y: A 8, B 10, even though state of
affairs x is better for no one. Correspondingly, as Temkin says, most ‘believe
there would be something morally bad about the evilest mass murders faring
better than the most benign saints, even if [as in state of affairs y] there was no
one for whom it was worse’ (Temkin, 2002, p. 139). If these beliefs are
plausible, then so is the belief that states of affairs can be in one way better or
worse regardless of how persons are affected for better or worse.
Of course, any comprehensive refutation of the person-affecting claim
cannot be made solely by appeal to commonly held beliefs, because our
commonly held beliefs may not reflect the true nature of morality. To
comprehensively refute the person-affecting claim would require defending a
meta-ethical theory from which it cannot be derived; a substantial undertaking I
shall not attempt. Temkin’s challenge nevertheless provides sufficient reason to doubt its truth, and referring to it, Cohen declares that he too rejects the person-
affecting claim (Cohen, 2011h, p. 233).
Yet, even if the person-affecting claim is false, for telic egalitarians to
escape the levelling down objection it must additionally be true that equality has
non-person-affecting value in the sense that desert has non-person-affecting
value in Temkin’s saints and sinners example. That is to say, it must be true that there is something morally good about the all-blind world as compared with the
world in which half are sighted and half are blind. Many think not, and
consequently feel the force of the levelling down objection. My intuition,
however, is that there is something morally good about the all-blind world as
compared with the world in which half are sighted and half are blind, and that
something is fairness; the all-blind world is fairer than the world in which half
are sighted and half are blind through no fault or choice of their own. Thus, I
share Temkin and Cohen’s view that, although we ought not to level down, some
kind of luck egalitarian social state of affairs – because fair – has non-
instrumental value and thus is in one way better than the unequal alternative even
when it is better for no one. The force of the levelling down does not therefore, at
least in my view, show the telic egalitarian component of Cohen’s egalitarian- prioritarian ethic to be implausible.